Frederick Davis v. Sandra Boylan , 670 F. App'x 435 ( 2016 )


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  •                    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 16-2604
    ___________________________
    Frederick P. Davis,
    lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant
    v.
    Sandra Boylan, Correctional Officer, individually and in her official capacity;
    Doris Brooks, Librarian, individually and official capacity; Gayle Ellerbeck,
    Correctional Officer, individually and official capacity; Aaron Evans, Correctional
    Sergeant, individually and official capacity; Melanie Hinkle, Caseworker,
    individually and official capacity; John Jomp, Correctional Officer, individually
    and official capacity; Kerry Klein, Function Unit Manager, individually and
    official capacity; Lori Langley, Education Director, individually and official
    capacity; Teri Lawson, Assistant Warden, individually and official capacity;
    Stanley G. Lucas, Caseworker, individually and official capacity; Shannon
    McCarty, PPS III Supervisor for Maintenance, individually and official capacity;
    Melba Miller, Librarian, individually and official capacity; Dale Phillips, Function
    Unit Manager, individually and official capacity; Claire Stadt, Caseworker,
    individually and official capacity; Troy Steele, Warden, individually and official capacity
    lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis
    ____________
    Submitted: November 4, 2016
    Filed: November 8, 2016
    [Unpublished]
    ____________
    Before WOLLMAN, GRUENDER, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    PER CURIAM.
    Missouri inmate Frederick Davis appeals the district court’s dismissal of his
    
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     pro se complaint. Having jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , this
    court grants Davis leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), affirms in part, reverses
    in part, and remands for further proceedings.
    Much of the complaint was subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim.
    Davis’s complaint was long, detailed, and named numerous defendants. However,
    the details were related to the incidents out of which his claims arose, and the claims
    were clearly stated, easily understood, and sufficiently placed each defendant on
    notice of the nature of the claims against him. See Fed. R. Civ. P 8(d)(1) (each
    allegation made in pleading must be simple, concise, and direct); Jones v. Pollard-
    Buckingham, 
    348 F.3d 1072
    , 1072 (8th Cir. 2003) (13-page handwritten narrative
    complaint did not violate Rule 8, as it still clearly identified how each defendant was
    involved in allegedly unconstitutional conduct); Oglala Sioux Tribe of Indians v.
    Andus, 
    603 F.2d 707
    , 714 (8th Cir. 1979) (purpose of Rule 8 pleading requirements
    is to give opposing party fair notice of nature, basis, or grounds of complaint); see
    also Haines v. Kerner, 
    404 U.S. 519
     (1972) (per curiam) (pro se complaints entitled
    to liberal construction). In addition, Davis substantially shortened the complaint in
    an effort to comply with the court’s directive. Cf. Mangan, 848 F.2d at 911 (plaintiff
    filed duplicative complaints, each hundreds of pages; amended complaint was
    dismissed with prejudice due to “deliberate” failure to comply with Rule 8).
    Davis did successfully state a claim that, in retaliation for his complaints and
    grievances: (1) Jomp issued a conduct violation report, see Lewis v. Jacks, 
    486 F.3d 1025
    , 1028-29 (8th Cir. 2007) (filing grievance is protected First Amendment
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    activity); Dixon v. Brown, 
    38 F.3d 379
    , 379 (8th Cir. 1994) (filing disciplinary charge
    is actionable under § 1983 if done in retaliation for inmate filing grievance); (2)
    Ellerbeck, Hinkle, Jomp, Lucas, and Stadt transferred him to a cell in unit 1 housing
    with conditions that threatened his health, see Spencer v. Jackson Cnty. Mo., 
    738 F.3d 907
    , 911-12 (8th Cir. 2013) (housing module transfer was adverse action for the
    purpose of retaliation claim because new module housed younger and more violent
    offenders); and (3) Steele threatened to limit his access to the grievance process, see
    Burgess v. Moore, 
    39 F.3d 216
    , 218 (8th Cir. 1994) (threat is sufficient injury if made
    in retaliation for filing grievances).
    This court concludes that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing
    under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). See Mangan v. Weinberger, 
    848 F.2d 909
    , 911 (8th Cir.
    1988) (abuse-of-discretion review). The judgment is vacated as to the retaliation
    claims against defendants Ellerbeck, Hinkle, Jomp, Lucas, Stadt, and Steele. Because
    we are reversing the dismissal of federal claims, we also vacate the dismissal of the
    state-law defamation claim against Jomp. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1367
    (a) (supplemental
    jurisdiction over state claims). The judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
    The case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
    ______________________________
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