Sarah A. Engelhart v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart , 207 F. App'x 739 ( 2006 )


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  •                       United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 05-3687
    ___________
    Sarah A. Engelhart,                    *
    *
    Appellant,                *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                               * District Court for the
    * District of Nebraska.
    Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of *
    the Social Security Administration,    * [UNPUBLISHED]
    *
    Appellee.                 *
    ___________
    Submitted: November 7, 2006
    Filed: December 5, 2006
    ___________
    Before MURPHY, BYE, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Sarah A. Engelhart appeals the district court’s1 decision affirming the denial of
    supplemental security income and disability insurance benefits. In her 2001
    applications, Engelhart alleged disability since August 2000 from dyslexia. After a
    September 2003 hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Engelhart’s
    severe impairments were a verbal borderline intellectual functioning level, low-
    average overall intelligence, and dyslexia. The ALJ noted that a recent post traumatic
    1
    The Honorable Lyle E. Strom, United States District Judge for the District of
    Nebraska.
    stress disorder diagnosis had been considered. The ALJ found, however, that
    Englehart’s impairments were not of listing-level severity, that she and her witness
    were not entirely credible, and that her residual functional capacity (RFC) did not
    preclude her past relevant work as a production helper or housekeeper, or other jobs
    a vocational expert had identified. Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm.
    See Pelkey v. Barnhart, 
    433 F.3d 575
    , 577-78 (8th Cir. 2006) (standard of review).
    We find that the ALJ’s credibility determination is entitled to deference. See
    Vester v. Barnhart, 
    416 F.3d 886
    , 889 (8th Cir. 2005) (this court defers to ALJ’s
    credibility determinations as to witnesses so long as they are supported by good
    reasons and substantial evidence). As to the ALJ’s RFC findings, they are consistent
    with Engelhart’s testimony that she thought she could learn tasks by demonstration,
    with the type of work that Engelhart had performed in the past, and with the RFC
    findings of evaluating psychologist William Stone and agency reviewing
    psychologists. See Goff v. Barnhart, 
    421 F.3d 785
    , 790 (8th Cir. 2005) (disability
    claimant has burden to establish RFC); Stormo v. Barnhart, 
    377 F.3d 801
    , 807 (8th
    Cir. 2004) (in determining RFC, ALJ should consider medical records, observations
    of treating physicians and others, and claimant’s own description of her limitations).
    Psychologists Kelly Potts and Lori Wennstedt gave no explanation for their check-list
    opinions that Englehart could not sustain an acceptable work pace, and Dr. Potts gave
    no basis for a global assessment of functioning (GAF) rating of 30. Cf. 
    Goff, 421 F.3d at 791
    (physician’s rating of claimant’s GAF at 58 was inconsistent with his
    opinion that she had extreme limitations); 
    Stormo, 377 F.3d at 805-06
    (treating
    physician’s opinion is given less weight if it consists of vague, conclusory statements
    unsupported by medically acceptable data). The ALJ’s failure to discuss a 2003
    workshop evaluation does not mean it was not considered, and contrary to Engelhart’s
    suggestion, such an evaluation is not per se determinative. See Social Security Ruling
    96-8p, 
    1996 WL 374184
    , at *5 (Social Security Administration July 2, 1996) (listing
    evidence to consider in assessing RFC for initial claims); Craig v. Apfel, 
    212 F.3d 433
    , 436 (8th Cir. 2000) (ALJ is not required to discuss all evidence, and failure to
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    cite specific evidence does not mean it was not considered); Lauritzen v. Weinberger,
    
    514 F.2d 561
    , 564-65 (8th Cir. 1975) (based on workshop evaluation, along with other
    evidence, claimant was disabled). Because we find that the ALJ’s RFC and credibility
    findings are supported by substantial evidence, we also reject Englehart’s challenge
    to the ALJ’s hypothetical. See 
    Stormo, 377 F.3d at 808-09
    (hypothetical is sufficient
    if it sets forth impairments supported by substantial evidence and accepted as true by
    ALJ).
    Accordingly, we affirm.
    ______________________________
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