United States v. Jimi Evan ( 2023 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 22-3024
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United States of America
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee
v.
Jimi Lee Evan
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of North Dakota - Western
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Submitted: June 12, 2023
Filed: June 30, 2023
[Unpublished]
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Before GRUENDER, ARNOLD, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
After Jimi Lee Evan pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual exploitation of a
child, see 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), (e), the district court1 sentenced him to two
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The Honorable Daniel M. Traynor, United States District Judge for the District
of North Dakota.
consecutive thirty-year prison terms. Evan maintains that the total sixty-year sentence
is substantively unreasonable because the district court gave significant weight to an
improper or irrelevant consideration in fixing his sentence and committed a clear
error of judgment in weighing the sentencing considerations. We affirm.
A presentence investigation report determined that the recommended sentence
for Evan under the Sentencing Guidelines was life in prison but that, since the
statutory-maximum sentence for each count was thirty years, the Guidelines
recommended that Evan receive a sixty-year sentence. See USSG § 5G1.2(b). Evan
did not object to the PSR's determination of the recommended sentence.
At sentencing, defense counsel recommended a thirty-year sentence and argued
that the government's fifty-year recommendation was too harsh. She explained, "the
available treatment opportunities now versus 10 years from now versus 20 years from
now and the staggering leaps and bounds that can be made scientifically, medically,
in those potentially 20, 30 years, we could be looking at a completely different course
of treating sex offenders," and so a fifty-year sentence "does not allow him to benefit
from potential available treatment." After asking defense counsel questions about
some of the circumstances of the offense and Evan's personal history and
characteristics, the court asked for "the prognosis for a gentleman in his late fifties
getting out of federal prison," which was the age when Evan would be released after
a thirty-year sentence. Defense counsel reviewed some of the treatment and
educational opportunities Evan would receive while in prison that would position him
for success upon his release.
The court then returned to the "hypothesis that some magic formula is going
to be developed to cure people" who sexually abuse children, and defense counsel
said "that we're making decisions to warehouse people for the next 50 years based
on . . . the fear of what they may do in the future." The court observed that "maybe
we warehouse him because of the quality of life that they would have at that point
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upon being released from a federal institution," and it suggested that defense counsel
might be overestimating Evan's prospects for success while in prison. In the end, the
court concluded, "I just don't know that I can base my sentencing decision on what
might be" and discussed the sentencing criteria in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), paying
particular attention to the seriousness of the offense, the need to protect the
community, and Evan's needs while incarcerated.
A district court abuses its discretion when it "gives significant weight to an
improper or irrelevant factor" when sentencing a defendant. See United States v.
Noriega, 35 F.4th 643, 651 (8th Cir. 2022). Evan maintains that the "court placed
significant weight on an improper or irrelevant factor—its assessment that Evan
would have a better quality of life being 'warehouse[d]' in prison than being released
from prison in his fifties." We do not think that the district court's remarks went as far
as Evan says they did. A fairminded reading of the exchange suggests that the district
court was merely musing about whether to accept defense counsel's recommendation
for a shorter sentence; it wasn't declaring, as Evan suggests, that it needed to impose
a longer sentence so he would have a better quality of life.
In any case, the court abandoned that discussion and explained that it would
not base its sentencing decision on hypotheticals about "magic" treatments but on its
review of the § 3553(a) criteria to which it immediately turned. And given the court's
detailed discussion of the § 3553(a) criteria and the overall context of the exchange,
the statements Evan focuses on had a "negligible" effect, if any, on the sentence
handed down. See United States v. Wrice, 855 F.3d 832, 832–33 (8th Cir. 2017) (per
curiam).
Evan also maintains that the court failed to give sufficient weight to "Evan's
history of abuse, neglect, and abandonment; his untreated mental health issues and
learning disabilities; and his extraordinary level of candor about the facts of the case
and his self-described sex addiction." The district court was well aware of these
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circumstances: The PSR described them in detail, and at sentencing defense counsel
emphasized a few of them in advocating for a below-Guidelines sentence. The district
court expressly stated that it had "considered the entire file in this matter," including
"the statements of counsel and the defendant." And it sought more information from
defense counsel about some of them, such as Evan's autism diagnosis and his history
of abuse. The court simply found other sentencing criteria weightier, such as the need
to protect the public from further crimes that Evan might commit and the egregious
nature and circumstances of the offenses of which he stood convicted. A sentence is
not substantively unreasonable just because the court gave some matters less weight
than the defendant had preferred. See Noriega, 35 F.4th at 651. We therefore decline
to hold that this Guidelines sentence is substantively unreasonable. Cf. United States
v. Smith, 795 F.3d 868, 872 (8th Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
Affirmed.
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