K.C. Hopps, Ltd. v. The Cincinnati Insurance Co. ( 2023 )


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  •                   United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 22-1356
    ___________________________
    K.C. Hopps, Ltd.
    Plaintiff - Appellant
    v.
    The Cincinnati Insurance Company, Inc.
    Defendant - Appellee
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City
    ____________
    Submitted: February 15, 2023
    Filed: August 21, 2023
    ____________
    Before SMITH, Chief Judge, STRAS and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    KOBES, Circuit Judge.
    K.C. Hopps, Ltd., sued its insurer, The Cincinnati Insurance Company,
    seeking coverage for lost business income incurred during the COVID-19 pandemic.
    Cincinnati moved for summary judgment based on K.C. Hopps’s inability to show
    physical loss or damage, which the district court 1 denied. After the jury returned a
    1
    The Honorable Stephen R. Bough, United States District Judge for the
    Western District of Missouri.
    verdict for Cincinnati, K.C. Hopps renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of
    law and moved for a new trial. The district court denied both motions, and we affirm.
    I.
    K.C. Hopps owns and manages bars, restaurants, catering services, and event
    spaces around Kansas City. In 2020, state and local governments began issuing
    shutdown orders in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. K.C. Hopps had to limit
    its operations, allegedly losing $2 million in business income. It filed a claim under
    its all-risk insurance policy with Cincinnati, which Cincinnati denied.
    K.C. Hopps sued, alleging that Cincinnati breached the insurance policy by
    refusing to pay the claim. It attempted to distinguish its suit from other dismissed
    COVID-19 insurance suits by alleging that COVID-19 had physically damaged its
    properties by altering air particles and surfaces. Cincinnati moved for summary
    judgment, but the district court found that there was a genuine dispute about whether
    K.C. Hopps had suffered physical loss or damage.
    The case went to a jury trial. At the close of evidence, K.C. Hopps and
    Cincinnati moved for judgment as a matter of law. The district court denied both
    motions, and the jury returned a verdict for Cincinnati. K.C. Hopps renewed its
    motion for judgment as a matter of law and moved for a new trial. The district court
    denied both motions. K.C. Hopps appeals.
    II.
    We review de novo the denial of judgment as a matter of law, “using the same
    standards as the district court.” Howard v. Mo. Bone & Joint Ctr., Inc., 
    615 F.3d 991
    , 995 (8th Cir. 2010).
    -2-
    K.C. Hopps argues that it was entitled to coverage under two policy
    provisions: the General Coverage provision and the Business Income provision.
    Both provisions protect K.C. Hopps from “direct loss.” The General Coverage
    provision protects K.C. Hopps from “direct ‘loss’” that is “caused by or resulting
    from any Covered Cause of Loss.” Joint App. 726. The Business Income provision
    covers lost business income due to the “necessary ‘suspension’ of [K.C. Hopps’s]
    ‘operations’” when the suspension was “caused by direct ‘loss’ to property at [the]
    ‘premises.’” Id. at 804. The policy defines “loss” as “accidental physical loss or
    accidental physical damage.” Id. at 761 (emphasis added).
    As we explained in Oral Surgeons, P.C. v. Cincinnati Insurance Co., 
    2 F.4th 1141
     (8th Cir. 2021), this definition of loss requires “some physicality to the loss or
    damage of property—e.g., a physical alteration, physical contamination, or physical
    destruction.” 
    Id. at 1144
    . And under the policy’s terms, the direct physical loss or
    damage must cause the lost income. See Torgerson Props., Inc. v. Cont’l Cas. Co.,
    
    38 F.4th 4
    , 6 (8th Cir. 2022).
    K.C. Hopps alleged that COVID-19 particles were present at its properties.
    We have repeatedly rejected similar claims for COVID-19-related business
    interruptions because the insured did not sufficiently allege physical loss or damage.
    See, e.g., Olmsted Med. Ctr. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 
    65 F.4th 1005
    , 1009–10 (8th Cir.
    2023); Rock Dental Ark. PLLC v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 
    40 F.4th 868
    , 871 (8th Cir.
    2022); Planet Sub Holdings, Inc. v. State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 
    36 F.4th 772
    ,
    776 (8th Cir. 2022); Oral Surgeons, 2 F.4th at 1144–45; Torgerson, 38 F.4th at 5–6.
    While contamination can be a direct physical loss, see Torgerson, 38 F.4th at
    6, “SARS-CoV-2 is [not] the kind of contaminant that results in a ‘direct physical
    loss,’” see Olmstead, 65 F.4th at 1010. Rather, “although SARS-CoV-2 may have
    a ‘physical’ element, it does not have a physical effect on real or personal property.”
    -3-
    Id. (citation omitted). So even if K.C. Hopps had discovered COVID-19 at its
    properties,2 it could not meet the standard for physicality.
    Even if K.C. Hopps could show actual contamination of its properties, any
    possible contamination was not the cause of its lost business income. K.C. Hopps
    did not limit its operations because COVID-19 particles were found at its
    properties—it did so because of the shutdown orders. K.C. Hopps remained open
    until government orders limited its operations. And even if its premises weren’t
    contaminated, K.C. Hopps “would have been subject to the exact same restrictions.”
    Torgerson, 38 F.4th at 6. We conclude that the district court properly denied
    judgment as a matter of law.
    III.
    K.C. Hopps also moved for a new trial because of alleged errors in the jury
    instructions. “We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for a clear abuse of
    discretion, with the key issue being whether a new trial is necessary to prevent a
    miscarriage of justice.” Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Graham, 
    792 F.3d 951
    , 957 (8th
    Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). “[E]ven where a jury instruction is erroneously given to the
    jury, reversal is warranted only where the error affects the substantial rights of the
    parties.” Brown v. Sandals Resorts Int’l, 
    284 F.3d 949
    , 953 (8th Cir. 2002).
    K.C. Hopps cannot show that any possible errors in the jury instructions
    impacted its substantial rights. K.C. Hopps presented no evidence that its premises
    were actually contaminated or that any possible contamination caused its lost
    income. Regardless of any errors in the jury instructions, the outcome would have
    been the same. United States v. Davies, 
    942 F.3d 871
    , 873 (8th Cir. 2019)
    2
    Although K.C. Hopps alleged that COVID-19 was present at its properties,
    it presented no evidence that COVID-19 was actually found. Cf. Lindenwood
    Female Coll. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 
    61 F.4th 572
    , 574 (8th Cir. 2023) (“[W]e have
    not held that allegations of the virus’s presence, standing alone, satisfy the Oral
    Surgeons standard.”).
    -4-
    (explaining that an error affects substantial rights if there is a “reasonable probability
    that, but for the error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different”
    (citation omitted)). The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying K.C.
    Hopps a new trial. 3
    IV.
    We affirm the district court’s judgment.
    ______________________________
    3
    Cincinnati also moved to strike Volume VII of the Joint Appendix. We
    dismiss this motion as moot since we did not rely on Volume VII in considering this
    appeal. Stewart v. Pro. Comput. Ctrs., Inc., 
    148 F.3d 937
    , 940 n.3 (8th Cir. 1998).
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 22-1356

Filed Date: 8/21/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/21/2023