Dorcas Njenga v. Alberto Gonzales ( 2007 )


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  •                     United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 05-3088
    ___________
    Dorcas Tabitha Njenga,                *
    *
    Petitioner,              *
    * Petition for Review of a Final
    v.                             * Decision of the Board of
    * Immigration Appeals.
    Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General    *
    of the United States of America,      *     [UNPUBLISHED]
    *
    Respondent.              *
    ___________
    Submitted: March 16, 2007
    Filed: March 30, 2007
    ___________
    Before MELLOY, SMITH, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Dorcas Tabitha Njenga, a native and citizen of Kenya, petitioned for asylum.
    The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied the petition. The Board of Immigration Appeals
    (BIA) affirmed. Njenga now seeks review. We deny the petition.
    Njenga arrived in the United States on a temporary visa that authorized her to
    stay until September 2001. She overstayed her visa and, in 2002, Njenga applied for
    asylum, withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture
    (CAT).
    Njenga, now age 26, submitted four grounds in support of her petition. She
    feared, if returned to Kenya, that: (1) her uncles and aunts would pressure her
    immediate family to subject her to Female Genital Mutilation (FGM); (2) she would
    be unable to receive a nursing education in Kenya; (3) she would become a victim of
    the country's high crime rate and (4) her brothers would be unable to protect her from
    the country's crime and her extended family's desire to subject her to FGM. Njenga
    was the sole witness in her hearing. The IJ found that her fears were not objectively
    reasonable and denied Njenga's petition. The BIA affirmed. Njenga appeals only the
    denial of asylum.
    Njenga is eligible for asylum if she establishes that she possesses "a
    well-founded fear of persecution [based upon] race, religion, nationality, membership
    in a particular social group, or political opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
    Denial of asylum is reviewed for abuse of discretion; underlying factual
    findings are reviewed for substantial support by the record. Manivong v. Dist. Dir.,
    United States Dep't of Justice I.N.S., 
    164 F.3d 432
    , 433 (8th Cir.1999). An IJ's factual
    determinations "must be upheld if supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative
    evidence on the record considered as a whole." Tang v. I.N.S., 
    223 F.3d 713
    , 718 (8th
    Cir.2000). "[This] standard is a deferential one, requiring a reviewing court to uphold
    a denial of asylum unless an alien demonstrates that the evidence he presented was so
    compelling that no reasonable fact finder could fail to find the requisite fear of
    persecution." Nyama v. Ashcroft, 
    357 F.3d 812
    , 816 (8th Cir.2004) (internal quotation
    and citation omitted).Where, as here, the BIA affirms the IJ opinion without
    discussion, we review the IJ's opinion directly. Gebrehiwot v. Ashcroft, 
    374 F.3d 723
    ,
    725 (8th Cir. 2004).
    Njenga submitted four grounds for her asylum petition. A lack of educational
    opportunities and a generalized fear of crime are not permissible grounds for asylum.
    Nyonzele v. I.N.S., 
    83 F.3d 975
    , 983 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that "[f]ears of economic
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    hardship or a lack of educational opportunities, however, do not establish a
    well-founded fear of persecution"); Hapidudin v. Gonzales, 126 Fed. Appx. 406 (9th
    Cir. 1005) (unpublished) (holding that generalized fear based upon crime is not a
    ground for asylum or CAT relief). Therefore, Njenga's asylum petition must be rooted
    in a well-founded fear of FGM.
    A well-founded fear of future persecution must be both subjectively genuine
    and objectively reasonable. Chay-Velasquez v. Ashcroft, 
    367 F.3d 751
    (8th Cir. 2004).
    The IJ assumed that Njenga had a credible and reasonable subjective fear of FGM.
    However, the IJ determined that this fear was not objectively reasonable.
    The IJ based its conclusion that Njenga's fear of FGM was not objectively
    reasonable on several factual findings: (1) Njenga had managed to live in Kenya into
    her twenties without being subjected to FGM; (2) Njenga admitted to her asylum
    officer that FGM is rarely performed on adults; (3) Njenga's parents, grandparents,
    and siblings all oppose FGM; (4) Njenga stated that if she were returned, then she
    would most likely live in Nairobi, the Kenyan capital, where the practice of FGM is
    rare; (6) only 38% of the Kenyan female population had undergone FGM, most of the
    victims living in rural communities; and (7) the Kenyan government had outlawed the
    practice of FGM.
    Njenga does not dispute any of these findings. The IJ's determination that
    Njenga lacked an objectively reasonable well-founded fear of future persecution is
    amply supported by the record. Her petition is denied.
    ______________________________
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