League of Women Voters of MO v. John Ashcroft ( 2021 )


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  •                  United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 20-2440
    ___________________________
    League of Women Voters of Missouri, St. Louis A. Philip Randolph Institute, and
    Greater Kansas City A. Philip Randolph Institute
    lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellees
    v.
    John R. Ashcroft, in his official capacity as Missouri Secretary of State, and Joel
    W. Walters, in his official capacity as Director of the Missouri Department of
    Revenue
    lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellants
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Western District of Missouri
    ____________
    Submitted: April 14, 2021
    Filed: July 26, 2021
    ____________
    Before KELLY, GRASZ, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    KELLY, Circuit Judge.
    In April 2018, the League of Women Voters, the St. Louis A. Philip Randolph
    Institute, and the Greater Kansas City A. Philip Randolph Institute (together,
    Plaintiffs) sued the Missouri Secretary of State and the Director of the Missouri
    Department of Revenue (together, Missouri) under Section 5 of the National Voter
    Registration Act of 1993. See 
    52 U.S.C. §§ 20504
    , 20510(b). Plaintiffs
    subsequently obtained a preliminary injunction requiring Missouri to send voter
    registration forms to thousands of Missouri citizens and to make certain changes to
    its voter registration procedures in time for the 2018 midterm elections.
    In November 2019, the parties entered into a settlement agreement that
    resolved all remaining issues except for attorney’s fees. Noting that Missouri did
    not dispute Plaintiffs’ status as the prevailing party, the district court 1 granted
    Plaintiffs’ motion for attorney’s fees a few months later and awarded Plaintiffs
    $1,143,627.96 in fees and $27,484.15 in litigation expenses. See 
    id.
     § 20510(c) (“In
    a civil action under this section, the court may allow the prevailing party . . .
    reasonable attorney fees, including litigation expenses, and costs.”). Missouri now
    appeals the fee award. Having jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , we affirm.
    I.
    “We review de novo the legal issues related to an award of attorneys’ fees,
    while the actual award is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Snider v. City of
    Cape Girardeau, 
    752 F.3d 1149
    , 1159 (8th Cir. 2014). “A district court by definition
    abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.” Koon v. United States, 
    518 U.S. 81
    , 100 (1996). It is also an abuse of discretion to fail to consider “a relevant
    factor that should have been given significant weight,” consider and give significant
    weight to “an irrelevant or improper factor,” or “commit[] a clear error of judgment”
    in weighing the appropriate factors. EEOC v. Prod. Fabricators, Inc., 
    666 F.3d 1170
    ,
    1172 (8th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up).
    Missouri first argues that the district court failed to conduct a meaningful
    review of Plaintiffs’ billing records when it calculated the lodestar amount using the
    number of hours that Plaintiffs submitted for compensation. The “lodestar” is often
    “[t]he starting point in determining attorney fees” and “is calculated by multiplying
    1
    The Honorable Brian C. Wimes, United States District Judge for the Western
    District of Missouri.
    -2-
    the number of hours reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly rates.” Fish v.
    St. Cloud State Univ., 
    295 F.3d 849
    , 851 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing Hensley v.
    Eckerhart, 
    461 U.S. 424
    , 433 (1983)). This method is meant to produce “an award
    that roughly approximates the fee that the prevailing attorney would have received
    if he or she had been representing a paying client who was billed by the hour in a
    comparable case.” Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 
    559 U.S. 542
    , 551 (2010); see
    also 
    id. at 554
     (“[T]here is a strong presumption that the lodestar figure is reasonable
    . . . .” (cleaned up)). Here, Plaintiffs represented in their petition that they expended
    3,753.96 hours on this case. To avoid duplicative billing, however, they voluntarily
    reduced that amount to 3,251.38 hours by excluding certain activities from their
    request, such as attorneys participating in settlement calls rather than leading them.
    The district court found Plaintiffs’ “voluntarily reduced time expenditures”
    reasonable. Missouri now contends that the district court failed to address
    Missouri’s specific objections—for example, that Plaintiffs’ billing records were
    vague, involved too many attorneys, and reflected excessive time expenditures—and
    thus, that the court failed to independently review Plaintiffs’ fee petition. See
    Johnston v. Comerica Mortg. Corp., 
    83 F.3d 241
    , 246 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting that
    the district court “bears the responsibility of scrutinizing attorney fee requests”). We
    disagree.
    For one, Missouri fails to provide any support for the proposition that a district
    court abuses its discretion by not specifically addressing every issue of contention.
    To the contrary, even general language from the district court can indicate “that it
    considered the reasonableness and necessity” of the requested fees and “that it
    considered and rejected” a party’s objections to the award. Craftsmen Limousine,
    Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 
    579 F.3d 894
    , 897 (8th Cir. 2009); see also Rawa v.
    Monsanto Co., 
    934 F.3d 862
    , 870 (8th Cir. 2019) (concluding that district court’s
    statement “that it had taken both the parties’ arguments and the submitted billing
    records under careful consideration in determining the fee award” was enough to
    show that it “fulfilled its responsibility of providing a concise but clear explanation
    of its reasons” (cleaned up)). And here, the district court offered more than just
    general language. For instance, in rejecting Missouri’s argument that too many
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    attorneys were involved on Plaintiffs’ side, the district court noted that “multiple
    attorneys are commonly used in multiple party litigation” and explained that
    Plaintiffs’ voluntary reductions resulted in a request for fees “for no more than two
    attorneys for any task performed.” This analysis of the attorney-to-task ratio,
    together with the district court’s various references to specific submissions and
    arguments made by the parties, demonstrates that the district court closely
    scrutinized Plaintiffs’ billing records. See Stodghill v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union,
    Local 50, 
    192 F.3d 1159
    , 1165 (8th Cir. 1999) (rejecting the argument that the “trial
    court’s method for calculating [the fee award] was too vague and was not explained
    in sufficient detail” because “[t]here is no precise rule or formula for making these
    determinations” and “[i]t seem[ed] clear . . . from the court’s order that it estimated”
    the fee award “to the best of its ability” (cleaned up)).
    In any event, Missouri has largely failed to point to specific tasks in the billing
    records that were overstaffed or for which the time expended was excessive. See
    Loughner v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 
    260 F.3d 173
    , 178 (3d Cir. 2001) (explaining that
    “[t]he party opposing the fee award has the burden to challenge . . . the
    reasonableness of the requested fee” through “affidavit or brief” and “with sufficient
    specificity to give applicants notice” (cleaned up)). The district court “need not, and
    indeed should not, become [a] green-eyeshade accountant[].” Fox v. Vice, 
    563 U.S. 826
    , 838 (2011). After all, the “[t]he essential goal in shifting fees (to either party)
    is to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection.” 
    Id.
     On this record, and
    given the district court’s “superior understanding of the litigation,” 
    id.
     (quoting
    Hensley, 
    461 U.S. at 437
    ), we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
    discretion in finding that Plaintiffs reasonably expended 3,251.38 hours on this
    matter.2
    2
    Missouri also asserts that the district court erred in “allow[ing] the hourly
    rates sought by Plaintiffs’ out-of-state attorneys.” Because Missouri “do[es] not
    develop [its] argument beyond that single sentence, we hold that [it has] forfeited
    it.” Sturgis Motorcycle Rally, Inc. v. Rushmore Photo & Gifts, Inc., 
    908 F.3d 313
    ,
    341 (8th Cir. 2018).
    -4-
    Missouri also contends that the district court abused its discretion by failing
    to apply the Johnson factors in evaluating the reasonableness of the lodestar
    amount.3 See Hardman v. Bd. of Educ. of Dollarway, 
    714 F.2d 823
    , 825 (8th Cir.
    1983) (per curiam) (noting that “this court has adopted the guidelines for
    determining attorneys’ fees set forth” in Johnson); 4 Johnson v. Ga. Highway
    Express, Inc., 
    488 F.2d 714
    , 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974), abrogated on other grounds by
    Blanchard v. Bergeron, 
    489 U.S. 87
    , 90 (1989). After calculating a fee award using
    either the lodestar method or the percentage-of-the-fund method, district courts
    generally evaluate “the ultimate reasonableness of the award . . . by considering
    relevant factors from the twelve factors listed” in Johnson. In re Target Corp.
    Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 
    892 F.3d 968
    , 977 (8th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up).
    Here, the district court recited all twelve Johnson factors twice and explained that
    3
    The twelve Johnson factors are:
    (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the
    questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
    (4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of
    the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or
    contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the
    circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the
    experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the
    “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and length of the
    professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar
    cases.
    Hensley, 
    461 U.S. at
    430 n.3.
    4
    Because the Supreme Court’s decision in Perdue calls into some question the
    role the Johnson factors play in evaluating the reasonableness of an attorney’s fees
    award, we assume without deciding that the Johnson factors apply here. See Perdue,
    
    559 U.S. at 551-52
    ; see also 
    id.
     (comparing the Johnson factors to the lodestar
    method and (1) explaining that the latter has become “the guiding light of our fee-
    shifting jurisprudence,” and (2) characterizing the lodestar method as “objective”—
    “unlike the Johnson approach”—and thus helps “cabin[] the discretion of trial
    judges, permits meaningful judicial review, and produces reasonably predictable
    results” (cleaned up)).
    -5-
    the fee request was reasonable based in part on “Plaintiffs’ success on the merits at
    the preliminary injunction stage and the time-sensitive nature of the claims,”
    “counsels’ relative litigation experience,” and “the general importance of the issues
    presented”—thus invoking the first, second, seventh, eighth, and ninth factors. This
    is sufficient indication that it meaningfully considered the Johnson factors that it
    found “relevant to this litigation.” Hardman, 
    714 F.2d at 825
    ; see also In re Target
    Corp., 892 F.3d at 977 (finding no abuse of discretion where district court “did not
    mention Johnson” but “expressed its view . . . that the award was justified by the
    time and labor required, the difficulty of the matter, the skills necessary to prevail .
    . . , and the length of the representation”).
    II.
    Because the district court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.
    ______________________________
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