Mario Alberto Selvan-Selvan v. Eric H. Holder, Jr. , 564 F. App'x 251 ( 2014 )


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  •                  United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 13-2092
    ___________________________
    Mario Alberto Selvan-Selvan
    lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner
    v.
    Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General of the United States
    lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent
    ____________
    Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    ____________
    Submitted: February 14, 2014
    Filed: April 29, 2014
    [Unpublished]
    ____________
    Before SMITH, BEAM, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    PER CURIAM.
    Mario Alberto Selvan-Selvan, a native citizen of Mexico, petitions for review
    of the Board of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") decision, affirming the immigration
    judge's ("IJ") denial of his motions to reopen and to stay his removal proceedings.
    We deny the petition.
    I.    BACKGROUND
    In 1999, Selvan-Selvan entered the United States without permission. On July
    6, 2012, the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") filed a Notice to Appear,
    initiating removal proceedings against Selvan-Selvan. On July 30, 2012, Selvan-
    Selvan appeared before the IJ and admitted all factual allegations, conceded
    removability and requested voluntary departure. The IJ granted voluntary departure
    and ordered Selvan-Selvan's departure on or before August 7, 2012. The IJ also
    entered an alternative order for departure stating that, if the voluntary departure
    conditions were not met, voluntary departure would be withdrawn and Selvan-Selvan
    would be removed to Mexico.
    On August 6, 2012, one day before his voluntary departure period expired,
    Selvan-Selvan filed motions to reopen and to stay his removal. Selvan-Selvan
    requested the IJ reopen his removal proceedings in order to allow him to apply for
    Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals ("DACA")1 relief. On August 7, 2012, the
    IJ denied the motions for numerous reasons: (1) Selvan-Selvan was ineligible to
    obtain prosecutorial discretion under DACA because he was not currently in school,
    had not completed high school or obtained an equivalent degree, nor had he served
    in the Coast Guard or Armed Forces; (2) Selvan-Selvan was previously evaluated for
    DACA relief; and (3) the IJ was without jurisdiction to grant Selvan-Selvan
    prosecutorial discretion. DHS removed Selvan-Selvan from the United States upon
    the IJ's decision, pursuant to the IJ's initial, alternative order for departure.
    1
    On June 15, 2012, the Secretary of Homeland Security announced that certain
    people who came to the United States as children and meet several key guidelines
    may request consideration of deferred action under DACA. See Patel v. Att'y Gen.
    of the U.S., 
    523 F. App'x 121
    , 123-24 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
    -2-
    Selvan-Selvan appealed the IJ's denial to the BIA, and the BIA affirmed. The
    BIA reasoned that reopening Selvan-Selvan's removal proceedings was not warranted
    because he had not demonstrated the prima facie case of eligibility for any form of
    relief from removal that the IJ or BIA had the power to grant and that removal was
    proper. Selvan-Selvan petitioned this court for review of the BIA's order.
    II.   DISCUSSION
    Selvan-Selvan asserts that the BIA abused its discretion in denying his motion
    to reopen. Having jurisdiction pursuant to 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a)(1), we review the
    BIA's decision denying a motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion. Hanan v.
    Mukasey, 
    519 F.3d 760
    , 763 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting our jurisdiction to review an
    order denying a motion to reopen); Quinteros v. Holder, 
    707 F.3d 1006
    , 1009 (8th
    Cir. 2013) (stating our standard of review).
    Selvan-Selvan contends that both the IJ and BIA erred in denying his motion
    to reopen on the grounds that they lacked jurisdiction to grant DACA relief. Selvan-
    Selvan asserts that he was not asking the IJ and BIA to grant him DACA relief, but
    rather he was motioning to reopen his removal proceedings to allow him to apply for
    DACA relief. A motion to reopen, however, must "present new facts that are material
    to the outcome of the proceeding and were neither available nor discoverable at the
    prior hearing." Quinteros, 707 F.3d at 1009 (internal quotation omitted). Here, the
    IJ noted that the evidence indicated that "ICE looked into [Selvan-Selvan's] eligibility
    for this relief but found [that] although he attended [high school], he stopped
    attending to work; he is not currently in school; has not obtained a GED; nor has [he]
    served or been honorably discharged from the Coast Guard or Armed Forces of the
    United States," and, was thus not eligible for the requested relief. The BIA affirmed
    -3-
    the IJ, recognizing that Selvan-Selvan had not presented additional evidence
    regarding his DACA claims. We too find that Selvan-Selvan's eligibility for DACA
    relief was previously considered, and the facts do not indicate a change in eligibility.
    Thus, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Selvan-Selvan's motion to
    reopen.
    Selvan-Selvan also asserts that his immediate removal after the IJ's opinion
    violated his due process and equal protection rights. Selvan-Selvan did not present
    these arguments to the BIA, and consequently they are not properly before us.
    Mambwe v. Holder, 
    572 F.3d 540
    , 551 (8th Cir. 2009) (concluding that we may not
    consider a due process claim relating to the IJ's proceedings that was not presented
    to the BIA).2
    III.   CONCLUSION
    For these reasons, we deny Selvan-Selvan's petition for review.
    ______________________________
    2
    Mambwe recognizes the split of authority in our circuit about "'whether the
    failure to raise an issue before the BIA is a jurisdictionally-fatal failure to exhaust an
    administrative remedy . . . [under] 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (d)(1),' or if it 'simply raises the
    non-jurisdictional question whether review of that issue is precluded by the doctrine
    of administrative exhaustion.'" 
    572 F.3d at 550
     (quoting Zine v. Mukasey, 
    517 F.3d 535
    , 539-40 (8th Cir. 2008)). This distinction, however, does not impact our analysis,
    because even assuming that Selvan-Selvan's failure to raise the issue is not
    jurisdictional, we see no reason why an exception to the issue exhaustion requirement
    would be warranted here, as his arguments have no merit. 
    Id.
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-2092

Citation Numbers: 564 F. App'x 251

Judges: Smith, Beam, Benton

Filed Date: 4/29/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024