United States v. Gregory McCoy ( 2023 )


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  • United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 22-2385
    ___________________________
    United States of America
    Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    Gregory Lynn McCoy
    Defendant - Appellant
    ___________________________
    No. 22-2412
    ___________________________
    United States of America
    Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    Gregory Lynn McCoy
    Defendant - Appellant
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the District of Minnesota
    ____________
    Submitted: May 12, 2023
    Filed: June 13, 2023
    ____________
    Before SMITH, Chief Judge, COLLOTON and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    BENTON, Circuit Judge.
    Gregory Lynn McCoy was convicted of being an armed career criminal in
    possession of a firearm, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 922
    (g)(1) and 924(e). The
    district court1 sentenced him to 262 months in prison. McCoy appeals, challenging:
    (1) the admission of evidence (field tests and a photograph); (2) the sufficiency of
    the evidence; and (3) the sentence (an adjustment and an enhancement). Having
    jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , this court affirms.
    In 2019, police learned that McCoy, a convicted felon, had a pistol and had
    sold drugs. A state judge issued a search warrant for his residence. While waiting
    to begin the search, officers saw McCoy arrive in his vehicle and go inside. Entering,
    police found McCoy in his upstairs bedroom. There, officers found baggies of drugs,
    ecstasy pills, a digital scale, rubber gloves, and cutting agents. Field testing showed
    that the baggies contained cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine. In the living-
    room closet, officers found a box of .45-caliber MagTech ammunition.
    A drug dog alerted to McCoy’s vehicle. There, police found a glass pipe and
    a .45-caliber semi-automatic pistol, with two fully loaded magazines of .45-caliber
    MagTech ammunition. They photographed the glass pipe but later accidentally ran
    over it.
    A jury convicted McCoy of unlawfully possessing a firearm. Applying an
    adjustment for obstructing justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 and an enhancement for
    possessing a firearm in connection with a controlled substance offense under
    U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(b)(3)(A), the district court sentenced McCoy to 262 months in
    prison.
    1
    The Honorable Nancy E. Brasel, United States District Judge for the District
    of Minnesota.
    -2-
    I.
    McCoy argues that the district court erred in admitting (1) testimony about
    the field tests of the narcotics, and (2) the photograph of the glass pipe from McCoy’s
    vehicle.
    At trial, McCoy objected to the field testing only for relevance and lack of
    foundation—neither of which he mentions on appeal. He did not object to the
    photograph. This court thus reviews only for plain error. See United States v.
    Pirani, 
    406 F.3d 543
    , 549-50 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc), citing United States v.
    Olano, 
    507 U.S. 725
    , 732-36 (1993). This court reverses only if there was an error,
    that was plain, that affected substantial rights, and seriously affected the fairness,
    integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. 
    Id.
    A.
    On appeal, McCoy challenges only the scientific reliability of the field tests.
    The officer who conducted the tests was trained and certified in using them. He
    testified to the procedures and the results. See United States v. Eisler, 
    567 F.2d 814
    ,
    817 (8th Cir. 1977) (holding that an experienced agent familiar with field tests could
    testify about the results of the test he conducted). The district did not err, let alone
    plainly err, by admitting the testimony about the field tests. See United States v.
    Downey, 
    672 Fed. Appx. 615
    , 616 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding that “a court may rely
    on circumstantial evidence such as field tests or testimony describing the
    substance”).
    B.
    McCoy argues that the photograph of the pipe was inadmissible because it
    was (1) not inventoried or referenced in the police reports; (2) poor quality; (3) and
    highly prejudicial. The contents of police reports do not govern the admissibility of
    evidence. See Sosna v. Binnington, 
    321 F.3d 742
    , 744 (8th Cir. 2003) (“The Federal
    -3-
    Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence.”). The photograph’s quality
    does not preclude its admissibility. Cf. United States v. De La Torre, 
    907 F.3d 581
    ,
    591-92 (8th Cir. 2018) (holding that the audio’s poor quality “did not render the
    recording wholly untrustworthy”); United States v. Williams, 
    512 F.3d 1040
    , 1044
    (8th Cir. 2008) (holding the court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the
    recordings of drug buys—inaudible over 40 times). The evidence was not
    inadmissible simply because it was prejudicial. See, e.g., United States v. Fechner,
    
    952 F.3d 954
    , 958 (8th Cir. 2020) (holding that a district court has broad discretion
    to admit probative evidence even when it is prejudicial).
    The district court did not err, let alone plainly err, by admitting the photograph
    of the pipe.
    II.
    McCoy believes the evidence at trial was insufficient to convict. Specifically,
    he claims there is no evidence that the .45-caliber pistol was a “firearm.” This court
    reviews the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. See United States v. Birdine, 
    515 F.3d 842
    , 844 (8th Cir. 2008).
    To convict McCoy for possession of a firearm as a convicted felon under 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1), the evidence must prove that McCoy’s pistol met the definition
    of a firearm under 
    18 U.S.C. § 921
    (a)(3). See United States v. Hardin, 
    889 F.3d 945
    , 947 (8th Cir. 2018). A firearm is “any weapon . . . which will or is designed to
    or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive.” 
    18 U.S.C. § 921
    (a)(3). Proof that a firearm was operable is not required. Hardin, 
    889 F.3d at 948-49
    .
    McCoy’s pistol, retrieved from his vehicle, was admitted into evidence (with
    the only objection at trial being “chain of custody,” which is not raised on appeal).
    The jury saw the pistol and photographs of it. An ATF agent, testifying as an expert,
    testified that it met the federal definition of a firearm. The pistol and the testimony
    -4-
    are sufficient to prove that the pistol was a firearm. See United States v. Dobbs, 
    449 F.3d 904
    , 911 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that lay testimony from an eyewitness is
    sufficient to determine whether an object is a firearm under 
    18 U.S.C. § 921
    (a)(3)(A)); United States v. Mullins, 
    446 F.3d 750
    , 755 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding
    expert testimony from an ATF agent sufficient to determine that the defendant’s gun
    met the federal definition of a firearm, even when the gun evaluated by the agent
    was a model and not the original).
    The evidence sufficiently proved that McCoy’s .45-caliber pistol was a
    firearm under 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 921
    (a)(3) and 922(g).
    III.
    McCoy argues the district court erred in adjusting and enhancing his offense
    level. This court reviews the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its
    application of the guidelines de novo. See United States v. Beckman, 
    787 F.3d 466
    ,
    494 (8th Cir. 2015).
    A.
    The district court applied an obstruction-of-justice adjustment under U.S.S.G.
    § 3C1.1 based on McCoy’s trial testimony. This court need not address his challenge
    to this adjustment because it did not affect his sentence. The adjustment raised his
    base offense level to 30. But because McCoy was an armed career criminal, his base
    offense level was 34. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b)(3)(A). Any adjustment under
    U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 was moot.
    B.
    The district court relied on the gun-possession-in-connection-with-a-drug-
    offense in setting the base offense level of 34. McCoy disputes the enhancement
    because the gun was found in his vehicle, while the drugs were found in his bedroom.
    -5-
    The district court found that McCoy was a drug dealer—not merely a drug
    user—due to the packaging of the drugs, the evidence found in the search and police
    investigations, and his own testimony that he intended to distribute drugs. An ATF
    special agent testified about a firearm’s use in the drug trade. The pistol was in close
    proximity to the drugs. See United States v. Vang, 
    3 F.4th 1064
    , 1067 (8th Cir.
    2021) (“Drugs do not need to be found next to the firearms in order to establish a
    nexus”; rather, “[a] nexus can exist when a firearm is in proximity to items identified
    as relating to drug trafficking.”). Officers saw McCoy leave his vehicle (that had
    the pistol and pipe) and enter his residence, where they found him in his bedroom
    with drugs. See 
    id.
     (finding sufficient evidence of a nexus where the firearm was
    two stories above the drugs because the firearm was found in a room with drug
    paraphernalia and there was expert testimony about drug traffickers using guns). See
    also United States v. Goodrich, 
    739 F.3d 1091
    , 1098 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding that a
    jury may infer that a firearm was used in connection with a drug offense if it was in
    close proximity to the drugs, quickly accessible, and an expert testified about the use
    of firearms in the drug trade).
    The district court did not err in applying the enhancement.
    *******
    The judgment is affirmed.
    ______________________________
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