United States v. Troy Travis , 583 F. App'x 574 ( 2014 )


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  •                United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 14-1318
    ___________________________
    United States of America
    lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    Troy Devon Travis, also known as Tilly
    lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Iowa - Cedar Rapids
    ____________
    Submitted: November 11, 2014
    Filed: November 19, 2014
    [Unpublished]
    ____________
    Before RILEY, Chief Judge, BEAM and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    PER CURIAM.
    Troy Travis pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm as a felon. The district
    1
    court sentenced Travis to 87 months’ imprisonment. Travis appeals, challenging the
    substantive reasonableness of his sentence. We affirm.
    During a party in March 2012, Travis and two other men took turns carrying a
    semi-automatic rifle with a partially obliterated serial number. The rifle had a large-
    capacity magazine capable of holding thirty rounds of ammunition. Sometime after
    Travis handled the rifle, one of the other men took it, left the party, and repeatedly
    fired the rifle into the air. Officers found the rifle and twenty shell casings nearby.
    Travis fled the party before officers arrived, but the police eventually apprehended
    him. Because Travis had been convicted of a drug felony in 2006, a grand jury
    indicted him for possessing a firearm as a felon, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g).
    Travis pleaded guilty and received a sentence of 87 months’ imprisonment, the top of
    his advisory sentencing guidelines range. He now appeals the substantive
    reasonableness of his sentence.
    “[W]e review the substantive reasonableness of [Travis’s] sentence ‘under a
    deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.’” See United States v. Robison, 
    759 F.3d 947
    ,
    950 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 41 (2007)). “A
    district court abuses its discretion and imposes an unreasonable sentence when it fails
    to consider a relevant and significant factor, gives significant weight to an irrelevant
    or improper factor, or considers the appropriate factors but commits a clear error of
    judgment in weighing those factors.” Id. at 950-51 (quoting United States v.
    Kreitinger, 
    576 F.3d 500
    , 503 (8th Cir. 2009)). A sentence imposed within the
    advisory guidelines range, such as Travis’s, is presumed to be substantively
    reasonable. See id. at 950.
    1
    The Honorable Linda R. Reade, Chief Judge, United States District Court for
    the Northern District of Iowa.
    -2-
    Travis first argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to
    consider a factor relevant to sentencing. Specifically, Travis alleges that the court did
    not consider a potential mitigating factor—the lack of evidence establishing that he
    knew about or was responsible for the alteration of the rifle’s serial number. His
    counsel argued both in Travis’s sentencing memorandum and at his sentencing
    hearing that no evidence showed Travis knew of or performed the alteration.
    Additionally, his counsel informed the court that the rifle had a second, unaltered
    serial number. Because the district court was aware of these arguments and did not
    refuse to consider them, Travis’s assertion that the court failed to consider the
    arguments fails. See United States v. Miles, 
    499 F.3d 906
    , 909 (8th Cir. 2007)
    (rejecting the defendant’s contention that the district court failed to consider the
    relevant § 3553(a) factors when “the sentencing record demonstrate[d] that the district
    court heard extensive arguments” about those factors).
    Travis next argues the district court abused its discretion by giving significant
    weight to several improper factors. First, he alleges the court relied on an improper
    assumption about his criminal history because the court stated that his four trespass
    convictions “must have had something to do with drug trafficking.” We disagree.
    Following this statement, Travis’s attorney informed the court that three of the four
    trespass convictions arose from Travis’s unauthorized entries into a housing project
    to see the mother of one of his children. The district court then referred to the
    presentence investigation report (“PSR”), which indicated that the fourth trespass
    arrest did result in a drug conviction, and stated that the “bottom line” with respect to
    the trespass convictions was that Travis repeatedly returned to a place where he was
    not wanted. Because the district court revised its initial statement in light of this
    discussion before imposing Travis’s sentence, Travis cannot show that the court relied
    on an improper assumption about the trespass convictions. Second, Travis contends
    that the court based his sentence on the disputed allegations in the PSR that Travis
    purchased the rifle and brought it to the March 2012 party. Once again, we disagree.
    Our review of the record reveals that the court did not rely on the disputed portions
    -3-
    as aggravating factors when imposing Travis’s sentence. Contrary to Travis’s
    argument, the court’s statement that the shooter “got the rifle from [Travis]” does not
    show reliance on the PSR’s contentions that Travis purchased the rifle or brought it
    to the party. Rather, this statement is fully consistent with the court’s findings that
    Travis was “holding,” “carrying,” “showing . . . off,” and “showing . . . around” the
    rifle that the shooter later fired. The record establishes that the court’s decision to
    impose the 87-month sentence rested on consideration of valid § 3553(a) factors,
    including Travis’s noncompliance with correctional supervision, his provision of false
    information to law enforcement, his history of gambling, and his record of violent
    conduct.
    Finally, Travis contends that the district court committed a clear error of
    judgment by attributing too much weight to his criminal history because most of his
    prior offenses were misdemeanors resulting in minor sentences. However, Travis’s
    criminal record—which includes convictions for battery, harassment, aggravated
    assault, and assault while displaying a dangerous weapon—supports the district
    court’s finding that he had a history of violent and assaultive conduct. Moreover, a
    “district court has wide latitude to weigh the § 3553(a) factors in each case and assign
    some factors greater weight than others in determining an appropriate sentence.”
    United States v. Bridges, 
    569 F.3d 374
    , 379 (8th Cir. 2009). “[G]iving ‘due deference
    to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on the whole,’ justify
    [Travis’s] sentence,” our review reveals no clear error of judgment with respect to the
    weight given Travis’s criminal history. See id. (quoting Gall, 
    552 U.S. at 51
    ).
    Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.
    ______________________________
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-1318

Citation Numbers: 583 F. App'x 574

Judges: Riley, Beam, Gruender

Filed Date: 11/19/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024