Association of Commonwealth v. Moylan , 71 F.3d 1398 ( 1995 )


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  •                                   ___________
    No. 95-1373
    ___________
    Association of Commonwealth           *
    Claimants, an unincorporated          *
    association,                          *
    *
    Appellant,                 *
    *
    v.                               *
    *
    James Moylan; Alfred H. Adams;        *
    Douglas G. Alford; Darrell D.         *
    Anderson; Denis K. Appelbee;          *
    Roy L. Ashcraft; William C.           *
    Beckman; Kenlon L. Hake;              *   Appeal from the United States
    Allan C. Roemmich; Timothy R.         *   District Court for the
    Spoeneman; Kenneth A. Wellman;        *   District of Nebraska.
    Dennis O'Neal; Commerce Savings,*
    Columbus, Inc.; Commerce              *
    Savings, Lincoln, Inc.;               *
    Commerce Savings, Scottsbluff,        *
    Inc.; Commerce Group, Inc.;           *
    First National Bank, of Grand         *
    Island, Inc.; Provident               *
    Federal Savings Bank, Inc.;           *
    Union National Bank & Trust           *
    Company, Inc.; First National         *
    Bank, of Omaha, Inc.,                 *
    *
    Appellees.                 *
    ___________
    Submitted:     October 16, 1995
    Filed:   December 6, 1995
    ___________
    Before FAGG, BOWMAN, HANSEN, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.
    This is one of several cases spawned by the failure of Commonwealth
    Savings Company (Commonwealth), a state-chartered industrial loan and
    investment company located in Lincoln, Nebraska.             The issue presented in
    1
    this appeal is whether the District Court               erred when it held that
    appellant's Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organization (RICO) claim, 18
    U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988), is barred by the statute of limitations.               We
    affirm the judgment of the District Court.
    The appellant, Association of Commonwealth Claimants (ACC), is an
    unincorporated association representing creditors and depositors of the
    failed     industrial thrift.      ACC is the assignee of the receiver of
    Commonwealth.    Appellees are the executive director and former members of
    the board of directors of the Nebraska Depository Institution Guaranty
    Corporation     (NDIGC),   the   financial    institutions    that   employed   those
    directors, and the corporate owners of those employers.                   Two other
    corporate appellees were not employers of NDIGC directors but are alleged
    to be co-conspirators of the other appellees.
    ACC filed this RICO action against the appellees on December 8, 1988.
    The gravamen of the complaint is that the appellees used the NDIGC as a
    RICO "enterprise" to engage in fraudulent activity that ultimately led to
    the collapse of Commonwealth and bilked depositors out of several million
    dollars.    In January 1989, the appellees moved to dismiss the complaint as
    time-barred under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), but ACC filed
    a motion to stay the action while related litigation between the parties
    was pending before this Court.      The District Court granted ACC's motion to
    stay the proceedings on March 9, 1989.          When the related litigation was
    resolved, the appellees moved the court to lift the stay order and renewed
    their motion to dismiss
    1
    The Honorable Lyle E. Strom, United States District Judge for
    the District of Nebraska.
    -2-
    the complaint.   The District Court lifted its stay order and dismissed the
    complaint as time-barred.   This appeal followed.
    I.
    This case has a long and complicated procedural history.        It is
    necessary to review the preceding twelve years of litigation in this case
    because the accrual of the statute of limitations requires this Court to
    determine what the parties knew and when they knew it.
    A.   Proceedings Initiated By The Receiver
    Commonwealth was declared insolvent in 1983.     On November 1, 1983,
    the Nebraska Department of Banking and Finance (Department) took possession
    of Commonwealth.   On November 8, 1983, the district court for Lancaster
    County, Nebraska, placed Commonwealth into receivership and appointed the
    Department receiver for Commonwealth (Receiver).       At the time of its
    insolvency, Commonwealth was a member institution of the NDIGC--a state-
    chartered private corporation modeled after the Federal Deposit Insurance
    Corporation to guarantee deposits and shareholdings of member institutions.
    See Nebraska Depository Institution and Guaranty Corporation Act, Neb. Rev.
    Stat. §§ 21-17,127 to 21-17,145 (1991).    The NDIGC originally guaranteed
    deposits up to $10,000 and subsequently increased that amount to $30,000.
    The $30,000 guarantee was in effect at the time Commonwealth was declared
    insolvent.
    On December 23, 1983, the Receiver filed an action with the State
    Claims Board (Board) against the State of Nebraska under the State Tort
    Claims Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 81-8,209 to 81-8,239.06 (1981 & Supp. 1983),
    on behalf of all creditors to recover $56 million in losses sustained by
    Commonwealth creditors, alleging negligence of the Department in the
    regulation and supervision of Commonwealth.   The Receiver alleged that the
    Department's employees
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    caused the creditors' losses by conspiring with officers and directors of
    the NDIGC to deceive the creditors of Commonwealth.      The Receiver then
    filed an amended tort claim with the Board on January 10, 1984, for $56.4
    million.2    The amended claim was similar to the first tort claim, except
    that it was brought on behalf of a special class of creditors--those
    certificate of indebtedness holders whose accounts were guaranteed by the
    NDIGC.   The purpose of the amended claim was to recover the $30,000 NDIGC
    guarantee on behalf of each certificate of indebtedness holder.      In the
    amended claim, the Receiver alleged once again that the Department's
    employees caused losses by fraudulently conspiring with officers and
    directors of the NDIGC.   Consequently, even though the two tort claims were
    directed primarily at the acts and omissions of the employees of the
    Department, many of the Receiver's allegations focused on an alleged
    conspiracy between employees of the Department and NDIGC officers and
    directors--the same NDIGC individuals who are named as defendants in this
    RICO action.    While these state tort actions were proceeding, the NDIGC
    itself collapsed due to severe under-capitalization of the NDIGC fund.   The
    NDIGC met its untimely demise on January 4, 1985, without having satisfied
    its guarantee obligations to Commonwealth depositors.
    The Board heard the Receiver's claims on February 13, 1984.     In the
    proposed work-out plan submitted by the Receiver to the Board, the Receiver
    estimated a shortfall in NDIGC funds of approximately $57 million.   At that
    time, the Receiver estimated NDIGC funds were a mere $1.2 million.       On
    February 29, 1984, the Board found that there was a strong possibility that
    the State of Nebraska may be liable for the Department's actions with
    respect to the Nebraska Depository Institution Guaranty Corporation Act.
    Based on its findings, the Board decided that the state should
    2
    The Receiver subsequently increased the amount sought to
    $65.7 million.
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    compromise and settle the claims.        In accordance with state law, the
    Receiver submitted the Board's decision to the Lancaster County district
    court for approval.    After a hearing, the district court rejected the
    Board's settlement decision for numerous reasons.   See In the Matter of the
    State Tort Claim of the Department of Banking and Finance of the State of
    Nebraska, Receiver of Commonwealth Savings Co., Docket 380, Page 10, Order
    at 30 (Neb. Dist. Ct. March 16, 1984).3      In its thirty page opinion, the
    district court pointed out that the Board had received into evidence two
    reports prepared by John Miller, the interim director for the Department,
    and David A. Domina.   These reports, commonly known as the Miller-Domina
    reports, were highly critical of Paul Amen, the former state banking
    director.   The reports concluded that Mr. Amen did not exclude weak
    industrial thrifts like Commonwealth from the NDIGC fund because he feared
    that such action would expose the fact that the NDIGC had inadequate funds
    to cover guarantees of the members' accounts, which, in turn, would create
    a domino-like series of failures throughout the state's other industrial
    thrifts.
    After rejecting the proposed settlement, the district court remanded
    the matter to the Board, which issued a second decision recommending a
    compromise settlement once again.    After conducting a hearing, the district
    court also rejected this second Board decision.     See In the Matter of the
    State Tort Claim of the Department of Banking and Finance of the State of
    Nebraska, Receiver of Commonwealth Savings Co., Docket 380, Page 10, Order
    at 46 (Neb. Dist. Ct. July 27, 1984).    The district court then remanded the
    matter to the Board yet again to allow the Receiver to withdraw the claim
    and to file suit on the claim.      The Receiver
    3
    At the request of both sides, Judge Strom took judicial
    notice of this case and other closely related cases. Consequently,
    we may properly consider them when reviewing this motion to
    dismiss. See Henson v. CSC Credit Services, 
    29 F.3d 280
    , 284 (7th
    Cir. 1994) (holding public documents filed in earlier state court
    case were properly considered when deciding motion to dismiss for
    failure to state claim).
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    filed suit against the State of Nebraska on March 20, 1985, in Lancaster
    County district court, alleging numerous acts of wrongful and negligent
    conduct by the Department in failing to supervise, regulate, and examine
    Commonwealth, including wrongful and negligent conduct of the Department's
    director in admitting Commonwealth as a member of the NDIGC.                Nine days
    later,   the   parties      sought   approval    of   an   $8.5   million   compromise
    settlement.    The state district court subsequently approved this settlement
    agreement.
    B.   Proceedings Initiated By ACC
    ACC was formed in 1985.         In 1986, ACC filed its first RICO action in
    federal court against the former director of the state banking department
    and others as assignee of the causes of action of more than 2,600
    Commonwealth creditors.        See Complaint, Weimer v. Amen, No. 86-L-248 (D.
    Neb. March 24, 1986).        An amended complaint was filed in 1987.          A short
    time later, ACC also initiated a state law fraud action in Lancaster County
    district     court   with    similar   factual    allegations     against   the   same
    defendants, but without RICO allegations.             The defendants in these cases
    asserted that ACC lacked standing to bring suit, claiming that the causes
    of action belonged to the Receiver.             While these standing issues were
    pending before the federal and state courts, ACC obtained an assignment
    from the Receiver on December 2, 1988, which purported to assign all of the
    Receiver's remaining causes of action to ACC.           ACC then filed this present
    RICO action on December 8, 1988, based upon the assignment from the
    Receiver; this action incorporates the identical RICO claim as alleged in
    the first RICO action, but cures the standing defect by alleging an
    assignment of the Receiver's causes of action against the appellees.              A new
    state court fraud action also was filed on December 5, 1988, based upon the
    assignment.    Appellees filed joint motions to dismiss the new suits, but,
    at the request of ACC, these
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    new actions were stayed pending final decisions in the original suits.
    In 1990, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that ACC lacked standing in
    the original state fraud case.   Weimer v. Amen, 
    455 N.W.2d 145
    , 153 (Neb.
    1990).   Following the lead of the Nebraska Supreme Court, the District
    Court also held that ACC lacked standing in the original RICO action.
    Weimer v. Amen, No. 86-L-248, slip op. at 7 (D. Neb. Aug. 24, 1990).      We
    subsequently affirmed that ruling on appeal, Weimer v. Amen, No. 87-2331,
    slip op. at 3 (8th Cir. Jan. 22, 1992), and certiorari was denied, Weimer
    v. Amen, 
    113 S. Ct. 74
    (1992).    ACC then sought leave to file a second
    amended complaint to incorporate an assignment from the Receiver to cure
    the standing defect.     The District Court denied this motion, and we
    affirmed on appeal.   Weimer v. Amen, No. 93-1410, slip op. at 3 (8th Cir.
    Dec. 15, 1993).
    After the courts entered final orders in the original suits, the
    stays were lifted in the second set of suits.         In 1994, the Nebraska
    Supreme Court held that the second state fraud action was barred by
    Nebraska's four-year statute of limitations.    ACC v. Moylan, 
    517 N.W.2d 94
    ,
    101 (Neb. 1994).   Similarly, the District Court dismissed the second RICO
    suit (this action) on January 5, 1995, as time-barred under the four-year
    limitations period applicable to civil RICO actions.      ACC v. Moylan, No.
    88-690, slip op. at 9 (D. Neb. Jan. 5, 1995).    The District Court reasoned
    that the Receiver, and ACC by assignment, had discovered more than four
    years before the filing of this suit that the NDIGC was without sufficient
    funds to make good on its account guarantees.      Relying on the state tort
    claims filed by the Receiver in December 1983 and later in January 1984,
    the District Court determined that the Receiver, and ACC by assignment, had
    discovered or reasonably could have discovered all of the elements of the
    RICO cause of action no later than July 1984.     ACC timely appeals.
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    II.
    We review de novo the granting of a motion to dismiss under Rule
    12(b)(6). Dover Elevator Co. v. Arkansas State University, 
    64 F.3d 442
    , 445
    (8th Cir. 1995).
    The issue before us is whether ACC's second RICO action was filed
    within the time allotted by the statue of limitations.               In making this
    determination, we are mindful that ACC stands in the shoes of its assignor-
    -the Receiver of Commonwealth.        The rights ACC acquired by assignment are
    no greater than those possessed by the Receiver.            See State Securities Co.
    v. Daringer, 
    293 N.W.2d 102
    , 105 (Neb. 1980) (holding assignee acquires
    only rights of assignor).       Accordingly, the facts known to the Receiver
    that are relevant to accrual must be imputed to ACC.             This means that ACC
    cannot maintain this action if the statute of limitations defense would
    have been good against the Receiver.           The critical inquiry thus becomes
    what did the Receiver know and when did the Receiver know it.
    Civil     RICO   actions   are    governed    by   a    four-year   statute   of
    limitations.   Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 
    483 U.S. 143
    ,
    156 (1987).    As noted above, this case was filed on December 8, 1988.            To
    fall within the four-year limitations period, the RICO claim must not have
    accrued prior to December 8, 1984.       With respect to each independent injury
    to the plaintiff, a civil RICO cause of action accrues "as soon as the
    plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, both the
    existence and source of his injury and that the injury is part of a
    pattern."     Granite Falls Bank v. Henrikson, 
    924 F.2d 150
    , 154 (8th Cir.
    1991) (quoting Bivens Gardens Office Bldg., Inc. v. Barnett Bank of
    Florida, Inc., 
    906 F.2d 1546
    , 1555 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 
    500 U.S. 910
    (1991)).
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    We conclude that the facts of this case demonstrate that prior to
    December 8, 1984, the Receiver had knowledge of both the existence and
    source of its injury and that the injury was part of a pattern.             In the
    first state tort claim filed by the Receiver on December 23, 1983--nearly
    five years before this suit was filed--the Receiver alleged that state
    employees     conspired   with    NDIGC   officers   and   directors   to   defraud
    Commonwealth creditors.    Less than a month later, in the amended state tort
    claim filed on January 10, 1984, the Receiver alleged once again that state
    employees     conspired   with    NDIGC   officers   and   directors   to   defraud
    Commonwealth depositors.         Even though the Receiver failed to make NDIGC
    directors defendants in those state tort actions, the Receiver believed
    that the NDIGC directors--who are appellees in this case--were part of a
    conspiracy.
    The documentary evidence submitted as part of these state tort
    proceedings also shows that the Receiver knew of the NDIGC's anemic
    financial condition more than four years before this suit was filed.            The
    Receiver attached a work-out plan as part of these state tort proceedings
    that showed a shortfall in the NDIGC fund of approximately $57 million.
    After the state district court rejected this plan, a second petition showed
    that the Board estimated a NDIGC shortfall in the range of $15 million to
    $45 million.    Finally, the Miller-Domina reports showed that the failure
    of a major industrial thrift like Commonwealth would cause the collapse of
    the NDIGC.
    In light of the facts and circumstances known to the Receiver through
    the state tort proceedings and the corresponding documentation, it is
    apparent that the Receiver had knowledge of the existence and source of the
    injury before December 8, 1984.           The Receiver was also aware that the
    injury was part of pattern prior to December 8, 1984, because the Receiver
    refers throughout these documents to the "schemes," "conspiracies," and
    "frauds" conducted by the appellees.       We agree with the District Court that
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    these "statements demonstrate that the Receiver was, at a minimum, aware
    of a vague pattern sufficient to satisfy the accrual requirements of
    Granite Falls Bank."         ACC v. Moylan, No. 88-690, slip op. at 9 (D. Neb.
    Jan. 5, 1995).   Accordingly, the Receiver, and ACC by assignment, knew of
    the existence, source, and pattern of injury more than four years before
    this suit was filed.     The action is therefore time-barred.
    ACC   attempts   to    bring   its    stale   claim   within   the   statute   of
    limitations by arguing that Commonwealth depositors suffered a new and
    independent injury when the NDIGC collapsed on January 4, 1985. In other
    words, ACC argues that the collapse of NDIGC is a second injury for which
    the statute of limitations begins to run anew because, under Granite Falls,
    each independent RICO injury accrues separately.              ACC complains that the
    District Court failed to realize that there were two economic injuries.
    This novel argument is fatally flawed for three reasons.
    First, the second injury theory is not alleged anywhere in the
    complaint; it is an entirely new contention.           Second, even if this theory
    were adequately pleaded and even if the NDIGC's inability to satisfy the
    guarantees may be considered a distinct and separate injury with respect
    to the depositors, the Nebraska Supreme Court has already determined that
    any claim arising from such a second injury accrued on November 8, 1983,
    when Commonwealth was declared insolvent.             ACC v. 
    Moylan, 517 N.W.2d at 101
    .   Third, the allegations made in the complaint (and throughout the
    course of the twelve years of litigation) run counter to this second injury
    argument.     ACC alleges that Commonwealth creditors and depositors were
    damaged by predicate acts, all of which occurred prior to November 1, 1983.
    These same actions are also alleged in the complaint to have had a
    "pervasive, debilitating, and ultimately fatal impact" on the NDIGC.
    Complaint at ¶ 20.      Even though ACC now claims that it was not injured
    until January 4, 1985, these same injuries formed the basis of the state
    tort claims filed by
    -10-
    the Receiver in December 1983 and January 1984.           Indeed, the Receiver's
    January 10, 1984 tort claim specifically addressed the losses of the
    depositors' $30,000 account guarantees--the same injury that ACC now claims
    did not even occur until nearly a year later when the NDIGC closed.             The
    insolvency of Commonwealth, and the consequent insolvency of the NDIGC,
    were at the very heart of the Receiver's allegations in the state tort
    claims.
    Undeterred, ACC asserts that even if the Receiver knew of the NDIGC's
    insolvency in January 1984, the limitations period did not begin to run
    until the account guarantees became "uncollectible" on January 4, 1985,
    when the NDIGC finally shut its doors.        ACC claims that until the NDIGC
    actually closed, there was a possibility that some fractional portion of
    the depositors' guarantees might be honored.          This argument reflects a
    misunderstanding of the governing law.        The Granite Falls test, properly
    applied, does not postpone accrual of a RICO claim until the injured
    party's damages can be ascertained with mathematical precision.          Instead,
    the limitations period begins to run even though the injured party, knowing
    he has suffered an injury, may not yet know the full extent of his
    injuries.     Cf. Pace Indus., Inc. v. Three Phoenix Co., 
    813 F.2d 234
    , 240
    (9th   Cir.   1987)    ("[U]ncertain   damages,   which   prevent   recovery,   are
    distinguishable from uncertain extent of damage, which does not prevent
    recovery. . . .       The question of whether there is a right to recovery is
    not to be confused with the difficulty in ascertaining the scope or extent
    of the injury.").       ACC has confused knowledge of the existence of its
    injury with knowledge of the exact amount of its injury.             In regard to
    injury, all that is required to start the running of the clock on a RICO
    claim is knowledge of the fact of injury, not knowledge of the precise
    quantum of damages.
    For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is
    affirmed.
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    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
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