Frank Robinson v. White County, AR , 459 F.3d 900 ( 2006 )


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  •                       United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 05-3362
    ___________
    Frank Robinson,                            *
    *
    Appellant,                   *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                                  * District Court for the
    * Eastern District of Arkansas.
    White County, Arkansas; Bob Parish, *
    individually and in his official capacity *
    as County Judge of White County,           *
    Arkansas; Pat Garrett, individually and *
    in his official capacity as Sheriff of     *
    White County, Arkansas,                    *
    *
    Appellees.                   *
    __________
    Submitted: July 10, 2006
    Filed: August 23, 2006
    ___________
    Before WOLLMAN and RILEY, Circuit Judges, and ROSENBAUM,1 District
    Judge.
    ___________
    RILEY, Circuit Judge.
    Frank Robinson (Robinson) filed a petition for rehearing and clarification in
    this case, urging this court to reverse the district court’s dismissal of Robinson’s state
    1
    The Honorable James M. Rosenbaum, Chief Judge, United States District
    Court for the District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.
    law claims against White County, Arkansas (White County), and Judge Bob Parish
    (Judge Parish). We grant the petition for rehearing, reverse the district court’s
    dismissal of Robinson’s state law claims against White County and Judge Parish, and
    remand this case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with our
    opinion.
    I.      DISCUSSION
    In his complaint, Robinson alleged claims under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     as well as
    six pendent state law claims against White County, Judge Parish, and Sheriff Pat
    Garrett (Sheriff Garrett) (collectively, the defendants). Robinson’s state law claims
    alleged a violation of the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, false arrest or false
    imprisonment, abuse of process, malicious prosecution, interference with a contractual
    relationship or business expectancy, and outrage. In moving for summary judgment
    in the district court, the defendants did not address the state law claims in detail, but
    merely stated that since Robinson’s arrest is lawful, “any alleged ulterior purposes . . .
    [and the state law] claims are irrelevant.” Noting the defendants made “no effort in
    their [summary judgment] motion to outline the elements for [Robinson’s] non-
    constitutional claims” beyond contending the arrest was lawful, the district court
    denied the defendants’ summary judgment motion in its entirety. The defendants then
    moved for reconsideration of the district court’s order and filed an amended summary
    judgment motion based on qualified immunity. Without any discussion or analysis
    of the state law claims, the district court entered summary judgment in the defendants’
    favor and dismissed Robinson’s entire complaint with prejudice.
    Robinson appealed. In our previous opinion, with regard to Robinson’s state
    law claims, we concluded the defendants “failed to identify any grounds beyond
    qualified immunity demonstrating the absence of genuine issues of material fact.”
    Robinson v. White County, Ark., 
    452 F.3d 706
    , 714 (8th Cir. 2006). Because we held
    Sheriff Garrett was not entitled to qualified immunity for Robinson’s unlawful arrest,
    we reversed the district court’s order granting summary judgment to Sheriff Garrett
    on Robinson’s state law claims. 
    Id.
     However, we affirmed the district court’s order
    -2-
    granting summary judgment to Judge Parish, and did not analyze Robinson’s state law
    claims against White County. 
    Id.
    Upon reexamination of our prior opinion, we now reverse the district court’s
    dismissal of the state law claims against all of the defendants. It is well settled “[t]he
    party seeking summary judgment must first identify grounds demonstrating the
    absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Urihen v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 
    346 F.3d 824
    , 827 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
    477 U.S. 317
    , 323
    (1986)). The defendants’ failure to do so, coupled with the district court’s failure to
    articulate its basis for dismissing the state law claims, persuades us summary
    judgment on the state law claims is inappropriate on this record.
    Thus, the state law claims remain viable against White County. Because Sheriff
    Garrett is an employee of White County, and we denied summary judgment to Sheriff
    Garrett, White County may be subject to suit under the state law claims for Sheriff
    Garrett’s conduct. The state law claims also remain viable against Judge Parish. In
    our previous opinion, we dismissed the state law claims against Judge Parish,
    concluding he had no power to participate in an arrest and thus did not undertake any
    unlawful act toward Robinson. However, some of Robinson’s state law claims may
    not depend on whether Judge Parish had the authority to participate in an arrest. In
    addition, we reiterate the defendants’ failure to demonstrate the absence of genuine
    issues of material fact on Robinson’s state law claims renders summary judgment
    inappropriate.
    II.    CONCLUSION
    We grant rehearing, and reverse the judgment of the district court dismissing
    Robinson’s state law claims against White County and Judge Parish. The portion of
    our opinion and judgment filed on July 3, 2006, affirming the dismissal of the state
    law claims is vacated. We otherwise affirm our earlier opinion, and remand to the
    district court for further proceedings on (1) Robinson’s individual capacity section
    -3-
    1983 claims against Sheriff Garrett, and (2) Robinson’s state law claims against White
    County, Judge Parish, and Sheriff Garrett.
    ___________________________
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-3362

Citation Numbers: 459 F.3d 900

Judges: Wollman, Riley, Rosenbaum

Filed Date: 8/23/2006

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024