United States v. Roseshell Hamilton , 583 F. App'x 572 ( 2014 )


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  •                  United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 14-1482
    ___________________________
    United States of America
    lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    Roseshell Hamilton
    lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Western District of Arkansas - Fayetteville
    ____________
    Submitted: November 10, 2014
    Filed: November 18, 2014
    [Unpublished]
    ____________
    Before BYE, SHEPHERD, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    PER CURIAM.
    Roseshell Hamilton was sentenced on October 6, 2010, in Arkansas state court,
    for delivery and possession of methamphetamine with the intent to deliver. She was
    paroled on October 10, 2012, with a parole discharge date of April 27, 2020. She
    violated her parole on February 13, 2013, by possessing methamphetamine with
    intent to distribute, and on February 20, 2013, the state moved to revoke her state
    parole.
    Hamilton was indicted in federal court on March 11, 2013, for the actions that
    also violated her state parole. Her parole was revoked on May 17, 2013, leading to
    a six-year state prison sentence. Hamilton also pleaded guilty in federal court on July
    8, 2013, to possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute in violation of
    21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). She was sentenced on February 7, 2014, to 120 months’
    imprisonment and 3 years’ supervised release.
    On appeal, Hamilton contends the district court1 erred by failing to mention
    at sentencing whether her federal sentence was to be served concurrently or
    consecutively with her state sentence. She failed to raise this objection before the
    district court, so we review the district court’s actions for plain error.2 United States
    v. Miller, 
    557 F.3d 910
    , 916 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Procedural sentencing errors are
    forfeited, and therefore may be reviewed only for plain error, if no objection was
    raised in the district court.”). “To establish plain error, [the defendant] must prove
    that (1) there was error, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the error affected [her]
    substantial rights.” 
    Id. “We will
    exercise our discretion to correct such an error only
    if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
    1
    The Honorable Jimm Larry Hendren, United States District Judge for the
    Western District of Arkansas.
    2
    Hamilton’s attorney did mention at sentencing that Hamilton “has a state
    charge in which she has been sentenced, and I believe she’s been sentenced first in
    that case, so I guess the state has her first. So she’s getting this punishment that you
    will affix today, plus some punishment the state’s given to her. I would ask the Court
    to take those things into consideration as it – as it sentences her.” Thus, it appears
    Hamilton’s attorney understood that Hamilton’s federal sentence would run
    consecutive to her state sentence, and he asked the district court to take that “into
    consideration” when imposing her sentence.
    -2-
    proceedings.” 
    Id. (quotation and
    alteration omitted). “In the sentencing context, an
    error was prejudicial only if there is a reasonable probability that the defendant would
    have received a lighter sentence but for the error.” 
    Id. 1. Section
    5G1.3(b)
    Under United States Sentencing Guidelines § 5G1.3(b), a defendant’s federal
    sentence should run concurrently to “a term of imprisonment result[ing] from another
    offense that is relevant conduct to the instant offense of conviction under . . . § 1B1.3
    (Relevant Conduct) and that was the basis for an increase in the offense level for the
    instant offense under Chapter Two . . . or Chapter Three.” Thus, to establish the
    applicability of § 5G1.3(b), Hamilton must prove that the conduct for which she was
    sentenced in state court is relevant conduct to the federal offense and resulted in an
    increase to her federal sentence under the specified Guidelines.
    Hamilton is correct that her state revocation of parole was because of her acts
    on February 13, 2013, and that her federal indictment, conviction, and sentence were
    based on her actions on that date. The fact that Hamilton’s offense conduct
    supporting her federal conviction also served as the basis for revoking her state
    parole, however, “does not make the state conviction ‘relevant conduct’ to the federal
    conviction for purposes of section 5G1.3(b).” United States v. Jones, 
    628 F.3d 1044
    ,
    1049 (8th Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Woods, 
    717 F.3d 654
    , 657–58 (8th
    Cir. 2013); United States v. Broadnax, 
    536 F.3d 695
    , 702 (7th Cir. 2008); United
    States v. Contreras-Martinez, 
    409 F.3d 1236
    , 1239–40 (10th Cir. 2005); United
    States v. Fifield, 
    432 F.3d 1056
    , 1062–63 (9th Cir. 2005). In addition, her state
    conviction did not increase the offense level for her federal conviction. See USSG
    § 5G1.3(b). The district court did not err by not applying the concurrent sentencing
    rules under § 5G1.3(b), because that section does not apply to the facts of Hamilton’s
    case.
    -3-
    2.     Section 5G1.3(c)
    Under § 5G1.3(c), the district court has discretion to make a defendant’s
    sentence run concurrent or consecutive to another undischarged term of
    imprisonment. As noted in the commentary to that section, however, “[c]onsistent
    with the policy set forth in Application Note 4 and subsection (f) of § 7B1.3
    (Revocation of Probation or Supervised Release), the Commission recommends that
    the sentence for the instant offense be imposed consecutively to the sentence imposed
    for the revocation.” USSG § 5G1.3(c) cmt. n.3(C). Had the district court considered
    on the record whether § 5G1.3(c) applied, the express recommendation would have
    been to run the sentences consecutively—which is what the district court did in this
    case. Thus, even if we assume for purposes of analysis that the district court erred in
    not expressly considering and discussing this guideline provision at sentencing,
    Hamilton fails to demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability she would have
    received a lighter sentence if the district court had done so. See United States v.
    Atteberry, 
    447 F.3d 562
    , 564 (8th Cir. 2006); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) (“Multiple
    terms of imprisonment imposed at different times run consecutively unless the court
    orders that the terms are to run concurrently.”).
    For the reasons above, we affirm.
    ______________________________
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