Robert Harmon v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs , 301 F. App'x 569 ( 2008 )


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  •                     United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ________________
    No. 08-1938
    ________________
    Robert Harmon,                       *
    *
    Appellant,               *
    *
    v.                             *      Appeal from the United States
    *      District Court for the
    Department of Veterans Affairs,      *      Eastern District of Arkansas.
    James R. Nicholson, Secretary of     *
    Veterans Affairs,                    *      [UNPUBLISHED]
    *
    Appellees.               *
    ________________
    Submitted: October 15, 2008
    Filed: December 4, 2008
    ________________
    Before MELLOY, BEAM and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.
    ________________
    PER CURIAM.
    Robert Harmon appeals the district court’s1 grant of summary judgment in favor
    of the Department of Veterans Affairs (“Department”) on Harmon’s claims of
    1
    The Honorable Susan Webber Wright, United States District Judge for the
    Eastern District of Arkansas.
    disability discrimination and retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
    791-794.2 We affirm.
    Harmon was diagnosed with HIV/AIDS in December 1996. His disease made
    it impossible for him to continue in his position as a practical nurse for the
    Department. Through a series of accommodations, however, the Department
    continued to employ Harmon in various positions from 1996 to 2004. In January
    2004, Harmon became a cancer registry abstractor in the Department’s John L.
    McClellan VA Medical Center in Little Rock, Arkansas.
    Harmon contends that shortly after he began working at McClellan, his
    supervisor, Maureen Coffey, learned of his HIV/AIDS status and his homosexuality,
    and she began to shun Harmon. Due to the stigma associated with his sexual
    preference and his HIV/AIDS status, Harmon alleges that Coffey stopped training him
    and pressured him to increase his work output. In June 2004, Harmon filed an Equal
    Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) complaint regarding Coffey’s conduct; however,
    the parties subsequently reached an agreement under which Harmon dismissed the
    complaint. Around this time, the Department placed Harmon on a Performance
    Improvement Program (“PIP”) and assigned Pat Coke to be Harmon’s new supervisor.
    As part of his PIP, Harmon attended a cancer registry seminar on September 30,
    2004. At the seminar, Harmon aggressively confronted Linda Urekman, a supervisor
    at the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences Cancer Registry, about
    disparaging comments that Coffey and Coke allegedly made to Urekman regarding
    Harmon’s work product. This incident prompted Urekman and Bettye Belleton,
    Urekman’s coworker, to send complaint letters to the Department documenting the
    altercation. While the Department was investigating the incident, Harmon filed a
    2
    Because Harmon did not provide any argument in his briefs regarding the
    validity of his sexual orientation discrimination claim, he is deemed to have waived
    this issue on appeal. See Fair v. Norris, 
    480 F.3d 865
    , 869 (8th Cir. 2007).
    -2-
    complaint with the Department alleging that Coffey and Coke improperly disparaged
    his work performance to Urekman. On December 3, 2004, the Department terminated
    Harmon’s employment purportedly as a result of his conduct at the seminar.
    Harmon filed an EEO complaint on December 6, 2004, alleging retaliation and
    discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and disability. The Department
    denied Harmon’s claims in a final agency letter on November 6, 2006, leading
    Harmon to file the complaint in the instant matter. After filing its answer, the
    Department filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment.
    Because the district court considered affidavits, exhibits and other matters outside of
    the pleadings, it construed the Department’s motion as one for summary judgment.
    See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
    The district court granted summary judgment to the Department based on its
    findings that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the Department
    was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all of Harmon’s claims. As to his
    disability discrimination claim, the district court found that (1) Harmon did not suffer
    an adverse employment action because there was no evidence that the Department
    failed to train him and (2) Harmon was not disabled under the Rehabilitation Act
    because he failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his HIV/AIDS
    status substantially limited a major life activity or whether the Department regarded
    him as being disabled. As to his retaliation claim, the district court found that Harmon
    put forth no evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the
    Department’s proffered reason for firing Harmon—his conduct at the seminar—was
    pretextual.
    In this appeal, Harmon argues that summary judgment on his disability
    discrimination claim is inappropriate because he raised genuine issues of material fact
    regarding whether he was disabled under the Rehabilitation Act and whether the
    Department failed to train him. Additionally, Harmon argues that summary judgment
    -3-
    on his retaliation claim is inappropriate because he raised a genuine issue of material
    fact regarding whether the Department’s reason for his termination was a pretext for
    retaliation.
    We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, affirming
    where “there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law.” Wojewski v. Rapid City Reg’l Hosp., Inc., 
    450 F.3d 338
    ,
    342 (8th Cir. 2006). Having carefully reviewed the record, the applicable legal
    authorities and the thorough and well-reasoned opinion of the district court, we agree
    with the district court that Harmon did not raise a genuine issue as to any material fact
    and that the Department was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, we
    affirm for the reasons set forth in the district court’s opinion. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.
    ______________________________
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 08-1938

Citation Numbers: 301 F. App'x 569

Judges: Melloy, Beam, Gruender

Filed Date: 12/4/2008

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024