United States v. Wilbur Turner ( 2020 )


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  •                  United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 20-1740
    ___________________________
    United States of America
    lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    Wilbur Turner
    lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Iowa - Cedar Rapids
    ____________
    Submitted: September 21, 2020
    Filed: December 4, 2020
    [Unpublished]
    ____________
    Before KELLY, WOLLMAN, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    PER CURIAM.
    Wilbur Turner appeals the nine-month prison sentence he received for violating
    the conditions of his supervised release, arguing the sentence is substantively
    unreasonable. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
    In 2013, Turner pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute crack
    cocaine and cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(B), 846. The district
    court1 sentenced him to 70 months (later reduced to 60 months) in prison and four
    years of supervised release. Turner began serving his first term of supervised release
    in December 2018. A month later, the district court revoked his supervised release
    for failure to comply with mandatory drug testing and use of a controlled substance,
    and imposed a seven-month prison sentence and a three-year term of supervised
    release. Turner began serving his second term of supervised release in August 2019.
    In April 2020, the district court again revoked his supervised release for several
    violations, including failure to participate in mandatory substance abuse testing and
    use of a controlled substance, and imposed a nine-month prison sentence and a one-
    year term of supervised release. This appeal concerns the second revocation
    sentence.
    We review the substantive reasonableness of a revocation sentence under the
    same deferential abuse of discretion standard we apply to an initial sentence. See
    United States v. Hall, 
    931 F.3d 694
    , 696 (8th Cir. 2019). The district court abuses its
    discretion when it “(1) fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received
    significant weight; (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or
    (3) considers only the appropriate factors but in weighing those factors commits a
    clear error of judgment.” United States v. Marshall, 
    891 F.3d 716
    , 719 (8th Cir.
    2018) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Feemster, 
    572 F.3d 455
    , 461 (8th Cir.
    2009) (en banc)).
    Turner argues that his second revocation sentence is substantively unreasonable
    because the district court failed to consider mitigating factors that would have
    warranted a shorter sentence, particularly in light of the ongoing COVID-19
    1
    The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern
    District of Iowa.
    -2-
    pandemic. First, he argues the district court gave insufficient weight to his “strong
    history of employment.” Second, Turner asserts the district court failed to consider
    that he is the sole financial provider for his wife and her grandchildren. Third, he
    contends the district court did not take into account that his hyperthyroidism,
    hypertension, and anxiety could elevate his risk of severe illness if he were to contract
    COVID-19 while incarcerated.
    Based on our review of the record, we find the district court sufficiently
    considered the sentencing factors, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e)(3), and did not rely
    on any improper factor or commit a clear error of judgment. The district court also
    addressed and gave appropriate consideration to the mitigating factors that Turner
    raised in support of a lower sentence. Turner’s sentence of nine months was within
    the advisory Guidelines range of 5–11 months, and nothing in the record suggests the
    sentence was an abuse of the district court’s discretion. See 
    Feemster, 572 F.3d at 464
    (“[I]t will be the unusual case when we reverse a district court sentence—whether
    within, above, or below the applicable Guidelines range—as substantively
    unreasonable.” (quoting United States v. Gardellini, 
    545 F.3d 1089
    , 1090 (D.C. Cir.
    2008))).
    We affirm the judgment of the district court.
    ______________________________
    -3-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 20-1740

Filed Date: 12/4/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/4/2020