Jeremy Rowles v. Curators of the Univ. of MO ( 2020 )


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  •                  United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 19-1946
    ___________________________
    Jeremy A. Rowles
    Plaintiff - Appellant
    v.
    Curators of the University of Missouri; Ellen L. Eardley; Andrea Hayes, Interim
    Assistant Vice Chancellor for Civil Rights & Title IX; Salama Gallimore; Cathy
    Scroggs
    Defendants - Appellees
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Western District of Missouri - Jefferson City
    ____________
    Submitted: September 22, 2020
    Filed: December 18, 2020
    ____________
    Before LOKEN, SHEPHERD, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.
    Jeremy A. Rowles, an African-American male, was a Ph.D. candidate at the
    University of Missouri (University) when a white female undergraduate student filed
    a Title IX complaint against him. Following an investigation, Rowles was found to
    have violated the University’s policies prohibiting sexual harassment and stalking
    on the basis of sex, and he was suspended for two years. Rowles filed this action
    against the Curators of the University and four individual Title IX investigators
    (collectively, Appellees), asserting nine claims. The district court 1 dismissed certain
    claims for failure to state a claim, denied Rowles’s motion to compel discovery, and
    granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees on the remaining claims. Rowles
    now appeals, and having jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , we affirm.
    I.
    Rowles was a Ph.D. candidate in the University’s cultural anthropology
    program. In 2015, while he was working as a teaching assistant, an undergraduate
    student filed a sexual harassment complaint against him. The University deemed
    the claim unsubstantiated. However, during the investigation, Appellee Salama
    Gallimore, one of the University’s Title IX investigators, allegedly told Rowles that
    he “looked like someone who might commit sexual assault.” R. Doc. 1-1, at 4.
    In September 2016, Rowles met A.B., a white female undergraduate student,
    at a dance fitness class that she taught at the University “Rec Center.” Rowles asked
    A.B. out on a date, and she declined. Subsequently, Rowles sent A.B. numerous
    flirtatious Facebook messages, prompting A.B. to ask him to stop because she said
    he had crossed the line and the messages made her feel uncomfortable. Thereafter,
    Rowles continued to attend A.B.’s dance classes and attempt to speak with her. He
    also asked A.B. for private dance lessons and gave her a three-page letter expressing
    his romantic feelings for her. A.B. filed a Title IX complaint, alleging sexual
    harassment. The University’s Title IX Office informed Rowles that it was
    investigating A.B.’s allegations as “fall[ing] under the sexual harassment and
    stalking provisions” of the Standard of Conduct for Students and Student
    Organizations. R. Doc. 1-1, at 70. After an investigation, Rowles was found to have
    violated the University’s policies prohibiting sexual harassment and stalking on the
    1
    The Honorable Brian C. Wimes, United States District Judge for the Western
    District of Missouri.
    -2-
    basis of sex. The University suspended Rowles for four years and permanently
    banned him from the residence halls and Rec Center. Rowles appealed within the
    University process, and his suspension was reduced to two years.
    The University’s sexual harassment policy prohibits:
    1) Unwelcome sexual advances or requests for sexual activity by a
    person or persons in a position of power or authority to another
    person, or
    2) Other unwelcome verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature by a
    person to another person, when:
    a) Submission to or rejection of such conduct is used explicitly
    or implicitly as a condition for academic or employment
    decisions; or
    b) Such conduct creates a hostile environment by being
    sufficiently severe or pervasive and objectively offensive that
    it interferes with, limits or denies the ability of an individual
    to participate in or benefit from educational programs or
    activities or employment access, benefits or opportunities.
    R. Doc. 1-1, at 70. Additionally, the University’s policy prohibiting stalking on the
    basis of sex provides:
    Stalking on the basis of sex is following or engaging in a course of
    conduct on the basis of sex with no legitimate purpose that puts another
    person reasonably in fear for his or her safety or would cause a
    reasonable person under the circumstances to be frightened, intimidated
    or emotionally distressed.
    R. Doc. 1-1, at 70.
    Rowles filed this action against the Curators of the University and four
    individual Title IX investigators: Cathy Scroggs, Ellen Eardley, Gallimore, and
    Andrea Hayes. He asserted nine claims: three alleging First Amendment
    violations—substantial overbreadth, void for vagueness, and retaliation—as well as
    claims for violations of procedural due process, substantive due process, Title IX’s
    -3-
    prohibition on sex discrimination in education, Title VI’s prohibition on race
    discrimination in federally funded programs, and the Missouri Human Rights Act’s
    (MHRA) prohibitions on race and sex discrimination in public accommodations.
    Appellees moved for dismissal of all claims, and the district court dismissed the
    substantial overbreadth, Title IX, and MHRA claims.
    In an effort to obtain evidence in support of his Title VI claim, Rowles sought
    information in discovery regarding prior Title IX complaints received by the
    University. Appellees provided summary information for 60 complaints, including
    the date of the complaint, the race and sex of the accused, the policies which the
    accused was found to have violated, and the punishment imposed. Rowles moved
    to compel the production of the Title IX complaints, investigations, and findings
    pertaining to the 60 complaints. He argued he needed the actual records for two
    reasons: (1) to show that the University disproportionately sanctions African-
    American students; and (2) because the records would reveal the factual
    circumstances underlying each complaint, which were necessary for him to identify
    similarly situated comparators. The district court denied the motion. It explained
    that a showing of disproportionate sanctions required statistical analysis and that
    Rowles had not designated an expert witness for such analysis. It further stated its
    belief that the existing discovery was sufficient for Rowles to identify similarly
    situated comparators, which it said were graduate students accused by undergraduate
    students of sexual harassment and stalking on the basis of sex. Additionally, the
    district court reasoned that disclosure of the records would unduly burden Appellees.
    Rowles moved for summary judgment on his First Amendment claims, which
    the district court denied. Appellees moved for summary judgment on all remaining
    claims. In granting Appellees’ motions, the district court held that: (1) on the Title
    VI claim, Rowles failed to demonstrate that similarly situated comparators were
    disciplined less harshly; (2) the University’s sexual harassment and stalking policies
    were not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Rowles; and (3) the record
    established that Rowles did not engage in protected speech nor was he punished for
    his speech, and even assuming he had engaged in protected speech, he failed to
    -4-
    demonstrate that he was deprived of a clearly established First Amendment right. 2
    Rowles appeals the district court’s dismissal of his substantial overbreadth, Title IX,
    and MHRA claims; its denial of his motion to compel discovery; and its grants of
    summary judgment on his vagueness, First Amendment retaliation, and Title VI
    claims. Due to the nature of the issues, we will begin by addressing the denial of
    Rowles’s motion to compel.
    II.
    Rowles challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to compel, which
    is most relevant to his Title VI claim. “A district court has very wide discretion in
    handling pretrial discovery and this Court is most unlikely to fault its judgment
    unless, in the totality of the circumstances, its rulings are seen to be a gross abuse of
    discretion resulting in fundamental unfairness in the trial of the case.” United States
    v. One Assortment of 93 NFA Regulated Weapons, 
    897 F.3d 961
    , 966 (8th Cir.
    2018) (citation omitted). For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that Rowles
    has failed to meet his burden of showing a gross abuse of discretion.
    We begin by observing that Rowles took a “kitchen sink” approach in his
    complaint. In his 58-page, 282-paragraph amended complaint, he asserted nine
    different causes of action under both federal and state law. In addition, Rowles
    alleged few facts in support of his Title VI claim: (1) Gallimore told him in a prior
    investigation that he looked like someone who might commit sexual assault; (2) a
    forthcoming law review article posited that the University’s enforcement of Title IX
    “likely” discriminates against African-Americans; (3) “[o]n information and belief,
    a statistical analysis of Title IX sanctions imposed by the University over the last
    several years will show a pattern and practice of selective enforcement against male
    students”; and (4) Rowles would have been treated less harshly if he were a white
    Ph.D. candidate. R. Doc. 1-1, at 51-52. He did not identify any non-African-
    2
    The district court also granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees on
    Rowles’s procedural and substantive due process claims, neither of which he
    challenges on appeal.
    -5-
    American males who were punished less harshly. However, he urged the district
    court not to dismiss the claim on the grounds that information on such comparators
    was in the unique possession of the University and that discovery would “bear out”
    his assertions. We agree with the district court’s observation that his request
    “stretche[d] the confines of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).” R. Doc. 28, at 22. It appears
    that Rowles was attempting to “skip” to the discovery process to learn facts that
    likely should have been uncovered in a pre-suit investigation and pleaded in his
    complaint.
    Unfortunately, Rowles’s “kitchen sink” approach carried over to the
    discovery process. He sought from Appellees information pertaining to all Title IX
    complaints received by the University for the previous five years. In response,
    Appellees provided much of the requested information for complaints going back
    three years, a time frame the district court ultimately found sufficient. Appellees
    provided summary information for a total of 60 complaints. Their responses
    revealed that, approximately one year prior to Rowles’s discipline, two white
    students were disciplined less harshly for violating the policies prohibiting sexual
    harassment and stalking on the basis of sex. To gain more information on potential
    similarly situated comparators, Rowles then moved to compel production of the
    actual Title IX complaints, investigations, and findings pertaining to all 60 Title IX
    complaints, even though he had not expressly requested such records in discovery.
    See R. Doc. 57, at 3. During a telephone conference on the motion to compel,
    Appellees stated that they would be willing to provide more information regarding
    the two white students mentioned above. However, Rowles did not take Appellees
    up on their offer: in supplemental briefing following the telephone conference,
    Rowles continued to insist upon obtaining records for all 60 complaints.
    The district court denied Rowles’s motion, based on its understanding that
    Appellees’ existing discovery responses were sufficient for Rowles to identify
    similarly situated comparators. Additionally, regarding Rowles’s attempt to show
    disparate treatment of African-Americans, the district court observed that such
    showing requires a “statistical analysis” and that Rowles had not designated an
    -6-
    expert witness for such analysis. R. Doc. 57, at 4. On appeal, Rowles argues that
    the district court’s denial of the motion prevented him from obtaining evidence
    necessary to prove that similarly situated comparators were treated differently.
    Further, Rowles points out that the district court ultimately granted summary
    judgment to Appellees on the basis that he failed to produce evidence that his
    proffered comparators engaged in sufficiently similar conduct, which the discovery
    he sought would have revealed.
    While we find such a catch-22 concerning, in light of Rowles’s approach to
    pleading and discovery, as well as Appellees’ offer to provide more information on
    the two white students who committed the same violations, we cannot say that the
    district court abused its discretion in denying Rowles’s motion to compel. Cf. Stuart
    v. Gen. Motors Corp., 
    217 F.3d 621
    , 637 (8th Cir. 2000) (district court did not abuse
    its discretion in refusing to compel the discovery of documents in Title VII case
    showing that female plaintiff was treated differently than similarly situated male co-
    workers); United States v. Hirsch, 
    360 F.3d 860
    , 864 (8th Cir. 2004) (district court
    did not abuse its discretion in refusing to compel discovery in selective prosecution
    case because defendant failed to produce “at least some credible showing of
    differential treatment of similarly situated members of other races or a protected
    class”). Moreover, as explained in further detail below, see infra Section III.A, we
    do not think the district court’s discovery ruling prevented Rowles from adequately
    opposing Appellees’ motion for summary judgment.
    III.
    Rowles next contends that the district court erred in granting summary
    judgment in favor of Appellees on his Title VI, vagueness, and First Amendment
    retaliation claims. We review de novo a grant of summary judgment. Jenkins v.
    Winter, 
    540 F.3d 742
    , 748 (8th Cir. 2008). “Viewing the evidence and drawing all
    inferences most favorably to the non-moving party,” we affirm “if there is no
    genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
    of law.” 
    Id.
    -7-
    A.
    Rowles argues that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether
    similarly situated white students were disciplined less harshly, making summary
    judgment on his Title VI claim improper. Title VI prohibits discrimination on the
    basis of race in federally funded programs. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (“No person in
    the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded
    from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
    under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”). It is
    undisputed that the University receives federal funding. To prevail on his Title VI
    claim, Rowles must show that his race, color, or national origin motivated the
    defendant’s discriminatory conduct. See Thompson v. Bd. of Spec. Sch. Dist. No.
    1, 
    144 F.3d 574
    , 581 (8th Cir. 1998). When there is no direct evidence of
    discrimination, the plaintiff may rely upon the three-step burden-shifting framework
    established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
    411 U.S. 792
     (1973), for Title
    VII claims. See Fuller v. Rayburn, 
    161 F.3d 516
    , 518 (8th Cir. 1998). On appeal,
    Rowles does not argue that there is direct evidence of discrimination, so we will
    apply the McDonnell Douglas framework to determine whether the district court
    properly granted summary judgment on this claim.
    Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff must first establish a
    prima facie case of racial discrimination. See 
    411 U.S. at 802
    . To establish a prima
    facie case, the plaintiff must show: (1) “he is a member of a protected class”; (2) “he
    suffered an adverse action at the hands of defendants in pursuit of his education”;
    (3) “he was qualified to continue in pursuit of his education”; and (4) he was treated
    differently from similarly situated students outside his protected class. Ajiwoju v.
    Curators of Univ. of Mo., No. 06-1005-CV-W-FJG, 
    2009 WL 10705058
    , at *2
    (W.D. Mo. Feb. 11, 2009) (citation omitted), aff’d sub nom. Ajiwoju v. Univ. of
    Mo.-Kansas City, 363 F. App’x 420 (8th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). If the plaintiff
    establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to proffer a
    legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
    
    411 U.S. at 802
    . If the defendant proffers such a reason, the burden shifts back to
    -8-
    the plaintiff to show that the proffered reason was mere pretext for discrimination.
    
    Id. at 804
    .
    The district court concluded that Rowles failed to make a prima facie case
    because he failed to demonstrate that his proffered comparators—particularly the
    two white students also accused of sexual harassment and stalking on the basis of
    sex—had engaged in sufficiently similar conduct. However, the district court also
    acknowledged that it denied Rowles access to further discovery which could have
    revealed such information. We agree with the district court that Rowles failed to
    meet his burden regarding similarly situated comparators, albeit for a different
    reason.
    Summary judgment was appropriate because Rowles failed to present
    evidence that his proffered comparators, including the two white students mentioned
    above, were graduate students and thus similarly situated to him in all relevant
    respects. In his amended complaint, Rowles alleged that Appellees would have
    treated him differently if he were a white Ph.D. student. Nonetheless, there is no
    indication from the record that Rowles sought to discover from Appellees whether
    the students who were the subject of Title IX complaints were graduate students.
    Moreover, the district court made clear in its ruling on Rowles’s motion to compel
    that the proper comparators were graduate students accused by undergraduate
    students of sexual harassment and stalking on the basis of sex. Because it appears
    that Rowles never challenged this finding, we will assume without deciding that such
    graduate students are similarly situated in all relevant respects, as opposed to a
    broader universe of students as urged by Rowles. While the district court was
    mistaken in stating that Rowles already had information on the accused students’
    status when it ruled on the motion to compel, nothing in the record suggests that
    Rowles brought this deficiency to the district court’s attention, even after Appellees
    moved for summary judgment. Nor is there any indication that Rowles subsequently
    sought such information from Appellees. In sum, Rowles failed to show that
    similarly situated comparators were treated differently because he failed to
    demonstrate that his proffered comparators were graduate students. Accordingly,
    -9-
    we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the Title VI claim. See
    Loftness Specialized Farm Equip., Inc. v. Twiestmeyer, 
    742 F.3d 845
    , 851 (8th Cir.
    2014) (appellate court may “affirm the district court’s judgment on any basis
    supported by the record”).
    B.
    Next, Rowles argues that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether
    the University’s policies are unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. To survive
    a vagueness challenge, a governmental policy must satisfy a two-prong test. “The
    [policy] must first provide adequate notice of the proscribed conduct, and second,
    not lend itself to arbitrary enforcement.” United States v. Barraza, 
    576 F.3d 798
    ,
    806 (8th Cir. 2009) (discussing vagueness in the context of a criminal statute).
    “[F]lexibility and reasonable breadth” are acceptable as long as it is “clear what the
    [rule] as a whole prohibits.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 
    408 U.S. 104
    , 110 (1972)
    (citation omitted). Moreover, “[t]he degree of vagueness that the Constitution
    tolerates—as well as the relative importance of fair notice and fair enforcement—
    depends in part on the nature of the enactment.” Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,
    Hoffman Estates, Inc., 
    455 U.S. 489
    , 498 (1982). When, as here, an enactment does
    not impose criminal penalties, due process tolerates a lesser degree of specificity
    than it would from a criminal statute. 
    Id. at 498-99
    . Still less specificity may be
    allowed for public school disciplinary rules. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser,
    
    478 U.S. 675
    , 686 (1986).
    We agree with the district court that the policies provide adequate notice of
    what conduct is prohibited. To constitute sexual harassment under the University’s
    policy, the verbal conduct must be “sufficiently severe or pervasive and objectively
    offensive.” Similarly, to constitute stalking, a person must engage in conduct “with
    no legitimate purpose that puts another person reasonably in fear for his or her safety
    or would cause a reasonable person under the circumstances to be frightened,
    intimidated, or emotionally distressed.”          These qualifiers, particularly the
    -10-
    “objective” and “reasonable person” components, provide adequate notice in this
    context.
    Additionally, we agree that the individual Appellees’ inability to agree on the
    exact scope of prohibited conduct or the definition of words in the policies does not
    mean the policies are subject to arbitrary enforcement. Enforcement of student
    conduct policies requires some degree of judgment. See Tinker v. Des Moines
    Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 
    393 U.S. 503
    , 507 (1969) (noting the “comprehensive
    authority” of school officials to proscribe and control conduct); Grayned, 
    408 U.S. at 110-11
    . We also agree with Appellees that although “borderline conduct may
    prompt disagreement about whether the policy applies in a given case, the mere fact
    that enforcement requires the exercise of a reasonable degree of judgment does not
    make the policy impermissibly vague.” Appellees’ Br. 50 (citing Grayned, 
    408 U.S. at 114
    ); see also State v. Vaughn, 
    366 S.W.3d 513
    , 521-22 (Mo. 2012) (en banc)
    (opining that “emotional distress” are words with common understanding).
    Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Rowles’s
    void for vagueness claim.
    C.
    Rowles next challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment on his
    First Amendment retaliation claim. He argues that his “amorous speech” is
    protected under the First Amendment and that genuine issues of fact exist as to
    whether he was punished for engaging in protected speech. A plaintiff alleging First
    Amendment retaliation must show that (1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2)
    defendant took adverse action against him that would chill a person of ordinary
    firmness from continuing in the activity; and (3) the adverse action was motivated
    in part by plaintiff’s exercise of his constitutional rights. Scheffler v. Molin, 
    743 F.3d 619
    , 621 (8th Cir. 2014). Appellees additionally asserted that they are protected
    by qualified immunity. To survive Appellees’ qualified immunity defense, Rowles
    must show that Appellees deprived him of a constitutional right and that his
    -11-
    constitutional right was clearly established at the time of Appellees’ alleged
    misconduct. See Nord v. Walsh Cnty., 
    757 F.3d 734
    , 738 (8th Cir. 2014).
    Rowles concedes that summary judgment was properly granted as to
    Gallimore. As to Eardley and Scroggs, Rowles argues that there are genuine issues
    of material fact concerning whether they took adverse action against him for
    engaging in protected “amorous speech.” We agree with the district court that even
    if Rowles had shown that he engaged in protected speech and that a causal
    connection exists between such speech and his discipline, Eardley and Scroggs are
    nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity because Rowles cannot show that he was
    deprived of a clearly established constitutional right. See 
    id.
     Rowles does not point
    to any clearly established law showing that a suspension from a University for a
    course of conduct found to constitute sexual harassment and stalking on the basis of
    sex could give rise to a First Amendment violation. It was reasonable for Eardley
    and Scroggs to conclude that it was permissible under the First Amendment to
    punish Rowles for violating the University’s policies against harassment and
    stalking. See Hope v. Pelzer, 
    536 U.S. 730
    , 739 (2002) (“For a constitutional right
    to be clearly established, its contours ‘must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable
    official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.’” (quoting
    Anderson v. Creighton, 
    483 U.S. 635
    , 640 (1987))).
    Next, we address Rowles’s argument that the district court erroneously held
    that the Eleventh Amendment barred the claim against Hayes in her official capacity.
    Notwithstanding Eleventh Amendment immunity, Ex parte Young allows suits for
    injunctive relief to proceed against a state official sued in her official capacity. See
    
    209 U.S. 123
     (1908). Rowles sued Hayes in her official capacity as the current Vice
    Chancellor for Civil Rights and Title IX, seeking only an injunction ordering his
    reinstatement as a doctoral candidate and prohibiting enforcement of the sexual
    harassment and stalking policies to the extent they are void for vagueness or
    overbroad. We agree with Appellees that Rowles’s request for reinstatement is moot
    because his suspension ended in July 2019. In addition, we agree that Rowles is not
    entitled to the requested injunctive relief because he did not suffer a First
    -12-
    Amendment violation. 3 Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of
    summary judgment on the First Amendment retaliation claim in its entirety. See
    Loftness, 742 F.3d at 851 (appellate court may “affirm the district court’s judgment
    on any basis supported by the record”).
    IV.
    Rowles further asserts that the district court erred in dismissing his substantial
    overbreadth, Title IX, and MHRA claims. “This court reviews de novo the grant of
    a motion to dismiss, accepting ‘the allegations contained in the complaint as true and
    mak[ing] all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.’” Jones v.
    Douglas Co. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 
    915 F.3d 498
    , 499 (8th Cir. 2019) (alteration in
    original) (quoting Martin v. Iowa, 
    752 F.3d 725
    , 727 (8th Cir. 2014)).
    A.
    Rowles argues that the University’s policies against sexual harassment and
    stalking on the basis of sex are facially overbroad in their prohibitions against non-
    threatening speech. To succeed on his claim that the policies are unconstitutionally
    overbroad, Rowles must plead sufficient facts to show that “a substantial number of
    [the policies’] applications are unconstitutional[] [when] judged in relation to [their]
    plainly legitimate sweep.” United States v. Stevens, 
    559 U.S. 460
    , 473 (2010)
    (citation omitted) (discussing overbreadth in the context of a criminal statute). He
    states a claim only if either of the policies is “not readily subject to a narrowing
    construction by the state courts, and its deterrent effect on legitimate expression is
    both real and substantial.” Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 
    422 U.S. 205
    , 216
    (1975) (citation omitted).
    3
    Rowles did not respond to either of these arguments in his reply brief.
    -13-
    We agree with the district court that Rowles failed to plausibly allege that the
    University’s policies have a real and substantial effect on protected speech. See 
    id.
    The policies do not target speech but instead prohibit conduct that is defined and
    narrowed using language with common usage and understanding. Cf. Vaughn, 366
    S.W.3d at 521-22 (“emotional distress” are words with common understanding).
    Moreover, Rowles failed to allege that the University’s policies have ever been
    impermissibly applied to protected speech (such as a student protest, a hypothetical
    he posed in his opening brief on appeal), let alone that such an application constitutes
    a “substantial number” of enforcement actions. See Stevens, 
    559 U.S. at 473
    .
    Finally, we note that the language of the University’s sexual harassment policy
    tracks nearly verbatim with the United States Supreme Court’s definition of
    “student-on-student” sexual harassment that may subject an educational institution
    to Title IX liability. See Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Ed., 
    526 U.S. 629
    , 649-52 (1999) (holding that, if a school is faced with allegations of sexual
    harassment that is “so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it denies its
    victims equal access to education that Title IX is designed to protect,” the school
    may be liable under Title IX if it remains deliberately indifferent to such allegations).
    Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Rowles’s substantial
    overbreadth claim.
    B.
    Rowles next contends that he stated a plausible claim of sex discrimination
    under Title IX. As relevant here, Title IX provides, “No person in the United States
    shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
    of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
    receiving Federal financial assistance.” 
    20 U.S.C. § 1681
    (a) (emphases added).
    Title IX is “understood to ‘bar[] the imposition of university discipline where [sex]
    is a motivating factor in the decision to discipline.’” Doe v. Columbia Univ., 
    831 F.3d 46
    , 53 (2d Cir. 2016) (first alteration in original) (quoting Yusuf v. Vassar Coll.,
    
    35 F.3d 709
    , 715 (2d Cir. 1994)). To state a claim, Rowles must “allege adequately
    -14-
    that the University disciplined him on the basis of sex—that is, because he is a male.”
    Doe v. Univ. of Ark. - Fayetteville, 
    974 F.3d 858
    , 864 (8th Cir. 2020).
    We recently held in Doe v. University of Arkansas - Fayetteville that a male
    plaintiff stated a plausible Title IX claim arising out of a university’s investigation
    of a reported sexual assault because he pleaded, among other things, facts
    demonstrating that the investigation “reached an outcome that was against the
    substantial weight of the evidence.” See 
    id.
     Considered together with allegations
    that the university’s decision was inconsistent with ordinary practice and that it faced
    external pressure to show it “acted vigorously in response to complaints by female
    students,” we concluded that the complaint supported an inference that the university
    was biased based on sex. 
    Id. at 865-66
    .
    We conclude that Rowles’s complaint fails to plausibly allege that the
    investigation reached an outcome against the weight of the evidence or allege any
    additional facts suggesting bias based on his sex. For example, Rowles argues that
    the University reached an erroneous outcome because A.B. did not claim that he
    intimidated, threatened, or touched her inappropriately, only that his “bizarre”
    behavior made her feel “uncomfortable.” But his characterization omits material
    and undisputed facts about his conduct that led the University to conclude that he
    had violated the sexual harassment and stalking policies. For example, after she
    declined his invitation for a date and asked him to stop messaging her, he continued
    to attempt to speak with her, requested private lessons from her, and gave her a love
    letter.4 Additionally, Rowles argues that Gallimore’s alleged comment during the
    prior Title IX investigation that he “looked like someone who might commit sexual
    assault” suggests bias towards large men. We do not believe that an investigator’s
    stray comment during a prior investigation, when such investigator is not alleged to
    have participated in the present investigation, plausibly demonstrates that the
    University disciplined Rowles based on his sex. See Doe v. Wash. Univ., 
    434 F. 4
    The entirety of A.B.’s complaint, the investigative report, and disciplinary
    findings were attached as exhibits to Rowles’s amended complaint.
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    Supp. 3d 735, 760 (E.D. Mo. 2020) (finding that Title IX investigator’s op-ed in
    which she expressed support for students who are sexually assaulted did not reveal
    bias against men, and also noting that investigator did not participate in the findings
    leading to plaintiff’s discipline).
    Rowles also advances a “selective enforcement” theory. This theory requires
    a male plaintiff to allege that “he received disparate punishment as compared to a
    similarly-situated comparator” and that such punishment “was motivated by his
    [sex].” Gentry v. Mountain Home Sch. Dist., No. 3:17-CV-3008, 
    2018 WL 2145011
    , at *6 (W.D. Ark. May 9, 2018). In support, Rowles alleges that the Title
    IX investigators treated A.B. more favorably during the investigation by giving her
    more time to decide between informal and formal resolution and also telling her that
    she could have an advisor. But allegations regarding the University’s treatment of
    Rowles’s accuser do not support his claim that a female in similar circumstances—
    i.e., a female accused of sexual harassment or stalking—was treated more favorably.
    Therefore, Rowles has failed to plausibly allege that the University disciplined him
    because he is a male. See Univ. of Ark. - Fayetteville, 974 F.3d at 864. Accordingly,
    we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Rowles’s Title IX claim.
    C.
    Finally, Rowles challenges the dismissal of his discrimination claims under
    the MHRA. To state a claim for discrimination in public accommodations under the
    MHRA, a plaintiff must allege that “(1) [he] is a member of a class protected by
    section 213.065; (2) [he] was discriminated against in the use of a public
    accommodation (as defined by section 213.010); and (3) [his] status as a member of
    a protected class was a contributing factor in that discrimination.” R.M.A. by
    Appleberry v. Blue Springs R-IV Sch. Dist., 
    568 S.W.3d 420
    , 424-25 (Mo. 2019)
    (en banc) (footnote omitted).
    We conclude that Rowles failed to state a plausible claim for sex
    discrimination under the MHRA for reasons similar to those that support our
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    conclusion that he failed to state a Title IX claim. Although we recognize that the
    MHRA’s “contributing factor” standard is less rigorous than Title IX’s “motivating
    factor” standard, see Button v. Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. Corp., 
    963 F.3d 824
    , 831
    (8th Cir. 2020), we conclude that Rowles’s allegations fail to meet either.
    Ultimately, we reach the same conclusion regarding Rowles’s race
    discrimination claim, but we are compelled to provide additional explanation.
    Because the district court allowed Rowles’s Title VI race discrimination claim to
    survive Appellees’ motion to dismiss, we believe it was error for the court to have
    dismissed the state law race discrimination claim. If Rowles’s complaint plausibly
    alleged that his race was a motivating factor, it necessarily follows that he plausibly
    alleged race was a contributing factor. See 
    id.
     Nonetheless, we find the error
    harmless in light of our conclusion that Appellees were properly granted summary
    judgment on Rowles’s Title VI claim. We conclude that the evidence proffered by
    Rowles in opposition to summary judgment fails to meet either the “contributing
    factor” or “motivating factor” standard.
    V.
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
    ______________________________
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