David Shannon, Sr. v. Barilla America , 300 F. App'x 437 ( 2008 )


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  •                       United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 08-1889
    ___________
    David Shannon, Sr.,                      *
    *
    Appellant,                   *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                                * District Court for the
    * Southern District of Iowa.
    Barilla America, Inc.; Stacey Cale;      *
    Larry Covington; Jason Morey,            *     [UNPUBLISHED]
    *
    Appellees.                   *
    ___________
    Submitted: September 25, 2008
    Filed: December 1, 2008
    ___________
    Before MURPHY, BOWMAN, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    On December 22, 2004, David Shannon, Sr., was fired from his job as a forklift
    operator at Barilla America, Inc., after he caused several forklift collisions. Shannon
    sued Barilla,1 alleging that he was terminated because of his age (fifty-one years old
    at the time of termination) in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
    of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634, and the Iowa Civil Rights Act of 1965, Iowa
    1
    Shannon later added Larry Covington, Barilla's plant manager; Jason Morey,
    Shannon's immediate supervisor; and Stacey Cale, Barilla's human resources manager
    as defendants. For simplicity, we generally use "Barilla" to refer to all the defendants.
    Code §§ 216.1–216.20. The District Court2 entered summary judgment for Barilla.
    The court concluded that although Shannon had established a prima facie case of age
    discrimination, Shannon could not establish that Barilla's legitimate,
    nondiscriminatory reasons for Shannon's termination were a pretext for age
    discrimination. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 
    530 U.S. 133
    , 143
    (2000) (discussing burdens of proof in ADEA cases). On appeal, Shannon argues that
    the District Court erred in entering summary judgment because he presented sufficient
    evidence to demonstrate material factual disputes concerning pretext. After de novo
    review, we affirm.
    The District Court determined that Shannon would be unable to prove by a
    preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by Barilla for
    terminating him were a pretext for discrimination. Barilla asserted that it made the
    decision to terminate Shannon based on the following uncontested facts:
    !     In April 2004, while Shannon was changing a forklift battery, the battery
    slipped off the pallet, fell over, and spilled battery acid.
    !     In September 2004, Shannon was reprimanded for failing to mark dates on
    pallets before putting them away.
    !     In early October 2004, Shannon hit a pole with the forklift's cage while a
    maintenance worker was in the cage. Shannon testified that he was aware that
    he should not have moved the cage with someone in it. He also conceded that
    his supervisor discussed the incident with him and advised him of safety
    concerns.
    !     On October 26, 2004, Shannon struck the platform of a large production
    machine with his forklift. A machine operator was standing on the platform at
    the time.
    2
    The Honorable Robert W. Pratt, Chief Judge, United States District Court for
    the Southern District of Iowa.
    -2-
    !     On December 17, 2004, Shannon ran a forklift into a support pole, causing
    more than $11,000 in damage to the forklift. He testified that he was driving
    the forklift through the warehouse when he heard the horn of another driver,
    turned his head, and hit the pole.
    !     At a meeting with Barilla management on December 22, 2004, Shannon was
    asked what he could do to avoid further accidents. Shannon responded that
    Barilla could remove the poles. Barilla viewed this as Shannon failing to take
    responsibility for the collision. When asked what behaviors he would change,
    Shannon responded broadly that he would "be more safe when using the
    forklift." J.A. at 211. Barilla management determined that Shannon's
    responses at this meeting showed that Shannon would not accept responsibility
    or change his behavior on the forklifts.
    To demonstrate that Barilla's reasons for the termination were pretextual,
    Shannon presented evidence and argument on two issues. First, Shannon asserted that
    two younger employees, Brian Morey and Dan Engleman, had similar forklift
    accidents but were not terminated. The District Court rejected this argument because
    it determined that Shannon could not prove that the two younger employees "were
    similarly situated in all relevant respects." Rodgers v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 
    417 F.3d 845
    ,
    853 (8th Cir. 2005). As to Morey, Barilla presented evidence that Morey's forklift
    collisions cost the company next to nothing, while Shannon's December accident cost
    the company more than $11,000. Shannon presented no evidence to dispute these
    facts. Thus, the misconduct of the two employees was not of comparative seriousness.
    Moreover, Barilla deemed Morey more receptive to correction than Shannon. A
    Barilla supervisor testified that Morey took personal responsibility for his actions
    while Shannon did not change his habits on the forklift.3 Shannon does not challenge
    3
    Shannon's disavowal of responsibility continued into the discovery phase of
    this case. At his deposition, when asked about the battery spill and the two October
    forklift collisions, Shannon testified, "[N]one of them was my problem. None of them
    was due to my negligence. . . ." J.A. at 71.
    -3-
    this conclusion; he simply asserts that he was never disciplined for his accidents. As
    to Engleman, the District Court concluded that Engleman was not similarly situated
    to Shannon because Engleman suffered cognitive and memory problems. As a result,
    Barilla management set out a clear plan for Engleman to follow. Shannon does not
    dispute that Engleman has mental limitations. Rather, Shannon argues that Engleman
    had more accidents than Shannon but was not terminated. Shannon fails to note that
    there is no evidence in the record showing that Engleman's accidents caused damage
    to the company. Rather, Engleman had a history of injuring himself by failing to
    follow the proper approach in operating equipment. A Barilla supervisor testified,
    moreover, that Engleman responds well to coaching and a clearly delineated plan.
    The District Court correctly found that Shannon failed to present evidence showing
    that he was similarly situated to Morey or Engleman.
    Shannon's second pretext argument challenged Barilla's claims that Shannon
    had a history of unsafe acts and had not previously responded to discipline or
    counseling. Shannon asserts that there is an issue of material fact concerning whether
    Barilla ever coached or counseled him on safety. Shannon notes that Barilla did not
    complete any accident reports or discipline forms with respect to any accidents caused
    by Shannon prior to the October 26, 2004, incident. He further asserts that Barilla
    failed to follow its own progressive discipline policy. Significantly, Shannon does not
    deny that the previous incidents happened; he just asserts that these previous accidents
    "did not constitute a history of unsafe acts" for which he was disciplined. Appellant
    Br. at 21. The record is uncontroverted that Shannon committed a series of forklift
    collisions and other safety violations immediately prior to his termination. Shannon
    admitted that he was verbally counseled about at least three of these incidents.
    Shannon has failed to present any evidence that generates a genuine issue of material
    fact as to whether Barilla had a good-faith belief that Shannon was unwilling to
    change his behavior and respond to coaching. "Employers are free to make
    employment decisions based upon mistaken evaluations. . . . Federal courts do not sit
    as 'super personnel departments reviewing the wisdom or fairness of the business
    -4-
    judgments made by employers, except to the extent that those judgments involve
    intentional discrimination.'" Edmund v. MidAmerican Energy Co., 
    299 F.3d 679
    ,
    685–86 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting Cronquist v. City of Minneapolis, 
    237 F.3d 920
    , 928
    (8th Cir. 2001)). With regard to Barilla's alleged deviation from its progressive
    discipline policy, the policy expressly noted that the company reserved the right to
    immediately terminate an employee. In any event, we have said that an employer
    "'can certainly choose how to run its business,' including not to follow its own
    personnel policies regarding termination . . . 'as long as it does not unlawfully
    discriminate in doing so.'" Hass v. Kelly Servs., Inc., 
    409 F.3d 1030
    , 1036 (8th Cir.
    2005) (quoting Mayer v. Nextel West Corp., 
    318 F.3d 803
    , 810 (8th Cir. 2003)).
    The District Court correctly determined that Shannon presented no evidence
    that could support his assertion that Barilla's proffered reasons for his termination
    were a pretext for intentional age discrimination. As the District Court noted, "[T]here
    is no issue of material fact that Shannon caused the forklift accident on December 17,
    2004, which resulted in damage in excess of $11,000, that Shannon had two other
    forklift accidents within two months prior to his termination, and that [Barilla's plant
    manager] believed that Shannon would not benefit from continued coaching or
    counseling." Order of March 10, 2008, at 15. Barilla was therefore entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law.
    We affirm the judgment of the District Court.
    ______________________________
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