United States v. Amin Ricker ( 2020 )


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  •                   United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 19-2351
    ___________________________
    United States of America
    lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    Amin Ricker
    lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the District of South Dakota - Pierre
    ____________
    Submitted: June 18, 2020
    Filed: December 22, 2020
    ____________
    Before GRUENDER, WOLLMAN, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.
    A jury convicted Amin Ricker of the following federal offenses: two counts
    of aggravated sexual abuse of a child who had not attained the age of 12 years; one
    count of travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct; and four counts related
    to the transportation, distribution, receipt, and possession of child pornography. The
    district court1 sentenced Ricker to a total of 600 months’ imprisonment. Ricker
    argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence, in
    sequestering his father during trial, in admitting certain evidence, and in determining
    the fact that Ricker had a prior conviction for possession or distribution of child
    pornography. Ricker also contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable.
    We affirm.
    I. Background
    Ricker traveled from South Dakota to Texas in January and March 2015 to
    sexually abuse S.M. and J.M., the seven-year-old twin daughters of an acquaintance.
    He took photos and videos of the abuse.
    Law enforcement officers in Pierre, South Dakota, received information in
    February 2017 suggesting that cheer_dad17 sent and received child pornography
    images via online chat. The internet provider disclosed that cheer_dad17 was
    accessing the internet from Ricker’s address. Officers then obtained a search warrant
    for Ricker’s residence.
    During the search, Ricker made incriminating statements and confirmed that
    he was the account user cheer_dad17. Officers seized several devices, including
    Samsung cell phones, an Apple iPad, and a 64-gigabyte thumb drive. A forensic
    review of the seized devices revealed approximately 30,000 images and more than
    100 videos of child pornography and child erotica. Data recovered from a Samsung
    cell phone indicated that Ricker had shared with an online friend links to his file
    storage system, which contained child pornography. In return, the friend sent Ricker
    child pornography and links to child pornography websites.
    1
    The Honorable Roberto A. Lange, now Chief Judge, United States District
    Court for the District of South Dakota.
    -2-
    Pornographic and non-pornographic images and videos of S.M. and J.M., were
    recovered from the 64-gigabyte thumb drive. The metadata indicated that the photos
    and videos were created in January and March 2015 and that many were created with
    the models of Samsung cell phone and Apple iPad that had been seized from Ricker.
    Ricker was charged with the child sexual abuse and child pornography offenses
    set forth above. After an evaluation, he was deemed competent to stand trial. The
    results of his evaluation included diagnostic impressions of autism spectrum disorder
    and major depression and a recommendation to monitor for pedophilic disorder.
    Ricker’s father moved from Florida to South Dakota to support his son during these
    legal proceedings. Ricker lived with his father while on pretrial release.
    Ricker moved to suppress the statements he made while his home was being
    searched, arguing that he was in custody, that he had invoked his right to counsel, and
    that his statements were not voluntary. The district court denied the motion, adopting
    the magistrate judge’s2 report and recommendation. As discussed more fully below,
    the district court overruled Ricker’s pretrial objections to the sequestration of his
    father as a potential witness and to the admission of descriptive cover sheets attached
    to the evidence obtained from his devices. The district court also denied Ricker’s
    motion to exclude the expert testimony of Anthony Imel, a Physical Scientist Forensic
    Examiner with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
    At trial, the government presented evidence—bank records, employment
    records, and airline records—that Ricker had traveled from South Dakota to Texas
    in January and March 2015. Ricker also confirmed the trips. Several law
    enforcement officers testified, including Special Assistant Attorney General Toby
    Russell of the South Dakota Division of Criminal Investigation. Russell had
    2
    The Honorable Mark A. Moreno, United States Magistrate Judge for the
    District of South Dakota.
    -3-
    completed forensic examinations on the devices seized from Ricker and had created
    the descriptive cover sheets for the evidence stored therein, which included photos,
    videos, and copies of online chats. Photos and videos showed Ricker digitally
    penetrating S.M. and J.M. and pushing his erect penis against their vaginas. In one
    video, S.M. can be heard saying, “Amin . . . stop hitting.”
    S.M. and J.M. testified that Ricker had sexually abused them in Texas, when
    they were seven years old. S.M. explained that Ricker would grab her and kiss her
    on the lips. He once climbed in bed with her, began taking off her clothes, and
    grabbed her ankle when she tried to get away. She was able to break free. On
    another occasion, S.M. was in the bathroom when Ricker entered and started kissing
    her. S.M. testified that “he pulled me in the bedroom and started having sex with
    me,” which she clarified as “taking his private spot into mine.” The government
    confirmed that S.M. meant vaginal intercourse. J.M. testified that she had witnessed
    Ricker sexually abuse S.M. and that Ricker had abused her, as well, “put[ting] his
    private part to mine.” Both girls testified that Ricker bought their family gifts and
    took them out to dinner.
    S.M. and J.M.’s mother, Rhonda, testified that Ricker had traveled to Texas
    two or three times to visit her family in late 2014 or early 2015. He brought gifts for
    the children and gave Rhonda money to help pay bills and buy food. Rhonda testified
    that she walked into a room during one of Ricker’s visits and saw Ricker lying on the
    floor in his underwear and the girls nearby in their underwear, whereupon she left the
    room. She returned and left repeatedly, observing Ricker naked with S.M.’s hand on
    his penis and later observing J.M. with her mouth on Ricker’s penis. S.M. and J.M.
    were removed from their mother’s home in December 2015. Rhonda testified that she
    had previously admitted to a Texas law enforcement officer that she had been
    watching the door to ensure that no one saw Ricker sexually abusing the girls.
    -4-
    Rhonda identified S.M. and J.M. as the children with Ricker in certain photos and
    videos that were found on Ricker’s devices.3
    FBI Forensic Examiner Imel testified that he had compared known images of
    Ricker’s left hand to two images of a left hand from a video found on a seized device.
    He “eliminated the female genitalia that was present in the” video images to complete
    the comparison. He pointed out the similarities between the images and testified that
    Ricker’s left index finger appeared to be the left index finger depicted in the video.
    Ricker presented expert evidence regarding his autism diagnosis and testified
    in his own defense. He denied sexually abusing S.M. and J.M. and testified that the
    images of child pornography may have been put in his electronic storage by an online
    friend who shared the account.
    Ricker was found guilty on all counts. At sentencing, the district court
    determined that Ricker’s total offense level was 43, that his criminal history category
    was I, and that his sentencing range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
    (Guidelines) was life imprisonment.
    II. Discussion
    A. Motion to Suppress
    We first address the district court’s denial of Ricker’s motion to suppress the
    statements he made to law enforcement officers while his home was being searched.
    We review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its findings of fact for
    clear error. United States v. Czichray, 
    378 F.3d 822
    , 825 (8th Cir. 2004).
    3
    Rhonda was charged with aggravated sexual abuse of a child in Dallas County,
    Texas. She agreed to plea to a lesser charge in exchange for her testimony against
    Ricker.
    -5-
    According to evidence presented at the suppression hearing, Detective Dusty
    Pelle and Officer David Estes of the Pierre, South Dakota, Police Department, along
    with five other law enforcement officers, went to Ricker’s residence to execute a
    search warrant in February 2017. Estes activated his bodycam upon arriving at the
    scene.
    Pelle and Estes approached the mobile home in which Ricker had rented a
    room. When Ricker answered the door, Pelle stepped inside and told Ricker about the
    search, while Estes conducted a protective sweep. Pelle then explained that Ricker
    was not under arrest, but that Pelle would like to speak to him.
    With Pelle’s permission, Ricker called his father, Carl Ricker, who thereafter
    asked to speak to the detective. Pelle accepted the phone and explained that Ricker
    was not under arrest, but that Pelle wanted to interview Ricker about “some online
    stuff.” Carl Ricker said that he did not want his son to talk to anyone without an
    attorney present, to which Pelle responded that Ricker was an adult who could make
    that decision for himself. During the call, the remaining officers entered the residence
    and began the search.
    Estes kept watch over Ricker during the search. While still talking with his
    father, Ricker went into the bathroom to urinate. Estes instructed Ricker to keep the
    door open, later testifying that he did so to ensure that Ricker could not destroy the
    phone or grab a hidden weapon. Ricker told his father to call his attorney, because
    his cell phone was covered by the warrant. After Pelle again spoke to Carl Ricker,
    the call ended and officers seized the cell phone.
    Estes and Ricker stepped outside the mobile home, where Estes made small
    talk. Ricker initially told Estes that he was scared and nervous, but he soon began
    discussing his work as a railroad conductor and his early life in Singapore. Pelle
    eventually joined Estes and Ricker. Pelle explained that he would like to talk to
    -6-
    Ricker, but that it was Ricker’s decision and that he could stop the conversation at
    any time. When Pelle asked whether he would like to talk at the police station or in
    Pelle’s vehicle, Ricker replied, “we can talk in the car.”
    Pelle activated a recording device after they were seated in the front seat of his
    vehicle. Pelle reiterated that Ricker was not under arrest, that Ricker did not have to
    talk to him, and that Ricker could end the conversation at any time. After Ricker said
    that his attorney was at a funeral, Pelle explained, “[I]f you don’t want to talk to me
    because you want an attorney, you got to tell me that . . . ’cause if you say you want
    an attorney, . . . we’ll just stop . . . talking.” Pelle twice reiterated that if Ricker asked
    for an attorney, the conversation would end. Ricker said that his father wanted the
    attorney to be present, to which Pelle replied that Ricker was an adult and that it was
    his decision to ask for an attorney. Ricker thereafter made several incriminating
    statements. When Ricker indicated that he would like to speak to his attorney, Pelle
    immediately terminated the interview, and the men exited the vehicle.
    Ricker argues that the district court should have suppressed the statements he
    made to Pelle, because he was in custody when he made them and had not been
    advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
    (1966). To determine
    whether a person is in custody, we ask “whether there is a formal arrest or restraint
    on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” California
    v. Beheler, 
    463 U.S. 1121
    , 1125 (1983) (internal quotation marks and citation
    omitted). We consider the totality of the circumstances in determining how a
    reasonable person in Ricker’s position would have understood his situation. See
    Berkemer v. McCarty, 
    468 U.S. 420
    , 442 (1984); see also United States v. Griffin,
    
    922 F.2d 1343
    , 1349 (8th Cir. 1990) (listing six non-exhaustive factors for evaluating
    whether an individual is in custody for purposes of Miranda). We have said that
    “[t]he most obvious and effective means of demonstrating that a suspect has not been
    taken into custody . . . is for the police to inform the suspect that an arrest is not being
    -7-
    made and that the suspect may terminate the interview at will.” 
    Griffin, 922 F.2d at 1349
    (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    We conclude that Ricker was not subjected to the restraints associated with a
    formal arrest and thus was not taken into custody at any time during the search of his
    home. Although several officers were present to execute the search warrant, only
    Pelle and Estes had any meaningful interaction with Ricker. Pelle repeatedly
    explained to Ricker that he was not under arrest, that the questioning was voluntary,
    that Ricker was free to end the conversation at any time, and that Pelle would end the
    interview if Ricker were to ask to speak to an attorney. To ensure that Ricker did not
    interfere with the search and that the other officers could complete their evidence-
    gathering tasks, Estes did not allow Ricker to move freely throughout his home and
    kept watch over Ricker when he used the bathroom. Ricker was not handcuffed or
    physically restrained, however, and he was allowed to call his father on his cell
    phone. Neither Pelle nor Estes employed any strong-arm tactics or deceptive
    stratagems during their conversations with Ricker. True to his word, Pelle ended the
    interview as soon as Ricker himself indicated that he wanted to wait for his attorney.
    In light of these circumstances, a reasonable person in Ricker’s situation would not
    have viewed himself restrained as though he were under formal arrest.
    We also conclude that Ricker did not assert his Fifth Amendment right to
    counsel by saying that his attorney was at a funeral and that his father wanted his
    attorney to be present. See Davis v. United States, 
    512 U.S. 452
    , 462 (1994) (holding
    that the remark “[m]aybe I should talk to a lawyer” was not a request for counsel);
    United States v. Mohr, 
    772 F.3d 1143
    , 1146 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding that the
    defendant’s “statement ‘I think I should get [a lawyer]’ was not an unequivocal
    invocation of his right to counsel”). Nor could Carl Ricker invoke his son’s right to
    counsel for him. See Moran v. Burbine, 
    475 U.S. 412
    , 433 n.4 (1986) (“[T]he
    privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is, by hypothesis, a personal one that
    can only be invoked by the individual whose testimony is being compelled.”).
    -8-
    Finally, we agree with the district court’s determination “that Ricker being on the
    autism spectrum and English being his second language did not make his statements
    involuntary based on the totality of the circumstances.” D. Ct. Order of March 8,
    2019, at 3 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 
    412 U.S. 218
    , 227 (1973)).
    B. Sequestration of Carl Ricker
    A week before trial began, the government filed its amended witness list, which
    included Carl Ricker’s name. The government also moved in limine to sequester all
    witnesses. Ricker objected to the sequestration of his father, arguing that the
    government had placed Carl Ricker on the witness list to exclude him from the trial.
    The government responded that Carl Ricker was a witness with respect to the day the
    search warrant was executed, as well as with respect to Ricker’s mental health and
    autism diagnosis, about which Ricker’s expert would testify. The court found that the
    government presented “a colorable reason” for placing Carl Ricker on the witness list
    and concluded that the sequestration order thus applied to him. The court revisited
    its ruling before the government closed its case-in-chief and decided to keep its order
    in place. Carl Ricker remained sequestered during the trial but was not called as a
    witness.
    Rule 615 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states, “At a party’s request, the
    court must order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear other witnesses’
    testimony.” The purpose of sequestration is twofold. “It exercises a restraint on
    witnesses ‘tailoring’ their testimony to that of earlier witnesses; and it aids in
    detecting testimony that is less than candid.” Geders v. United States, 
    425 U.S. 80
    ,
    87 (1976). We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s decision to sequester
    a witness, reversing only upon “a showing of substantial prejudice.” See United
    States v. Conners, 
    894 F.2d 987
    , 991 (8th Cir. 1990) (standard of review).
    -9-
    We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by sequestering
    Carl Ricker during trial. Although the government has failed to articulate how Carl
    Ricker’s testimony about the day of the search might have been relevant at trial, its
    claim that it considered calling Carl Ricker to rebut the defense expert’s testimony
    is not without some merit. Ricker had filed a notice of intent to present expert
    evidence, anticipating that the psychiatrist would testify to “Ricker’s mental health
    condition(s).” Carl Ricker had testified at the suppression hearing that despite having
    been diagnosed as suffering from autism, his son was intelligent and self-sufficient.
    Carl Ricker also had claimed that the victims had taken advantage of his son. The
    district court’s decision to order Carl Ricker’s sequestration thus fell within the
    bounds of its discretion.
    Ricker argues that the exclusion of Carl Ricker from the courtroom during trial
    violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial and constituted structural error.
    The Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused’s “right to a speedy and public trial.”
    The Supreme Court has said “that an accused is at the very least entitled to have his
    friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter with what offense he may be
    charged.” In re Oliver, 
    333 U.S. 257
    , 272 (1948). This entitlement is not absolute,
    however, and does not necessarily prohibit the sequestration under Rule 615 of the
    defendant’s friends or relatives who may be called as witnesses. See United States
    v. Blanche, 
    149 F.3d 763
    , 769-70 (8th Cir. 1998) (rejecting defendant’s claim that his
    Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was violated when the district court, pursuant
    to Rule 615, refused to allow his sister to be in the courtroom for part of trial); see
    also United States v. Sherlock, 
    962 F.2d 1349
    , 1356 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The right to a
    public trial . . . is not absolute and must give way in some cases to other interests
    essential to the fair administration of justice.” (citing Waller v. Georgia, 
    467 U.S. 39
    ,
    45 (1984))). Because Carl Ricker could have been called to testify during his son’s
    trial, we conclude that the district court did not err when it excluded him from the
    courtroom under Rule 615.
    -10-
    C. Admission of Cover Sheets
    Special Assistant Attorney General Russell completed forensic examinations
    of nineteen devices seized from Ricker. Russell testified that he previewed the files
    on the devices looking for evidence of child pornography, which he defined as
    “images or videos that show minors engaging in prohibited sex acts.” The district
    court interrupted Russell’s testimony to explain to the jury that they would receive
    an instruction “defining child pornography under federal law, which may or may not
    be different than [the] testimony you’re hearing.”
    Over Ricker’s objection, the district court admitted the descriptive cover sheets
    that Russell had created to accompany the numerous exhibits associated with his
    forensic examinations. The cover sheets stated the device information and described
    the underlying exhibit, typically listing the file name, the file path, and the file date
    and time. Some cover sheets also included Russell’s opinions, however. For
    example, one described the exhibit as “show[ing] the receipt of a video file depicting
    child pornography” and another described the exhibit as containing images “that are
    visual duplicates or visually similar to the erotic and pornographic image files
    depicting [the minor victim] that were recovered” from another device. Some cover
    sheets identified the minor victim. The district court issued the following pre-
    submission limiting instruction:
    Some of these cover sheets and some of Special Agent Russell’s
    testimony characterized images as “child pornography” and named
    someone whom Special Agent Russell believed to be the subject of the
    image or exhibit. It is for you to decide based on the evidence and these
    instructions what, if any, images constitute child pornography and who
    is pictured in any image.
    -11-
    Ricker argues that the information set forth on the cover sheets constituted
    inadmissible hearsay. “‘Hearsay’ means a statement that (1) the declarant does not
    make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence
    to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(c).
    Statements include a person’s written assertions. Fed. R. Evid. 801(a). We review
    the district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. See United States v.
    Hawkins, 
    796 F.3d 843
    , 864 (8th Cir. 2015) (standard of review).
    The opinions set forth in the cover memos (e.g., that images depicted child
    pornography, that certain images were similar to other images, and that certain
    victims were depicted in the exhibits) constituted hearsay. These previously written
    assertions by Russell were offered in evidence by the government to prove the truth
    of the matters asserted. The government did not cite any relevant rule or case that
    would permit Russell’s earlier statements to be admitted into evidence. We thus
    conclude that the district court should not have admitted these hearsay-containing
    cover sheets into evidence.
    We do not decide whether it was error to admit the cover sheets that listed only
    the device and file information (i.e., name, path, date, and time). Ricker has not
    specifically challenged the content of those cover sheets, and we conclude that he
    suffered no prejudice from their admission.
    We hold that any error in admitting the cover sheets was harmless in light of
    the overwhelming evidence against Ricker, coupled with the district court’s limiting
    instruction. See 
    Hawkins, 796 F.3d at 866
    (holding that the district court’s erroneous
    admission of certain evidence was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence
    and “the safeguards the district court and the parties implemented to minimize the
    prejudicial effect of this evidence”); United States v. Adejumo, 
    772 F.3d 513
    , 525
    (8th Cir. 2014) (“An erroneous evidentiary ruling is harmless . . . if it did not have a
    substantial influence on the jury’s verdict.”). The victims offered compelling
    -12-
    testimony of the abuse they suffered, which was supported by the photos and videos
    of their abuse, as well as the testimony of other witnesses. The evidence that Russell
    traveled from South Dakota to Texas, recorded his sexual abuse of the victims,
    distributed certain images of that abuse, and organized and maintained thousands of
    images and more than 100 videos of child pornography and child erotica supported
    the child pornography charges.
    D. Admission of Expert Testimony
    Shortly after he was indicted in 2017, Ricker requested that the government
    disclose any expert witnesses it intended to call at trial. The government filed its
    notice of intent to present expert testimony on March 5, 2019, approximately two
    weeks before trial was scheduled to begin. The notice identified FBI Forensic
    Examiner Imel as an expert and stated that he had examined child pornography videos
    that were recovered from Ricker’s devices and compared them to exemplar photos of
    Ricker’s hands, which had been taken pursuant to a search warrant in November
    2018. The notice stated that Imel would testify that the hands portrayed in the videos
    matched the exemplar photos. The government provided Imel’s expert report to
    defense counsel on March 14. The next day, the government filed an amended notice
    of intent to present expert testimony and provided to defense counsel the exemplar
    photos and hand comparison charts. Each chart showed an image from the videos and
    an exemplar photo placed side by side, with arrows noting comparison points. Ricker
    moved for a continuance and for the exclusion of Imel’s testimony.
    The district court denied the motion for a continuance and denied, in part, the
    motion to exclude Imel’s testimony. As relevant here, the district court ruled that
    Imel would be allowed to testify that the hand depicted in certain videos appeared to
    be Ricker’s hand. Trial began on March 18, 2019, and Imel testified on March 22.
    Two hand comparison charts and four exemplar photos were entered into evidence.
    -13-
    Ricker argues that the government failed to provide adequate notice of Imel’s
    expert opinion and failed to timely provide the comparison charts and exemplar
    photos. He contends that the government’s inexcusable delay required that Imel’s
    testimony be excluded.
    Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(G) requires that, at the
    defendant’s request, the government provide a written summary of any expert
    testimony that the government intends to use at trial during its case-in-chief. If the
    government does not comply with this rule, the court may order disclosure, grant a
    continuance, prohibit the party from introducing the evidence or grant any relief that
    is “just under the circumstances.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(2). “Decisions concerning
    the admissibility of expert testimony lie within the broad discretion of the trial court
    and will not be reversed on appeal unless there has been an abuse of that discretion.”
    United States v. Anderson, 
    446 F.3d 870
    , 874 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States
    v. Ortega, 
    150 F.3d 937
    , 943 (8th Cir. 1998)).
    We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
    Imel’s testimony. As an initial matter, no specific deadline had been set for the
    disclosure of expert testimony. Rule 16 does not address the time for providing
    notice, and the scheduling order did not include a deadline for filing witness lists or
    disclosing experts. Unlike cases in which sanctions have been imposed on the
    government, there was no finding here that the government acted with reckless
    disregard of a discovery deadline. E.g., United States v. Sims, 
    776 F.3d 583
    , 584,
    586 (8th Cir. 2015) (DNA evidence justifiably excluded in light of the government’s
    post-deadline disclosure of lab report and identity of expert and its four-day pretrial
    identification of additional expert witnesses.); United States v. Davis, 
    244 F.3d 666
    ,
    668, 671-72 (8th Cir. 2001) (no abuse of discretion in excluding DNA evidence
    where the February 28 disclosure deadline for expert testimony had passed, and the
    government provided a preliminary DNA report on March 30 and a written report on
    March 31, the business day before the April 3 trial was set to begin).
    -14-
    On this record, we cannot say that the district court erred in admitting Imel’s
    testimony. Ricker and his attorney plainly knew that photos of Ricker’s hands had
    been taken pursuant to a warrant and were well aware of the videos Imel ultimately
    used for comparison, because they were central to the government’s case and had
    been provided in discovery. Although the government did not produce the
    comparison charts and exemplar photos with its initial notice of intent to present
    expert testimony, the March 5 notice disclosed that Imel would testify regarding the
    comparison, as well as his conclusion that the hand in the videos was Ricker’s.
    Visual comparisons of two images of hands may be within the province of an expert,
    but it is different from the “scientific and highly technical” nature of DNA evidence.
    See 
    Davis, 244 F.3d at 671
    . As the district court aptly stated, “[I]f the fingers in the
    video were different from Ricker’s, the very able defense attorney involved in the
    case would have presented such testimony.” D. Ct. Order of Apr. 10, 2019, at 18.
    E. Prior Conviction Determined by Court
    With respect to the four counts related to the transportation, distribution,
    receipt, and possession of child pornography, the superseding indictment alleged that
    Ricker “had a prior conviction under the laws of the State of South Dakota relating
    to the possession and distribution of child pornography.” Such a prior conviction
    under state law increases the statutory sentencing range for federal child pornography
    offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1),(2).
    The government presented evidence at trial that Ricker had pleaded guilty in
    April 2015 to possession or distribution of child pornography in Beadle County,
    South Dakota. Ricker admitted on cross-examination that he had been convicted of
    the state offense. Over Ricker’s objection, the district court concluded that the fact
    of the prior conviction was a determination for the court, not the jury, and thus it did
    not instruct the jury that the prior conviction was an element of the federal child
    pornography offenses. The court determined at sentencing that Ricker’s earlier
    -15-
    conviction constituted a qualifying prior conviction and that Ricker thus was subject
    to the enhanced sentencing ranges under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1), (2).
    Ricker argues that the question whether he had a prior state conviction for
    possession or distribution of child pornography should have been submitted to the
    jury because the existence of such a conviction increased the mandatory minimum
    sentences. See Alleyne v. United States, 
    570 U.S. 99
    , 103 (2013) (holding that “any
    fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to
    the jury”). But as Ricker recognizes, the Supreme Court has held that the fact of a
    prior conviction is a sentencing factor for the court to decide. Almendarez-Torres v.
    United States, 
    523 U.S. 224
    , 239-47 (1998); 
    Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 111
    n.1 (deciding
    to “not revisit” Almendarez-Torres because the parties did “not contest that decision’s
    vitality”); United States v. Abrahamson, 
    731 F.3d 751
    , 752 (8th Cir. 2013) (per
    curiam) (“[T]he Court in Alleyne left intact the rule that enhancements based on the
    fact of a prior conviction are an exception to the general rule that facts increasing the
    prescribed range of penalties must be presented to a jury.”). The district court thus
    did not err in determining that Ricker had a qualifying prior conviction, nor in
    refusing to submit the issue to the jury. We also reject Ricker’s arguments that the
    district court’s actions constituted a constructive amendment of or variance in the
    indictment. See United States v. Farish, 
    535 F.3d 815
    , 821-22 (8th Cir. 2008) (“A
    constructive amendment occurs when the essential elements of the offense as charged
    in the indictment are altered in such a manner—often through . . . jury
    instructions—that the jury is allowed to convict the defendant of an offense different
    from or in addition to the offenses charged in the indictment.” (quoting United States
    v. Whirlwind Soldier, 
    499 F.3d 862
    , 870 (8th Cir. 2007))); United States v.
    Buchanan, 
    574 F.3d 554
    , 564 (8th Cir. 2009) (“A variance arises when the evidence
    presented proves facts that are materially different from those alleged in the
    indictment.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
    -16-
    F. Sentence
    Ricker argues that his 600-month sentence is substantively unreasonable
    because the district court failed to adequately consider the impact of Ricker’s autism
    diagnosis. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (instructing the district court to consider “the
    history and characteristics of the defendant”). Ricker claims that his autism diagnosis
    is a mitigating factor because it “pushes him toward relationships with children,”
    causes him to be susceptible to manipulation, and results in immaturity and an
    undeveloped sense of responsibility. Appellant’s Br. 41. In support, he cites research
    indicating that “characteristics of autism may . . . predispose an autistic individual to
    sexual crimes,” Christine N. Cea, Note, Autism & the Criminal Defendant, 88 St.
    John’s L. Rev. 495, 502 (2014), as well as case law requiring district courts to
    consider a defendant’s mental disability and age, United States v. Williams, 
    553 F.3d 1073
    , 1085 (7th Cir. 2009) (remanding for the district court to consider the
    defendant’s “actual disability and the combination of his disability with his
    susceptibility to manipulation”); Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 58 (2007)
    (“Immaturity at the time of the offense conduct is not an inconsequential
    consideration.” (quoting United States v. Gall, 
    374 F. Supp. 2d 758
    , 762 n.2 (S.D.
    Iowa 2005))). Ricker contends that the need to protect the public from further crimes
    does not justify his sentence.
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Ricker. See United
    States v. Feemster, 
    572 F.3d 455
    , 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (standard of review).
    The court considered Ricker’s autism diagnosis and the ably presented argument
    regarding its impact, along with Ricker’s post-secondary education and solid work
    history, noting that Ricker’s personal characteristics weighed in favor of a below-
    Guidelines sentence. Against Ricker’s positive attributes, the court weighed the
    remaining 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors.
    -17-
    The court recounted the details of Ricker’s offenses, describing the case as
    “one of the worst child pornography cases that the Court has seen,” in part because
    Ricker recorded himself sexually abusing the victims and then distributed the
    recording. The court rejected the argument that Ricker had been manipulated by S.M.
    and J.M.’s mother, finding instead that Ricker had groomed the girls, in part by
    helping to support their mother. The court found Ricker’s testimony that perhaps the
    victims themselves took the photos and videos “completely ridiculous,” because the
    images depict an adult penis and Ricker’s fingers and because S.M. stated Ricker’s
    name in one of the videos. The court also considered the trove of child pornography
    that Ricker possessed and had meticulously organized. Before sentencing Ricker to
    a below-Guidelines sentence, the court found cause to subject Ricker to a severe
    punishment, to deter him from committing further crimes, and to protect the public
    from him. We thus conclude that the sentence is not substantively unreasonable, and
    we reject Ricker’s argument that “the mandatory minimum is unconstitutional as
    applied in this case.” Appellant’s Br. 44. See United States v. Rodriguez-Ramos,
    
    663 F.3d 356
    , 366 (8th Cir. 2011) (“A sentence within statutory limits is generally not
    subject to review under the Eighth Amendment.” (quoting United States v. Murphy,
    
    899 F.2d 714
    , 719 (8th Cir. 1990) (alteration omitted))).
    Conclusion
    The judgment is affirmed.
    ______________________________
    -18-