Scott A. Crow v. Marty Montgomery , 403 F.3d 598 ( 2005 )


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  •                     United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 03-3859
    ___________
    Scott A. Crow,                            *
    *
    Appellee,                   *
    *
    v.                                  *
    * Appeal from the United States
    Marty Montgomery, Individually and * District Court for the Eastern
    as Sheriff of Faulkner County,            * District of Arkansas.
    Arkansas; Kyle Kelly, Individually        *
    and as Administrator of the Faulkner      *
    County Detention Center;                  *
    Lieutenant Gene Stephens,                 *
    Individually and in his official capacity *
    as Disciplinary Officer for the           *
    Faulkner County Detention Center,         *
    *
    Appellants.                 *
    ___________
    Submitted: September 17, 2004
    Filed: April 12, 2005
    ___________
    Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, BEAM and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    BEAM, Circuit Judge.
    Scott A. Crow brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988 civil rights
    action against officials of Faulkner County Detention Center (FCDC), alleging
    violations of the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
    Constitution. Appellants Marty Montgomery, Sheriff of Faulkner County; Kyle
    Kelly, jail administrator of the FCDC; and Gene Stephens, lieutenant and disciplinary
    officer for the FCDC (collectively referred to as "FCDC officials") moved for
    summary judgment based upon qualified immunity. The district court denied the
    motion, finding genuine issues of material fact existed and therefore the FCDC
    officials were not entitled to summary judgment on their qualified immunity defense.
    The FCDC officials now appeal that ruling. We reverse and remand.
    I.    BACKGROUND
    In June 2001, Crow surrendered himself to the custody of the FCDC after
    violating his probation. Crow, a nonviolent offender, expected to be released on bond
    the next morning. FCDC placed Crow in cell 305, which consisted of a day room and
    two bedroom cells. Shortly thereafter, two inmates in cell 305 punched Crow and
    broke his jaw.1 FCDC personnel removed Crow from the cell and took him to a local
    hospital for emergency treatment. Crow's jaw was surgically repaired and he
    remained in the hospital for several days.
    In the ensuing litigation, Crow sued the FCDC officials in their individual and
    official capacities. Crow alleged that the FCDC was unreasonably dangerous due to
    chronic overcrowding and that the FCDC officials knew it. Crow also alleged that
    the FCDC officials exacerbated the already unsafe conditions by operating with
    insufficient staff who were inadequately trained and supervised. Finally, Crow
    alleged that the FCDC officials acted with deliberate indifference by allowing
    overcrowding, failing to take reasonable measures to protect Crow from violence at
    1
    The facts are disputed as to what precipitated the attack. Crow contends he
    was the victim of an unprovoked attack while the FCDC officials contend Crow made
    provocative remarks. For purposes of our review, we accept the facts as alleged by
    Crow.
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    the hands of other detainees, and disregarding Crow's safety and medical needs, all
    in violation of the Eighth Amendment. None of the defendants was on duty or even
    present at the FCDC when Crow was classified, placed in cell 305, and assaulted.
    II.   DISCUSSION
    Ordinarily, there is no appeal from a trial court order denying summary
    judgment. Moore v. Duffy, 
    255 F.3d 543
    , 545 (8th Cir. 2001). However, we do have
    limited authority through interlocutory appeals to review the denial of qualified
    immunity. Johnson v. Jones, 
    515 U.S. 304
    , 311 (1995). Such review is limited to
    issues of law raised by the denial. Moore v. Briggs, 
    381 F.3d 771
    , 772 (8th Cir.
    2004). "[A] defendant, entitled to invoke a qualified immunity defense, may not
    appeal a district court's summary judgment order insofar as that order determines
    whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a 'genuine' issue of fact for trial."
    
    Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319-20
    . "'[T]he appealable issue is a purely legal one: whether
    the facts alleged . . . support a claim of violation of clearly established law.'" 
    Id. at 313
    (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 
    472 U.S. 511
    , 528 n.9 (1995)). Accordingly, at this
    point, we may not assume any fact asserted by the FCDC officials which the district
    court has deemed to be genuinely disputed. Parks v. Pomeroy, 
    387 F.3d 949
    , 954 (8th
    Cir. 2004).
    Qualified immunity shields government officials "from liability for civil
    damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
    constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v.
    Fitzgerald, 
    457 U.S. 800
    , 818 (1982). A court required to rule upon the qualified
    immunity issue must first consider the threshold question of whether, construed in the
    light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, the facts alleged show the
    officers' conduct violated a constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 
    533 U.S. 194
    , 201
    (2001). "If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations
    established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity."
    -3-
    
    Id. Only if
    a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the parties'
    submissions, do we take the next step and ask whether the right was clearly
    established. 
    Id. at 201.
    For these inquiries, we conduct a de novo review. 
    Parks, 387 F.3d at 954
    .
    We first consider whether the facts as alleged show the FCDC officials'
    conduct violated a constitutional right. As a pretrial detainee, Crow's claims against
    the FCDC officials are analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
    Clause rather than the Eighth Amendment. Owens v. Scott County Jail, 
    328 F.3d 1026
    , 1027 (8th Cir. 2003). The FCDC officials violated Crow's due process rights
    if the FCDC's conditions of confinement constituted punishment. 
    Id. However, because,
    "[u]nder the Fourteenth Amendment, pretrial detainees are entitled to 'at
    least as great' protection as that afforded convicted prisoners under the Eighth
    Amendment," we apply the identical deliberate-indifference standard as that applied
    to conditions-of-confinement claims made by convicts. 
    Id. (quoting City
    of Revere
    v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 
    463 U.S. 239
    , 244 (1983)); see also Whitnack v. Douglas
    County, 
    16 F.3d 954
    , 957 (8th Cir. 1994).
    The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of "cruel and unusual
    punishments." U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The Supreme Court has held that the Eighth
    Amendment requires prison officials to take "reasonable measures to guarantee the
    safety of the inmates [and] . . . to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other
    prisoners." Farmer v. Brennan, 
    511 U.S. 825
    , 832-33 (1994) (quotations omitted).
    In order to establish a constitutional violation, Crow must show: (1) that his
    incarceration in cell 305 posed a substantial risk of serious harm (objective
    component), and (2) the FCDC officials actually knew of but disregarded, or were
    deliberately indifferent to, Crow's health or safety (subjective component). Pagels v.
    Morrison, 
    335 F.3d 736
    , 740 (8th Cir. 2003); Jackson v. Everett, 
    140 F.3d 1149
    , 1151
    (8th Cir. 1998).
    -4-
    For purposes of this appeal we assume that Crow's incarceration in cell 305
    posed a substantial risk of serious harm to Crow and that the FCDC officials were
    aware of the risk. However, we reverse the district court's denial of qualified
    immunity because, as a matter of law, the facts alleged by Crow do not establish that
    the FCDC officials disregarded any known risk alleged by Crow.
    To satisfy the subjective element of Crow's Eighth Amendment claim, the
    FCDC officials "must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn
    that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and [they] must also draw the inference."
    
    Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837
    . "In short, [Crow] must show that [the FCDC officials]
    acted, or failed to act, with 'deliberate indifference' to the safety of [Crow]." 
    Pagels, 335 F.3d at 740
    (quoting 
    Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837
    ). "'[D]eliberate indifference
    includes something more than negligence but less than actual intent to harm'; it
    requires proof of a reckless disregard of the known risk." 
    Jackson, 140 F.3d at 1152
    (quoting Newman v. Holmes, 
    122 F.3d 650
    , 653 (8th Cir. 1997)).
    Crow alleges that the FCDC officials failed to keep adequate records. He also
    alleges that the facility was overcrowded, poorly supervised and understaffed and that
    the detainees were inadequately classified. All of this, he claims, contributed to the
    June 2001 incident in cell 305 and provides evidence of the reckless disregard of a
    known risk sufficient to constitute deliberate indifference. The district court held that
    the reasonableness of the FCDC officials' actions in response to the known risks at
    the facility was a jury question. We disagree. At most, Crow's allegations show that
    the FCDC officials may have acted unreasonably in failing to take particular measures
    to improve the conditions at the facility, but that does not rise to the level of
    deliberate indifference. Even if they were unreasonable, and might have done various
    things to prevent the blow Crow endured, "reasonableness is a negligence standard"
    and negligence cannot give rise to an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim. 
    Id. -5- "The
    Supreme Court has generously construed qualified immunity protection
    to shield 'all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.'"
    Davis v. Hall, 
    375 F.3d 703
    , 711-12 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 
    475 U.S. 335
    , 341 (1986)). "'Officials are not liable for bad guesses in gray areas; they
    are liable for transgressing bright lines.'" 
    Id. at 712
    (quoting Maciariello v. Sumner,
    
    973 F.2d 295
    , 298 (4th Cir. 1992)). "A prison official's duty under the Eighth
    Amendment is to ensure reasonable safety, a standard that incorporates due regard for
    prison officials' unenviable task of keeping dangerous men in safe custody under
    humane conditions." 
    Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844-45
    (quotations omitted).
    Crow alleges, at most, institution-wide deficiencies which were known to these
    supervisory officials but over which they had only partial control. On these facts, we
    refuse to hold supervisory jail officials liable for acts that may or may not have
    contributed to Crow's injury in June of 2001. In short, there is no record evidence of
    anything beyond the FCDC officials' simple negligence. Thus, on the facts taken in
    the light most favorable to Crow, he has not made out a constitutional violation.
    III.   CONCLUSION
    We reverse that part of the district court's order denying qualified immunity to
    the FCDC officials, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this
    opinion.
    SMITH, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
    I am unable to join the panel's decision. The district court ruled that there
    remain material factual disputes regarding the FCDC officials' knowledge and
    conduct. It is my view that, under our applicable precedents, we cannot review the
    denial of summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity in this interlocutory
    appeal.
    -6-
    Our jurisdiction to review the denial of summary judgment in qualified
    immunity cases is limited. Johnson v. Jones, 
    515 U.S. 304
    (1995); see also Parks v.
    Pomeroy, 
    387 F.3d 949
    (8th Cir. 2004); Krein v. Norris, 
    309 F.3d 487
    , 489 (8th Cir.
    2002). In Johnson, the Court held "a defendant, entitled to invoke a qualified
    immunity defense, may not appeal a district court's summary judgment order insofar
    as that order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a 'genuine' issue
    of fact for trial." 
    Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319
    –20. The Court reasoned that "the
    appealable issue is a purely legal one: whether the facts alleged support a claim of
    violation of clearly established law." 
    Id. at 313
    (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 
    472 U.S. 511
    , 528 n.9 (1995)).
    In Krein, we applied Johnson and held that "summary judgment is not
    appropriate when there is a genuine issue of material fact surrounding the question
    of the plaintiff's or defendant's relevant conduct-because, under those circumstances,
    the court cannot determine as a matter of law what predicate facts exist in order to
    decide whether or not the defendant's conduct violated clearly established law."
    
    Krein, 309 F.3d at 493
    (emphasis in original). We concluded that interlocutory
    appellate jurisdiction was lacking over the district court's determination that there
    remain genuine issues of material fact and challenges to the sufficiency of the
    plaintiff's evidence to support that conclusion. 
    Id. In this
    case, Crow specifically alleged that FCDC was increasingly and
    unreasonably unsafe due to chronic overcrowding and that the FCDC officials were
    aware and had even acknowledged these facts. Crow also alleged that the
    unreasonable danger to detainees due to overcrowding was exacerbated by under-
    staffing of trained personnel to provide reasonable safety to detainees. Finally, Crow
    alleged that the FCDC officials acted with deliberate indifference in allowing over-
    crowding, failing to take reasonable measures to protect Crow from violence at the
    hands of other detainees, and showed deliberate indifference to Crow's safety and
    medical needs. The district court found that the facts respecting the subjective
    -7-
    knowledge of the FCDC officials and their actions in response to what they knew
    were genuinely disputed and thus not sufficiently conclusive to entitle the FCDC
    officials to summary judgment. This is precisely the type of case we are unable to
    hear on interlocutory appeal under both Johnson and Krein.
    As the majority correctly notes, an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim
    requires proof greater than negligence. Farmer v. Brennan, 
    511 U.S. 825
    , 835 (1994).
    The plaintiff must show that the defendants subjectively knew that an excessive risk
    to detainees existed and that they disregarded that risk. 
    Id. The proper
    question under
    an analysis for deliberate indifference is whether the FCDC officials intended to
    avoid taking action that would have addressed the known serious risk of harm to
    Crow or purposely took ineffective action. See 
    Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842
    . Alleging and
    showing the FCDC officials failed to respond reasonably is insufficient under Farmer
    to establish deliberate indifference.
    If the facts required to determine whether the FCDC officials are entitled to
    qualified immunity are not genuinely in dispute, we have jurisdiction and may resolve
    the question as a matter of law. Prosser v. Ross, 
    70 F.3d 1005
    (8th Cir. 1995).
    However, in this case, the district court has definitively found that material factual
    disputes exist regarding the FCDC officials' knowledge and conduct. The FCDC
    officials raise sound arguments that upon further factual development could prove
    meritorious for the application of qualified immunity, but at this stage of the
    litigation, it is not our call.
    For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
    ______________________________
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