United States v. Cecil Parker, Jr. ( 2023 )


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  •                   United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 22-2905
    ___________________________
    United States of America,
    lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    Cecil Samuel Parker, Jr.,
    lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant.
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Central
    ____________
    Submitted: September 18, 2023
    Filed: December 18, 2023
    [Unpublished]
    ____________
    Before COLLOTON, GRASZ, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    PER CURIAM.
    Cecil Parker, Jr., pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm as a felon.
    See 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1). The district court* determined that Parker was subject to
    *
    The Honorable James M. Moody, Jr., United States District Judge for the
    Eastern District of Arkansas.
    an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because he had
    sustained three previous convictions for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or
    both. See 
    id.
     § 924(e)(1). The court sentenced Parker to the statutory minimum term
    of 180 months’ imprisonment. Without the sentencing enhancement for an armed
    career criminal, the statutory maximum penalty would have been 180 months’
    imprisonment, id. § 924(a)(8), but Parker’s advisory guideline range would have been
    lower.
    Parker argues on appeal that the district court erred in sentencing him as an
    armed career criminal because the government did not establish that two of his prior
    offenses qualified as violent felonies. The disputed convictions, both from Arkansas,
    came in 1995 for battery in the second degree and in 2017 for domestic battering in
    the third degree. Parker maintains that these offenses do not categorically qualify as
    violent felonies. Although each statute defines multiple alternative offenses, some
    of which constitute violent felonies, Parker contends that the government did not
    show that he was convicted based on elements that meet the standard.
    At sentencing, the district court asked defense counsel whether he objected to
    the recommendation of the presentence report that Parker was an armed career
    criminal. Counsel stated that he could not “find a good legal basis to challenge the
    ACCA designation,” but lodged an objection “to preserve it for appeal in case the law
    changes.”
    The government argues that Parker waived any challenge to his status as an
    armed career criminal. Parker argues that he made an “inartful” objection that
    preserved the issue, and that he should prevail under the plain-error standard even if
    the objection was forfeited. We conclude that even if Parker did not waive the
    contention, he did not preserve an objection. He acknowledged that the armed career
    criminal designation applied to him under current law, and objected only “in case the
    law changes” in the future. To obtain relief under the plain-error standard, Parker
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    must show an obvious error that affected his substantial rights and seriously affected
    the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See Fed. R. Crim.
    P. 52(b); United States v. Olano, 
    507 U.S. 725
    , 732-35 (1993).
    The government moves to supplement the record on appeal with charging
    documents for Parker’s convictions in 1995 and 2017. See Fed. R. App. P. 10(e). We
    ordinarily consider only evidence that was presented in the district court, but this
    court has authority to supplement the record when the interests of justice demand it.
    Dakota Indus., Inc. v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc., 
    988 F.2d 61
    , 63 (8th Cir. 1993). We
    conclude that supplementation is warranted here. The government had no need to
    present the charging documents at sentencing, because Parker disclaimed any
    objection to his classification as an armed career criminal. With Parker disputing the
    classification for the first time on appeal, the interests of justice support expanding
    the record to include documents that the government could have presented if Parker
    had properly objected. Parker does not dispute the authenticity of the charging
    documents or advance any other reason why they should not be considered in
    determining whether the district court imposed a lawful sentence.
    An offense constitutes a violent felony under the ACCA if it has “as an element
    the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of
    another.” 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (e)(2)(B). To determine whether an offense qualifies, we
    are required to use a categorical approach that examines only the elements of the
    offense. Mathis v. United States, 
    579 U.S. 500
    , 504 (2016). Where a statute lists
    elements in the alternative and creates multiple offenses, we may look to “a limited
    class of documents (for example, the indictment, jury instructions, or plea agreement
    and colloquy) to determine what crime, with what elements, a defendant was
    convicted of.” 
    Id. at 505-06
    ; see Shepard v. United States, 
    544 U.S. 13
    , 26 (2005).
    Applying this approach to Parker’s disputed convictions, we conclude that both
    offenses qualify as violent felonies. The second-degree battery statute in Arkansas
    is divisible into multiple offenses. 
    Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-202
    (a); United States v.
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    Rice, 
    813 F.3d 704
    , 705 (8th Cir. 2016). The charging document for Parker’s
    conviction alleged that he “feloniously, with the purpose of causing physical injury
    to another person . . . did cause serious physical injury” to the victim. To commit that
    violation, an offender must act purposefully, and it is not possible to cause serious
    physical injury without using physical force. Parker’s offense of conviction thus
    required the use of physical force against the person of another. United States v.
    Myers, 
    928 F.3d 763
    , 767 (8th Cir. 2019); United States v. Winston, 
    845 F.3d 876
    ,
    878 (8th Cir. 2017).
    The Arkansas statute prohibiting domestic battering in the third degree is also
    divisible into multiple offenses. 
    Ark. Code Ann. § 5-26-305
    ; United States v. Eason,
    
    829 F.3d 633
    , 642 (8th Cir. 2016). Parker’s charging document alleged that he
    “unlawfully, feloniously, with the purpose of causing physical injury to a family or
    household member, did cause physical injury to” the victim who was a member of the
    family or household. Those elements require proof of purposeful conduct causing
    physical injury. So the crime entails the use of physical force against another, and the
    offense qualifies as a violent felony. United States v. Eason, 
    907 F.3d 554
    , 558 (8th
    Cir. 2018); United States v. Moore, 
    713 F. App’x 511
    , 514 (8th Cir. 2017) (per
    curiam); United States v. Starks, 
    674 F. App’x 580
    , 582 (8th Cir. 2016) (per curiam).
    For these reasons, we conclude that Parker had sustained two previous
    convictions for violent felonies. It is undisputed that he also had sustained a previous
    conviction for a serious drug offense. Therefore, the district court correctly
    determined that Parker was an armed career criminal under 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (e).
    The motion to supplement the record is granted. The judgment of the district
    court is affirmed.
    ______________________________
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Document Info

Docket Number: 22-2905

Filed Date: 12/18/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/18/2023