Ralph E. McCarthy v. Beal Bank , 192 F. App'x 560 ( 2006 )


Menu:
  •                      United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 05-2453
    ___________
    Ralph E. McCarthy,                    *
    *
    Appellant,               *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                              * District Court for the
    * Western District of Missouri.
    Beal Bank, SSB; Missouri Capital      *
    Mortgage; John Vacey, doing business *
    as Missouri Capital Mortgage;         * [UNPUBLISHED]
    Springfield Title Company; Trustee    *
    Does, 1 to 10,                        *
    *
    Appellees.               *
    ___________
    Submitted: August 4, 2006
    Filed: August 11, 2006
    ___________
    Before RILEY, COLLOTON, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Ralph McCarthy appeals from the district court’s1 adverse judgment on his
    claims arising out of the foreclosure of real property he used to secure a defaulted
    bank loan. Upon careful review of the issues raised on appeal, we affirm.
    1
    The Honorable Dean Whipple, Chief Judge, United States District Court for
    the Western District of Missouri.
    First, we hold that the district court did not err in instructing the jury not to
    consider evidence regarding issues McCarthy was foreclosed from raising due to his
    failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See Tri-State Hotels, Inc. v. FDIC, 
    79 F.3d 707
    , 712 (8th Cir. 1996) (judicial review of claims governed by Financial
    Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) is contingent on
    completion of administrative process); Am. First Fed., Inc. v. Lake Forest Park, Inc.,
    
    198 F.3d 1259
    , 1263 n.3 (11th Cir. 1999) (holder of note purchased from Resolution
    Trust Corp. (RTC) stands in shoes of RTC and acquires RTC’s protected status under
    FIRREA; thus, if maker of note was barred from asserting claim against RTC, it is
    similarly barred from asserting claim against note holder). Second, we hold that the
    district court did not abuse its discretion in denying McCarthy’s motion to amend his
    complaint. See United States ex rel. Lee v. Fairview Health Sys., 
    413 F.3d 748
    , 749
    (8th Cir. 2005) (abuse-of-discretion standard; futility is valid basis for denying leave
    to amend complaint); Bediako v. Stein Mart, Inc., 
    354 F.3d 835
    , 841 (8th Cir. 2004)
    (district court did not abuse its broad discretion in denying plaintiff’s motion for leave
    to amend complaint where litigation process was already in advanced stage and
    plaintiff sought to add theories not presented in original complaint). Finally, we
    conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding as a trial
    exhibit an agreement McCarthy concedes was negotiated in an effort to settle his
    claim. See Fed. R. Evid. 408 (as general rule, evidence of offer of valuable
    consideration to compromise claim is not admissible to prove liability for claim or its
    amount; evidence of statements made in compromise negotiations likewise not
    admissible); Kraft v. St. John Lutheran Church, 
    414 F.3d 943
    , 947 (8th Cir. 2005)
    (review for abuse of discretion). While McCarthy now contends that the agreement
    was “offered to show a Redemption agreement,” he has failed to show that he ever
    presented such an argument to the district court.
    The judgment is affirmed. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.
    ______________________________
    -2-