United States v. William Trimble, Jr. ( 2023 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 22-2168
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
William Trimble, Jr.
Defendant - Appellant
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No. 22-2852
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
William Trimble, Jr.
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa - Central
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Submitted: April 10, 2023
Filed: April 28, 2023
[Unpublished]
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Before SMITH, Chief Judge, MELLOY and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
In the decade following William Trimble, Jr.’s conviction for possession of
child pornography, he has been released from prison on supervision, violated the
conditions of his supervised release, and returned to prison on four separate
occasions. The reasons for the revocations included unauthorized access to the
internet and computers, viewing pornography and child pornography, prohibited
contact with minors, and prohibited contact with a known sex offender. In the instant
case, Trimble sought a modification of his supervised release conditions to allow
him access to the internet and internet-capable devices without the approval of his
probation officer so that he could attend a local community college. The district
court1 declined to modify Trimble’s conditions, and he appeals. We affirm.
As part of his judgment entered in 2013, Trimble has been subject to a special
condition of supervision that prohibits him from possessing or using “a computer or
any other device with an internal, external, or wireless modem, without the prior
approval of the U.S. Probation Officer.” During his first revocation in 2018, Trimble
was found to have violated several release conditions, including possession of an
internet-capable device, accessing the internet, associating with felons, and failure
to comply with the sex offender registry. He filed a pro se motion to modify the
terms of his supervised release, challenging the conditions prohibiting him from: (1)
1
The Honorable Stephanie M. Rose, Chief Judge, United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa.
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possessing a media storage device; (2) being employed at a location where he would
encounter minors; and (3) working at a business that derives most of its revenue
from alcohol sales. The district court denied the motion and this Court affirmed on
appeal. United States v. Trimble, 969 F.3d 853 (8th Cir. 2020).
In 2020, Trimble’s supervised release was revoked a second time for
possessing an internet-capable device and having contact with a minor. In 2021,
Trimble’s supervised release was revoked by the district court for a third time when
he possessed a camera, had contact with a minor, violated residential reentry center
rules, and failed to provide truthful information to probation.
In May 2022, Trimble unsuccessfully sought to modify the terms of his
supervised release to allow him to use computers without first seeking the
permission of his probation officer. In August 2022, Trimble added a twist, claiming
the condition deprived him of an education because he needed access to a computer
and the internet to enroll at a local community college. He appeals the district court’s
denial of his motions. While the appeals were pending, the district court revoked
Trimble’s supervised release for a fourth time and sentenced him to 24 months’
imprisonment to be followed by four years of supervised release.
District courts have statutory authority to “modify, reduce, or enlarge the
conditions of supervised release, at any time prior to the expiration or termination of
the term of supervised release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2). We review a district court’s
denial of a motion to modify a defendant’s term of supervised release for an abuse
of discretion. United States v. Norris, 62 F.4th 441, 449 (8th Cir. 2023).
Trimble challenges the supervised release condition that prohibits him from
accessing the internet and possessing or using computers, internet-capable devices,
cellular telephones, and other electronic communications, data storage devices, or
media without the prior approval of his supervising probation officer. While
Trimble contends this condition imposes a greater restriction on his liberty than is
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reasonably necessary, this Court previously determined that the condition is
permissible. Trimble, 969 F.3d at 857-58.
Trimble points to United States v. Crume, 422 F.3d 728 (8th Cir. 2005), to
support his argument that the internet restriction condition is overly broad. In
Crume, this Court found that a total ban on internet and computer access was too
broad because “the record is devoid of evidence that [the defendant] has ever used
his computer for anything beyond simply possessing child pornography.” Id. at 733.
But this case involves substantial evidence that Trimble has used his computer for
inappropriate conduct beyond simply possessing child pornography. Trimble’s
supervised release was revoked not only for possessing child pornography, but also
for having contact with a minor and for using a cell phone to take pictures of women
and send them to another person. See, e.g., United States v. Strubberg, 929 F.3d
969, 979-80 (8th Cir. 2019) (affirming internet prohibition where defendant’s search
history revealed interest in how to arrange sexual relations with a minor); United
States v. Perrin, 926 F.3d 1044, 1050 (8th Cir. 2019) (determining that internet
prohibition justified by evidence of production of child pornography); United States
v. Bender, 566 F.3d 748, 751 (8th Cir. 2009) (collecting cases where we have
“affirmed computer and internet restrictions where the defendants sold, transferred,
produced, or attempted to arrange sexual relations with minors”). Further, as we
previously noted, this condition “is not an absolute prohibition, and it specifically
contemplates that Trimble’s probation officer may allow access to these devices for
employment purposes.” Trimble, 969 F.3d at 857. Given Trimble’s repeated
violations, which involve activities such as viewing pornography—including child
pornography and contacting another convicted sex offender—we find no abuse of
discretion by the district court.
We also reject Trimble’s challenge on the ground that the condition prevents
him from pursuing an education. The district court found that: “Trimble has yet to
demonstrate he has made much progress in his rehabilitation and the Court is not
satisfied that his conditions should be modified to allow him to use a computer for
online classes.” Trimble contends that in the past, probation was willing to allow
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him to enroll at a local community college that used monitoring software on its
computers. But then, Trimble violated the conditions of his supervised release and
was sent back to prison. Upon his release, he enrolled at the college but was
informed by probation that it would not authorize the use of any computers at that
time.
Trimble concedes that his probation officer will consider allowing him to
enroll in community college if he passes a polygraph test. Based on the evidence in
the record, Trimble has not availed himself of this opportunity. If Trimble seeks an
educational opportunity that requires him to use a computer and the internet, his
probation officer has indicated he can enroll in college if Trimble establishes that he
is trustworthy. The district court’s decision that Trimble has yet to demonstrate
sufficient trustworthiness is not unreasonable on this record, which demonstrates
that since the time his motion was filed, he has once again had his supervised release
revoked for unauthorized use of computers and violations of the sex offender registry
requirements. Trimble is currently serving his fourth revocation sentence. Given
Trimble’s repeated violations of his release conditions, Trimble cannot show the
district court abused its wide discretion in declining to modify his conditions of
supervised release.
In light of the nature of Trimble’s conviction and his continued improper use
of electronic devices in violation of his supervised release terms, restricting
Trimble’s access to the internet, computers, and media storage devices is reasonably
related to the sentencing factors and the Sentencing Commission’s pertinent policy
statements. See United States v. Carson, 924 F.3d 467, 474 (8th Cir. 2019)
(upholding challenges to supervise release conditions when the reasons for their
imposition are “sufficiently evident from the record”). We find no abuse of
discretion by the district court.
The district court’s judgment is affirmed.
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