United States v. Matthew Haymond, Sr. ( 2020 )


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  •                  United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 19-3426
    ___________________________
    United States of America
    lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    Matthew James Haymond, Sr.
    lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Iowa - Davenport
    ____________
    Submitted: September 21, 2020
    Filed: December 1, 2020
    [Unpublished]
    ____________
    Before LOKEN, SHEPHERD, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    PER CURIAM.
    Matthew Haymond appeals an order of the district court1 denying a motion to
    reduce his sentence pursuant to Section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018. Pub. L.
    1
    The Honorable John A. Jarvey, Chief Judge of the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Iowa.
    No. 115-391, § 404, 
    132 Stat. 5194
    , 5222 (2018). With one exception, his arguments
    on appeal have been rejected in our prior recent decisions resolving First Step Act
    issues. We affirm.
    In 2008, Haymond pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute at least 50 grams
    of cocaine base in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 846
     and 841(b)(1)(A). Because
    Haymond was a career offender with two or more prior serious drug or violent felony
    convictions, the district court imposed a life sentence, as then mandated by 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(A) (2009). Six years later, on motion by the government, the court
    reduced the sentence to 200 months.
    Section 404(b) of the First Step Act provides that, if the statutory penalty for
    an offense was modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (Pub.
    L. No. 111-220, 
    124 Stat. 2372
    ), the district court may “impose a reduced sentence
    as if sections 2 and 3 . . . were in effect at the time the covered offense was
    committed.” The Fair Sentencing Act increased from 50 to 280 grams the minimum
    quantity of cocaine base that calls for a sentence mandated by § 841(b)(1)(A). Thus,
    Haymond is eligible for First Step Act relief. See United States v. Banks, 
    960 F.3d 982
    , 984 (8th Cir. 2020); United States v. McDonald, 
    944 F.3d 769
    , 771 (8th Cir.
    2019).
    Haymond argued to the district court that, under the Fair Sentencing Act, his
    advisory guidelines range becomes the range as determined under the career offender
    provisions, not mandatory life imprisonment, and the court should reduce his
    sentence to the bottom of that range, 262 months, reduced by 50% to reflect the prior
    reduction of his initial sentence, in which case he would be released for time served.
    In his plea agreement, Haymond stipulated “that he distributed in excess of 50 grams
    of cocaine base (crack) in the course of the conspiracy and that he knew that others
    were involved with more than 4.5 kilograms of cocaine base.” In a Stipulation of
    Facts attached to the agreement, Haymond admitted receiving from a co-conspirator
    -2-
    between 63 and 126 grams of cocaine base every two to three days from mid-January
    2008, when his brother was arrested, until February 27, 2008, when Haymond was
    arrested, a total amount in excess of 280 grams. Based on the guilty plea and these
    fact admissions, the district court denied Haymond’s motion for First Step Act relief:
    The defendant is entitled to retroactive application of the Fair
    Sentencing Act of 2010. If indicted today, given the amount of crack
    cocaine that the defendant admitted as a part of his conspiracy, he would
    still be subject to mandatory life in prison. Nothing has changed except
    for the requirement that the drug quantity was increased from 50 to 280
    grams in order to trigger the mandatory minimum ten year term of
    incarceration. The defendant is not entitled to relief.
    On appeal, in addition to arguing he is eligible for First Step Act relief, which
    our recent cases have now established, Haymond argues the district court erred by
    failing to appreciate its broad discretion to grant a sentence reduction under the First
    Step Act. This argument is foreclosed by our recent decision in United States v.
    Booker, 
    974 F.3d 869
     (8th Cir. 2020), in which we affirmed Chief Judge Jarvey’s
    denial of another First Step Act motion a few months before he issued the order here
    under review. In Booker, we confirmed that the district court is “not required to make
    an affirmative statement acknowledging its broad discretion under Section 404.” 974
    F.3d at 871, citing Banks, 960 F.3d at 985. Rather, the standard for appellate review
    is whether the court “set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has
    considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own
    legal decisionmaking authority.” Id., quoting Rita v. United States, 
    551 U.S. 338
    ,
    356 (2007).
    Here, the district court -- which had sentenced Haymond in 2010 -- stated that
    “nothing has changed except for the [Fair Sentencing Act’s] requirement . . . to
    trigger the mandatory minimum,” and the sentencing record established that
    Haymond’s admitted offense conduct would still trigger a mandatory minimum life
    -3-
    sentence under 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(B) in effect when the Fair Sentencing Act was
    enacted. Our recent cases have rejected Haymond’s assertion that the court erred by
    failing to consider a myriad of factors, including those under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a), in
    exercising its First Step Act discretion. The First Step Act permits but “does not
    mandate that district courts analyze the section 3553 factors for a permissive
    reduction in sentence.” United States v. Hoskins, 
    973 F.3d 918
    , 921 (8th Cir. 2020),
    quoting United States v. Moore, 
    963 F.3d 725
    , 727 (8th Cir. 2020); see Banks, 960
    F.3d at 985.
    Haymond further argues the district court erred in finding that he admitted
    personal responsibility for more than 280 grams of crack cocaine. The question is
    important because, under the statutory penalties as amended by the Fair Sentencing
    Act, a person who committed an offense involving less than 280 grams of cocaine
    base “shall be sentenced” to a term not less than 10 years and not more than life. 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(B)(iii) (2011). If that statute applies, then Haymond’s guidelines
    range under the Fair Sentencing Act would be determined by his career offender
    status, 262 to 327 months imprisonment, rather than a mandatory minimum life
    sentence, a change that would affect the district court’s analysis under the First Step
    Act. Reviewing the district court’s finding of drug quantity for clear error, we
    conclude the court did not clearly err in basing its more-than-280-gram finding on a
    Stipulation of Facts signed by Haymond and attached to his plea agreement. See
    United States v. Goodrich, 
    754 F.3d 569
    , 572 (8th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 
    577 U.S. 944
     (2015)
    The Order of the district court dated October 28, 2019, is affirmed.
    ______________________________
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-3426

Filed Date: 12/1/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/1/2020