Scott Halley v. Kilolo Kijakazi ( 2023 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 22-1934
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Scott M. Halley
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner of Social Security Administration
Defendant - Appellee
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri - Hannibal
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Submitted: January 10, 2023
Filed: May 18, 2023
[Unpublished]
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Before KELLY, ERICKSON, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
An administrative law judge denied social-security benefits to Scott Halley,
who suffers from heart issues and migraine headaches. The district court1 affirmed,
and so do we.
1
The Honorable Sarah E. Pitlyk, United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Missouri.
Halley’s health problems began in 2017, when he suffered a heart attack,
followed by a brain bleed that required multiple surgeries. His current complaints
include “constant” light-induced migraine headaches and “continuous” chest pain
“on a daily basis.” According to him, these conditions are disabling because he
needs to “lie[] down 10-12 hours a day” and has become “dependent on other
people.”
The administrative law judge viewed the evidence differently. Halley had
“some limitations,” to be sure, but they were not enough to take him out of the
workforce. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) (defining “disability,” as relevant here,
as an inability to work because of a “physical or mental impairment”); see also 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). Key to this finding were the answers to a series
of hypothetical questions posed to a vocational expert, who testified that Halley
could still work as a short-order cook or salad maker. As long as there has been “no
legal error,” and “substantial evidence” supports the decision to deny benefits, we
will affirm. Papesh v. Colvin, 786 F.3d 1126, 1131 (8th Cir. 2015) (citation
omitted).
Halley’s position is that the administrative law judge made a mistake by
disregarding his testimony. What the decision says, however, is that, although
Halley has “some limitations,” the “entire record” is inconsistent with anything
more. See Cox v. Barnhart, 471 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006); 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1529, 416.929. It then gave reasons why. Among them were his “largely
normal” scans and physical exams since 2017. See Steed v. Astrue, 524 F.3d 872,
875 (8th Cir. 2008) (affirming the denial of disability benefits, in part, because
diagnostic tests and exams came back “normal” or showed “minimal” problems).
Not to mention that his headaches were “conservatively managed,” and he only took
his heart medication occasionally. See Lawrence v. Saul, 970 F.3d 989, 996 (8th
Cir. 2020) (noting that a “generally conservative treatment” plan supported a finding
that the claimant could perform sedentary work).
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Other evidence contradicted Halley’s account too. Activities like “car[ing]
for his disabled wife” or “cleaning the bathroom[]” were “inconsistent with his
complaints of disabling pain,” Riggins v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 689, 693 (8th Cir. 1999).
See Ponder v. Colvin, 770 F.3d 1190, 1195–96 (8th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (stating
that “wash[ing] dishes” and “shop[ping] for groceries” served to “undermine[ the]
assertion of total disability”). Trying to reconcile the evidence and resolve
inconsistencies is exactly what we ask factfinders to do. See Davis v. Apfel, 239
F.3d 962, 968 (8th Cir. 2001) (“Subjective complaints may be discounted if there
are inconsistencies in the record as a whole . . . .” (quotation marks omitted)).
The findings then become the ingredients for the hypothetical questions posed
to the vocational expert. See Perkins v. Astrue, 648 F.3d 892, 902 (8th Cir. 2011).
As we have explained, the questions must capture “the impairments . . . accepted as
true by the” administrative law judge. House v. Shalala, 34 F.3d 691, 694 (8th Cir.
1994) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Here, they did.
The judgment is accordingly affirmed.
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