Kathy Swedberg v. Andrew Saul ( 2021 )


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  •                  United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 19-2916
    ___________________________
    Kathy Swedberg
    Plaintiff - Appellant
    v.
    Andrew Saul, Commissioner, Social Security Administration
    Defendant - Appellee
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the District of North Dakota - Fargo
    ____________
    Submitted: October 21, 2020
    Filed: March 16, 2021
    ____________
    Before COLLOTON, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    GRASZ, Circuit Judge.
    Kathy Swedberg appeals the district court’s 1 order upholding the Social
    Security Administration’s denial of her benefits claim. We affirm.
    1
    The Honorable Alice R. Senechal, United States Magistrate Judge for the
    District of North Dakota, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by
    consent of the parties pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 636
    (c).
    I. Background
    In March 2015, Swedberg filed an application for disability insurance benefits
    and disabled widow’s benefits. 2 Before seeking those benefits, Swedberg worked
    for the Army Reserve for twenty-six years. There, her job combined the duties of
    an administrative clerk and a combat rifle crewmember.
    The SSA initially denied Swedberg’s application and denied it a second time
    upon reconsideration. At Swedberg’s request, an SSA Administrative Law Judge
    conducted a hearing to address her claim. At the hearing, the ALJ received
    testimony from Swedberg and James Miller, a vocational expert (the “Vocational
    Expert”).
    The Vocational Expert testified that Swedberg’s physical limitations
    prevented her from performing her past work. The ALJ asked the Vocational Expert
    to respond to a hypothetical about possible jobs for Swedberg. In doing so, the ALJ
    asked the Vocational Expert to assume Swedberg’s age, education, and work
    experience, as well as limitations including (1) lifting or carrying “ten pounds
    occasionally and less than ten pounds frequently”; (2) sitting “for about six hours in
    an eight-hour workday”; (3) standing or walking “for about four hours in an eight-
    hour workday;” (4) frequently, but not constantly, fingering and feeling bilaterally
    with her hands; and (5) requiring no exposure to “extreme cold, extreme heat, high
    humidity, vibration” or “hazards such as unprotected heights and fast and dangerous
    moving machinery.” The Vocational Expert replied that, with the given limitations,
    Swedberg could work as (1) an appointment clerk, with 35,000 jobs available
    nationally; (2) a receptionist, with 140,000 jobs available nationally; or (3) an order
    clerk, with 50,000 jobs available nationally.
    2
    The health issues underlying Swedberg’s application are not disputed on
    appeal.
    -2-
    The ALJ upheld the denial of Swedberg’s claim. Relying on the Vocational
    Expert’s testimony and other evidence in the record, the ALJ concluded that
    Swedberg’s health limitations prevented her from performing the tasks associated
    with her former Army Reserve job. But, the ALJ found that Swedberg possessed
    relevant work skills that were transferable to the clerk and receptionist jobs listed by
    the Vocational Expert.
    Swedberg appealed the ALJ’s decision, and the Appeals Council declined
    review. She then appealed to the district court, and, on cross-motions for summary
    judgment, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the SSA,
    concluding that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision. Swedberg now
    appeals and argues the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence in
    the record as a whole because there was no foundation for the Vocational Expert’s
    testimony.
    II. Discussion
    We review de novo the district court’s decision upholding the SSA’s denial
    of benefits and will affirm the ALJ’s decision if it is supported by substantial
    evidence in the record as a whole. Renfrow v. Astrue, 
    496 F.3d 918
    , 920 (8th Cir.
    2007); Pickney v. Chater, 
    96 F.3d 294
    , 296 (8th Cir. 1996).
    The SSA uses a five-step “sequential evaluation process” for determining
    disability. 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1520
    (a)(4). The five steps are (1) whether the claimant
    is engaged in any substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe
    impairment; (3) whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals an impairment
    listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; (4) whether the claimant can
    return to the claimant’s past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant can perform
    other work in the national economy. 
    Id.
     § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v). Step five is at issue
    in this appeal.
    -3-
    A. Vocational Expert Testimony
    First, we address Swedberg’s main argument that the Vocational Expert based
    his opinion on insufficient information because he did not consider the complexities
    of Swedberg’s past relevant work when opining about the skills she possessed for
    future suitable employment.
    The role of a vocational expert is “to take into account medical limitations,
    including opinions as to work time limits, and offer an opinion on the ultimate
    question whether a claimant is capable of gainful employment.” Smallwood v.
    Chater, 
    65 F.3d 87
    , 89 (8th Cir. 1995). We have held a vocational expert’s opinion
    is valid when based on listening to a claimant’s earlier testimony. Tucker v.
    Barnhart, 130 F. App’x 67, 68 (8th Cir. 2005) (unpublished per curiam) (“Because
    the [vocational expert] was present when [claimant] testified about her age, past
    work, and educational level, it was not necessary for the ALJ to specify those in his
    hypothetical.”).
    From the Vocational Expert’s testimony, it is clear he relied on a “Past Work
    Summary” and Swedberg’s testimony as the basis for his opinion. Swedberg
    testified that she worked in an “administrative clerk type position” and engaged in
    some mild lifting of groceries and mail. She did not object when the ALJ
    characterized an administrative clerk position as “someone sitting at a nice desk just
    typing on the computer or filing papers.” And, Swedberg indicated in a disability
    report that she “had administrative duties, contracting, reserve center, unloaded
    freight, security, mail duties and payroll.”
    Our review of the record convinces us the Vocational Expert relied on
    sufficient evidence, such as Swedberg’s own testimony, when he formed his expert
    opinion. He considered Swedberg’s statements about coordinating meetings,
    scheduling training sessions, and performing inventory when he determined that she
    was qualified to perform jobs requiring data entry, record keeping, and
    administrative skills. Further, the Vocational Expert’s testimony and opinion are
    -4-
    consistent with Swedberg’s admissions. Thus, we hold that the Vocational Expert’s
    testimony relied on sufficient information to provide substantial support for the
    ALJ’s denial of benefits. 3
    B. SSA’s Burden of Proving Skill and Transferability
    1. Proving Evidence of Skill
    Swedberg first argues that the Vocational Expert’s testimony does not create
    substantial evidentiary support for the ALJ’s finding that Swedberg is qualified to
    perform work based on her limitations and skills. Because the Vocational Expert’s
    opinion is supported by Swedberg’s testimony, we disagree.
    An ALJ can rely on a vocational expert’s testimony to find a claimant has
    acquired skills that are transferable to another position. Fines v. Apfel, 
    149 F.3d 893
    ,
    895 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1566
    (e)). “Testimony from a vocational
    expert constitutes substantial evidence only when based on a properly phrased
    hypothetical question.” Pickney, 
    96 F.3d at
    296 (citing Cruze v. Chater, 
    85 F.3d 1320
    , 1323 (8th Cir. 1996)). If “a hypothetical question does not encompass all
    relevant impairments, the vocational expert’s testimony does not constitute
    substantial evidence.” 
    Id.
    The ALJ specifically asked the Vocational Expert if Swedberg possessed “any
    transferable skills that would transfer to any occupations within the parameters of
    th[e] hypothetical[.]” In response, the Vocational Expert stated that Swedberg had
    acquired several basic administrative skills, including data entry, record keeping,
    and office administrative skills. He also stated that Swedberg could perform
    positions with a specific vocational preparation level of three or four, meaning jobs
    3
    Swedberg argues the Vocational Expert’s testimony is unreliable because the
    expert improperly defined the term “skill” in his testimony. However, we conclude
    any purported error is harmless because the ALJ applied the proper SSA definition
    of skill in her decision.
    -5-
    that would require one-to-three or three-to-six months of training, respectively.
    Swedberg did not challenge the hypothetical question the ALJ posed to the
    Vocational Expert. On this basis alone, we can conclude substantial evidence in the
    record exists to support the denial of Swedberg’s claim. Pickney, 
    96 F.3d at 296
    (“Testimony from a vocational expert constitutes substantial evidence only when
    based on a properly phrased hypothetical question.”).
    However, other evidence in the record demonstrates that Swedberg possessed
    basic administrative skills. In a self-assessment, Swedberg indicated that her work
    duties included “administrative duties, contracting, reserve center, unload[ing]
    freight, security, mail duties and payroll.” And, in a consultative examination,
    Swedberg stated her previous job duties included “inventory, personnel records,
    logistics, facility management, contract retention, managing safety concerns in the
    building, manag[ing] mail[,] . . . writ[ing] specs/guidelines, coordinat[ing] the lawn
    service. . . . She said she wore many hats and had to do a variety of tasks.” In light
    of this evidence, we hold there is substantial evidence in the record to demonstrate
    that the SSA met its burden of demonstrating Swedberg derived the job skills listed
    above during her twenty-six-year career with the Army Reserve.
    2. Skill Transferability
    Swedberg also challenges the ALJ’s reliance on the Vocational Expert’s
    testimony stating that Swedberg’s job skills were transferable to other sedentary
    positions that could accommodate her limitations. Because the Vocational Expert’s
    opinion was properly rooted in Swedberg’s testimony, we uphold the ALJ’s
    decision.
    “An ALJ may rely on a vocational expert’s testimony as long as some of the
    identified jobs satisfy the claimant’s residual functional capacity.” Grable v. Colvin,
    
    770 F.3d 1196
    , 1202 (8th Cir. 2014). Here, the Vocational Expert testified that
    Swedberg’s transferable skills qualified her for sedentary jobs. The Vocational
    -6-
    Expert also opined that Swedberg would be qualified to perform positions using her
    data entry and recordkeeping skills.
    This evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Swedberg can transfer her job
    skills to new sedentary positions, such as the suggested positions of order clerk,
    receptionist, or appointment clerk. There is also sufficient evidence in the record to
    show that Swedberg possessed job skills that would transfer to other sedentary
    occupations. Accordingly, we hold substantial evidence supports the finding that
    the SSA met its burden.
    The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
    ______________________________
    -7-