United States v. Todd Manuel Griffin ( 2006 )


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  •                      United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 06-1285
    ___________
    United States of America,                *
    *
    Appellant,                  *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                                 * District Court for the
    * Western District of Arkansas
    Todd Manuel Griffin,                     *
    *       [UNPUBLISHED]
    Appellee.                   *
    ___________
    Submitted: September 26, 2006
    Filed: October 24, 2006
    ___________
    Before ARNOLD, BYE, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Todd Griffin pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C.
    § 1343 and the district court1 sentenced him to 30 months' imprisonment. Mr. Griffin
    appeals and we affirm.
    Mr. Griffin admitted to committing wire fraud by forging a signature on a
    contract to purchase realty and faxing the signature page from Louisiana to an attorney
    in Arkansas; the forged document induced three clients of the attorney to invest
    1
    The Honorable Harry F. Barnes, United States District Judge for the Western
    District of Arkansas.
    substantial sums of money to buy the land to resell it to the person whose signature
    had been forged. As part of his plea agreement, Mr. Griffin agreed to pay restitution
    to the three investors and another party whom Mr. Griffin had defrauded. The district
    court decided that only losses to these four victims would count for restitution
    purposes, thus deviating from the presentence report that had recommended the
    inclusion of losses to several other people whom Mr. Griffin had allegedly bilked in
    other, similar schemes. The court also decided to use the losses of only those four
    persons to calculate the sentencing guideline range.
    The court then concluded that the appropriate guideline range for sentencing
    Mr. Griffin was 30 to 37 months and sentenced him to the low end of that range. On
    appeal, Mr. Griffin maintains that his sentence was unreasonable. We review the
    reasonableness of a sentence for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Sanchez,
    
    429 F.3d 753
    , 755 (8th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). "A sentence is reasonable and not an
    abuse of discretion if the sentencing court considers the matters contained in
    18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), does not consider inappropriate matters, and makes no clear error
    of judgment." 
    Id. Mr. Griffin
    contends that the district court erred by considering information
    about victims other than the four previously mentioned when deciding whether to
    impose a sentence below the guideline range, because the court had already agreed not
    to use that information when determining the guideline range itself or the amount of
    restitution. While the court chose not to use a number of victim impact statements for
    loss calculation under the guidelines, it explained that it would not use those
    allegations for purposes "other than the fact of prior conduct." It is familiar law that
    a district court may consider prior similar conduct that does not result in a conviction
    when sentencing a defendant. Indeed, § 3553(a)(1) specifically directs the district
    court to consider "the history ... of the defendant" before imposing a particular
    sentence. Cf. United States v. Bistrup, 
    449 F.3d 873
    , 883 (8th Cir. 2006).
    -2-
    Accordingly, the district court did not err when it took Mr. Griffin's prior conduct into
    account in choosing whether to sentence him below the advisory guideline range.
    Mr. Griffin also argues that under § 3553(a)(1), the only "history" of the
    defendant that a district court can consider for sentencing purposes are facts that the
    defendant admits or that a jury or court sitting as a factfinder has determined to be
    true. But here the district court in fact found that Mr. Griffin had engaged in other
    criminal conduct. Perhaps Mr. Griffin means to imply that the victim impact
    statements were inadmissible at the sentencing hearing because they were hearsay.
    But we have consistently held that reliable hearsay can serve as evidence for
    sentencing purposes. See e.g., United States v. Wallace, 
    408 F.3d 1046
    , 1048 (8th Cir.
    2005)(per curiam), cert. denied, 
    126 S. Ct. 816
    (2005); United States v. Shevi, 
    345 F.3d 675
    , 679 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 
    540 U.S. 1166
    (2004). It is appropriate
    to consider that type of evidence "because the sentencing process requires the fullest
    information possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics." United
    States v. Manuel, 
    912 F.2d 204
    , 207 (8th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). We note,
    moreover, that Mr. Griffin gave a statement at the sentencing hearing in which he
    mentioned by name some people (other than the four victims referred to earlier) who
    had prepared victim impact statements, and he apologized to them for his conduct.
    Affirmed.
    ______________________________
    -3-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 06-1285

Judges: Arnold, Bye, Melloy, Per Curiam

Filed Date: 10/24/2006

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024