United States v. Seneca Harrison ( 2022 )


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  •                  United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 21-1340
    ___________________________
    United States of America
    lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    Seneca Harrison
    lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City
    ____________
    Submitted: September 19, 2022
    Filed: October 17, 2022
    [Unpublished]
    ____________
    Before COLLOTON, WOLLMAN, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    PER CURIAM.
    Seneca Harrison knowingly exhibited a handgun in an angry or threatening
    manner in the presence of one or more persons in 2008. He was thereafter convicted
    of unlawful use of a weapon – exhibiting, in violation of 
    Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.030.1
    (4).
    Following failed plea negotiations and a bench trial, Harrison was convicted
    in 2018 of unlawful possession of a firearm as a previously convicted felon, in
    violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 922
    (g)(1) and 924(a)(2). He was sentenced to 92 months’
    imprisonment. On appeal, we concluded that the district court had committed plain
    error by participating in the plea negotiations in violation of Federal Rule of Criminal
    Procedure 11(c)(1). We vacated Harrison’s sentence and remanded the matter with
    instructions that it be assigned to a different judge. United States v. Harrison, 
    974 F.3d 880
    , 883 (8th Cir. 2020). We issued the following instructions:
    On remand, in addition to the usual factors, see 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a), the
    court can consider the procedural history of the case, including the
    likelihood that Harrison would have pleaded guilty without the error and
    what his sentence might have been had he done so. Cf. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1
    cmt. n.2 (explaining that, “[i]n rare situations,” even “a defendant who
    puts the government to its burden of proof at trial” may still qualify for
    an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction).
    Id.
    The newly assigned district judge1 calculated Harrison’s advisory sentencing
    range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. The court determined that his base
    offense level was 20 because his 2008 Missouri offense constituted a “crime of
    violence.” See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). It also denied any offense-level reduction
    for acceptance of responsibility. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. With a total offense level of
    24 and a criminal history category of V, Harrison’s Guidelines sentencing range was
    92 to 115 months’ imprisonment. The district court varied downward and sentenced
    Harrison to 87 months’ imprisonment.
    1
    The Honorable Beth Phillips, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the
    Western District of Missouri.
    -2-
    In this second appeal, Harrison argues that the district court erred in
    determining his base offense level. He claims that his Missouri offense is not a
    “crime of violence.” In United States v. Pulliam, we held that “Missouri’s crime of
    unlawful use of a weapon meets the statutory definition of violent felony in
    § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), because it involves the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
    physical force against the person of another.” 
    566 F.3d 784
    , 788 (8th Cir. 2009). We
    later upheld a determination that, under Pulliam, 
    Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.030.1
    (4)
    qualified as a “crime of violence” under the Guidelines’s force clause. United States
    v. Hudson, 
    851 F.3d 807
    , 810 (8th Cir. 2017).
    Harrison acknowledges that Pulliam is binding precedent, but argues that en
    banc review is necessary because we have not adequately considered Missouri’s
    interpretation of 
    Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.030.1
    (4). This argument has been raised in
    earlier cases, and, as then, Harrison “has not identified any pertinent developments
    in Missouri law after 2009 that undermine this court’s conclusion in Pulliam.” See
    United States v. Pryor, 
    927 F.3d 1042
    , 1044 (8th Cir. 2019). We are therefore bound
    by our prior decisions absent en banc review. Mader v. United States, 
    654 F.3d 794
    ,
    800 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“It is a cardinal rule in our circuit that one panel is
    bound by the decision of a prior panel.” (citation omitted)).
    In his reply brief, Harrison argues that Pulliam is no longer good law in light
    of Borden v. United States, 
    141 S. Ct. 1817
     (2021). We considered this argument in
    United States v. Larry, No. 21-3237 (8th Cir. Oct. 17, 2022), another decision filed
    today. Larry concluded that Pulliam remains binding precedent because “Borden
    holds only that the force clause categorically excludes offenses that can be committed
    recklessly.” 
    Id.,
     slip op. at 4. We likewise reject Harrison’s Borden argument.
    Harrison next argues that the district court erred in denying him an offense-
    level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. He asserts that the court wrongly
    believed it was without authority to grant the reduction because Harrison proceeded
    -3-
    to a bench trial and did not plead guilty. We are confident that the district court
    understood its authority to grant a reduction in light of the Guidelines commentary,
    U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.2, our instructions that quote that commentary, Harrison, 974
    F.3d at 883, and the arguments at sentencing regarding whether Harrison’s pretrial
    statements and conduct demonstrated acceptance of responsibility despite his decision
    to go to trial. The district court’s decision to deny an acceptance-of-responsibility
    reduction constituted the exercise of its discretionary judgment.
    The judgment is affirmed.
    ______________________________
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 21-1340

Filed Date: 10/17/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/17/2022