A v. Park Hill School District ( 2024 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 23-1119
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Plaintiff A, by his natural mother and general guardian, Parent A;
Plaintiff B, by his natural father and general guardian, Parent B;
Plaintiff C, by his natural mother and general guardian, Parent C;
Plaintiff D, by his natural father and general guardian, Parent D
Plaintiffs - Appellants
v.
Park Hill School District; Janice Bolin, President and Member, Park Hill School
District Board of Education; Bart Klein, Vice President and Member, Park Hill
School District Board of Education; Kimberley Ried, Treasurer and Member, Park
Hill School District Board of Education; Todd Fane, Member, Park Hill School
District Board of Education; Scott Monsees, Member, Park Hill School District
Board of Education; Susan Newburger, Member, Park Hill School District Board
of Education; Brandy Woodley, Member, Park Hill School District Board of
Education; Jeanette Cowherd, Superintendent of Schools, Park Hill School
District; Josh Colvin, Director of Student Services, Park Hill School District;
Kerrie Herren, Principal, Park Hill South High School
Defendants - Appellees
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri
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Submitted: December 14, 2023
Filed: April 2, 2024
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Before SMITH,1 Chief Judge, GRUENDER and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
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GRASZ, Circuit Judge.
As a part of an ill-advised “joke,” a ninth-grade boy at Park Hill High School
created an online petition calling for the return of slavery. Three other students
posted online comments favoring the petition. After the Park Hill School District
(the School District) expelled or suspended the four students, they sued, claiming
the School District violated their rights to equal protection and due process. The
district court 2 denied these claims on summary judgment. The four students appeal,
and we affirm the district court.
I. Background
Plaintiffs A, B, C, and D (collectively, Plaintiffs) were ninth-grade students
on the football team at Park Hill High School (PHS), in Kansas City, Missouri. On
September 16, 2021, they were traveling with the team to an away game. While en
route, Plaintiff A, a biracial black and Brazilian student, published a petition online
titled “Start Slavery Again”; he then circulated the petition to other members of the
team through Snapchat. Plaintiff B, a white student, commented “I love slavery.”
Plaintiff C, a white student, commented “i hate blacks.” Plaintiff D, a biracial Asian
and white student, commented “I want a slave.” The petition included a picture of
TRL, a black student.
1
Judge Smith completed his term as chief judge of the circuit on March 10,
2024. See 28 U.S.C. § 45(a)(3)(A).
2
The Honorable Stephen R. Bough, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Missouri.
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The next day, PHS’s Assistant Principal, Melvin Walker, investigated the
incident. Walker spoke with Plaintiffs and determined they violated the School
District’s policies. The discipline notice stated violations of the following four
school policies: Cellphone/Electronic Device, Disorderly Conduct, Disruptive
Behavior, and Harassment. Plaintiffs’ written statements noted they were “joking
around” and “thought it would be funny.” Plaintiffs B, C, and D explicitly noted
they regretted their actions. Walker suspended Plaintiffs for ten days, and
recommended extended-term suspensions or expulsions. That evening, PHS’s
Principal, Kerrie Herren, emailed PHS families. In that email, he condemned the
racist statements and assured families that “we will not tolerate discrimination or
harassment.”
On Monday, September 20, Principal Herren sent letters to each of the
Plaintiffs’ parents, informing them of the ten-day suspensions and of his
recommendations to the School District’s Superintendent for extended-term
suspensions or expulsions. The next day, the School District notified Plaintiffs’
parents that it would hold disciplinary conferences on October 1, and gave the
parents a procedural outline and a “Notice of Charges.” The Notice of Charges—
much like the ones Plaintiffs received—stated the discipline was due to
“Harassment, Disruptive Behavior, Disorderly Conduct, Cell Phone/Electronic
Device [Use]” in violation of school policies.
The following day, the School District’s Superintendent, Jeanette Cowherd,
emailed a letter to the community, condemning the petition, supporting the
Principal’s actions, and committing to following school policy. An onslaught of
media attention followed, and the School District received calls from parents,
students, community members, alumni, and others across the country, expressing
concerns about the petition.
On October 1, the School District held disciplinary conferences with Plaintiffs
and their parents. Superintendent Cowherd and Student Services Director Josh
Colvin agreed that Plaintiff A should be suspended for 170 days, or the remainder
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of his freshman year, and further recommended to the School Board that Plaintiff A
should be expelled. Cowherd and Colvin agreed that Plaintiffs B, C, and D should
be suspended for 170 days. In making their decisions, the administrators compared
the situation to other incidents where students were expelled. The first involved a
student writing racist and threatening graffiti on school bathroom walls. The second
involved a student drawing swastikas on school bathroom walls. Plaintiffs
administratively appealed their punishments.
On November 3, the School District held an administrative appeal hearing
with Plaintiffs, their parents, and their legal counsel. Plaintiffs were allowed to call
and cross-examine witnesses. This hearing lasted from 5:00 p.m. until 3:00 a.m.
The School District ultimately expelled Plaintiff A, and required Plaintiffs B, C, and
D to undergo ten hours of diversity and inclusion training before they could return
to PHS for the 2022–23 school year.
On November 12, Plaintiffs sued the School District, the PHS Principal, and
various school board members (collectively, the Defendants) in federal court,
asserting various claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After voluntarily dismissing two
of those claims, Plaintiffs proceeded to summary judgment on their due process and
equal protection claims. Plaintiffs claimed the disciplinary procedures deprived
them of substantive and procedural due process. They also claimed the Defendants
deprived Plaintiffs of equal protection because they did not punish TRL—the black
student whose photo was used on the petition—even though Plaintiffs claimed he
was a willing participant in creating the petition. The district court granted summary
judgement for the School District, dismissing the Plaintiffs’ procedural due process,
substantive due process, and equal protection claims.
II. Analysis
“We review the grant of a summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence
in light most favorable to [the Plaintiffs] as the nonmoving part[ies] and
drawing all reasonable inferences in [their] favor.” Onyiah v. St. Cloud State Univ.,
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5 F.4th 926, 930 (8th Cir. 2021). Summary judgment in favor of the Defendants is
warranted “if the movant[s] show[] that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant[s] are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a).
A. Procedural Due Process Claims
“[A] student’s legitimate entitlement to a public education [is] a property
interest . . . protected by the Due Process Clause.” Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574
(1975). A school district must provide students facing a temporary suspension of
ten days or less notice and an opportunity to be heard. See id. at 581. Specifically,
the student must “be given oral or written notice of the charges against him and, if
he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an
opportunity to present his side of the story.” Id. But “[l]onger suspensions or
expulsions . . . may require more formal procedures.” Id. at 584 (cautioning the
notice-and-hearing requirements only pertain to “short suspension[s], not exceeding
10 days”).
Since Goss, the Supreme Court has not addressed whether due process
requires additional formal procedures for longer suspensions or expulsions. Instead,
courts “have applied the balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 [ ]
(1976), to determine what additional process may be due.” Doe ex rel. Doe v. Todd
Cnty. Sch. Dist., 625 F.3d 459, 462–63 (8th Cir. 2010).
Under Mathews, courts balance three factors to determine the required
procedural protections: (1) the private interest affected by the official action; (2) “the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used” and
the probable value of additional procedure safeguards; and (3) the government’s
interest, “including the fiscal or administrative burdens” of additional procedures.
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 321. See also Watson ex rel. Watson v. Beckel, 242 F.3d 1237,
1240 (10th Cir. 2001) (“The three-factor test from the Mathews decision, decided
one year after Goss, is appropriate for determining when additional procedure is due
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because the test crystallizes the balancing of student interests against school interests
suggested in the Goss decision.”).
Applying Mathews’ balancing test here suggests a low risk of an erroneous
deprivation of Plaintiffs’ interest because Plaintiffs received adequate notice and
meaningful opportunities to be heard at every stage of the disciplinary process, and
additional procedures unduly burden the School District. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at
321.
First of all, Plaintiffs were sufficiently notified of “what [they were] accused
of doing and what the basis of the accusation [was].” Goss, 419 U.S. at 582.
Plaintiffs and their parents were notified about the initial ten-day suspension; they
were notified about Principal Herren’s recommendation of extended-term
suspension or expulsion; they were notified about the upcoming disciplinary
conferences; and they were given a written notice of charges ten days before the
disciplinary conferences.
Additionally, Plaintiffs received multiple opportunities “to explain [their]
version of the facts.” See id. The day after the incident, Plaintiffs had the
opportunity to recount their versions of the events at their initial meetings with
Assistant Principal Walker. During those meetings, Plaintiffs were provided with
explanations of why their behaviors resulted in specific violations. Each plaintiff
had an opportunity to tell his version of events—each plaintiff provided a written
statement to PHS administration about his admitted involvement in the incident. See
Keefe v. Adams, 840 F.3d 523, 535 (8th Cir. 2016) (concluding school complied with
due process requirements when a school official “met with [the student], informed
him that there were concerns regarding his Facebook, read from the posts of greatest
concern, explained that his posts implicated the professionalism and professional
boundary requirements of the [program], and gave him an opportunity to respond”).
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Beyond the initial meetings, Plaintiffs had opportunities to respond to the
decision makers during the October 2021 disciplinary conferences and even
opportunities to appeal the adverse decisions at the November administrative appeal
hearings with legal counsel present. See London v. Dirs. of DeWitt Pub. Schs., 194
F.3d 873, 874, 877 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding middle school student’s expulsion not a
due process violation where student’s mother was informed of grounds upon which
expulsion recommendation was based and where student was given hearing where
he was represented by counsel who had full opportunity to examine and cross-
examine witnesses).
In light of the above, Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim fails. Plaintiffs
had fair notice and meaningful opportunity to present their case in the school
disciplinary proceedings.
B. Substantive Due Process
To prove a violation of substantive due process rights, Plaintiffs must show a
government violation of a fundamental constitutional right so egregious that it
shocks the contemporary conscience. C.N. v. Willmar Pub. Schs., Indep. Sch. Dist.
No. 347, 591 F.3d 624, 634 (8th Cir. 2010). Accord Keefe, 840 F.3d at 533. Because
the right to a public education is a property interest, and not a fundamental right,
Goss, 419 U.S. at 574, Plaintiffs “must show that there was no rational basis for the
[school’s] decision or that the decision was motivated by bad faith or ill will.”
Disesa v. St. Louis Cmty. Coll., 79 F.3d 92, 95 (8th Cir. 1996).
Plaintiffs have not met this burden. Long-term suspensions and expulsions
are routine disciplinary actions that generally do not “offend . . . notions of fairness
or human dignity.” Costello v. Mitchell Pub. Sch. Dist. 79, 266 F.3d 916, 921 (8th
Cir. 2001); cf. Neal ex rel. Neal v. Fulton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 229 F.3d 1069, 1071,
1075–76 (11th Cir. 2000) (Excessive corporal punishment found to shock the
conscience where a coach intentionally struck a student with a metal weight lock,
knocking the student’s eye out of its socket.).
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The undisputed evidence shows there was a rational basis for the School
District’s disciplinary decisions. The petition and its fallout drew national news-
media attention and caused disruptions in the school environment. Defendants
decided additional punishment, beyond a short suspension, was needed to address
the magnitude of Plaintiffs’ disruption. There is no indication the disciplinary
decisions were motivated by bad faith or ill will.
Defendants’ chosen punishments simply do not make for a substantive due
process violation. In light of the disruption and violation of the School District’s
policies, all of which occurred during a school event, the disciplinary actions were
rationally related to its legitimate purpose of maintaining order. See Wise v. Pea
Ridge Sch. Dist., 855 F.2d 560, 566 (8th Cir. 1988) (noting school district has
“legitimate interest in maintaining order and discipline in its schools”). Thus, we
reject Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim.
C. Equal Protection
Finally, we turn to Plaintiffs’ claim of an equal protection violation. “The
Equal Protection Clause generally requires the government to treat similarly situated
people alike.” Klinger v. Dep’t of Corrs., 31 F.3d 727, 731 (8th Cir. 1994). “[T]he
first step in an equal protection case is determining whether the plaintiff has
demonstrated that [he] was treated differently than [comparators] who were similarly
situated to [him].” Id. Plaintiffs and their comparators must be similarly situated
“in all relevant respects.” Saunders v. Thies, 38 F.4th 701, 714 (8th Cir. 2022)
(quoting Gilani v. Matthews, 843 F.3d 342, 348 (8th Cir. 2016)).
Plaintiffs sought to compare their situations to TRL. According to Plaintiffs,
TRL also participated in the creation, approval, and posting of the petition and yet
faced no discipline. Plaintiffs argue this shows the School District violated the Equal
Protection Clause. Even assuming Plaintiffs’ version of TRL’s involvement in the
incident is true, TRL was still not similarly situated to Plaintiffs. Whereas each of
the Plaintiffs either created the petition or made racist electronic statements when
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commenting on the post, TRL’s alleged involvement was limited; he did not create
the petition—as Plaintiff A did, nor did he make any posts—as Plaintiffs B, C, and
D did.
Plaintiffs also failed to present evidence that the School District’s decision to
punish Plaintiffs, but not TRL, was racially motivated. Plaintiffs noted that in 2018,
the school administration took steps to address the racial disparity in suspensions
and adopted a policy to “support our students in a way that they are not being
suspended.” Plaintiffs claim the School District implemented a policy of treating
black students more leniently than white students to even out the statistical
disparities in suspensions. But nothing in the evidence suggests such a practice
happened here, as TRL’s and Plaintiffs’ participation in the incident were materially
different. Plaintiffs’ mere suspicion is not sufficient to defeat summary judgment.
See Thomas v. Corwin, 483 F.3d 516, 527 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Mere allegations,
unsupported by . . . evidence beyond the nonmoving party’s own conclusions, are
insufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment.”).
We reject Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim because we find no evidence
supporting the contention that Plaintiffs were similarly situated with TRL, given
Plaintiffs’ greater involvement in creating and supporting the petition.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court.
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