United States v. Cecil Robinson ( 2024 )


Menu:
  •                   United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 23-3438
    ___________________________
    United States of America
    lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    Cecil Jason Robinson
    lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Western District of Missouri - Jefferson City
    ____________
    Submitted: September 23, 2024
    Filed: October 9, 2024
    [Unpublished]
    ____________
    Before BENTON, ARNOLD, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    PER CURIAM.
    After a jury found Cecil Robinson guilty of being a felon in possession of a
    firearm, see 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1), the district court1 determined that he was an armed
    1
    The Honorable Roseann A. Ketchmark, United States District Judge for the
    Western District of Missouri.
    career criminal and sentenced him to 235 months' imprisonment. Robinson challenges
    the court's conclusion that he was an armed career criminal. We affirm.
    The Armed Career Criminal Act, or ACCA, subjects convicted felons who
    possessed a firearm to a fifteen-year minimum prison sentence if they have had three
    or more previous convictions for violent felonies that were "committed on occasions
    different from one another." See 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (e)(1). Robinson had four relevant
    convictions under Missouri law—two for second-degree robbery, see 
    Mo. Rev. Stat. § 569.030
     (2013) (now codified at 
    Mo. Rev. Stat. § 570.025
    ), and two for unlawful
    use of a weapon, see 
    Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.030.1
    (4). We have held in previous cases
    that second-degree robbery, see United States v. Swopes, 
    886 F.3d 668
    , 672 (8th Cir.
    2018) (en banc), and unlawful use of a weapon under § 571.030.1(4), see United
    States v. Pryor, 
    927 F.3d 1042
    , 1043–44 (8th Cir. 2019), are violent felonies under
    the ACCA.
    Robinson nonetheless maintains that two of those convictions should really
    count as only one for purposes of the ACCA because he was arrested for them on the
    same date and convicted of them on the same date. We have rejected this argument
    before, see United States v. Stowell, 
    82 F.4th 607
    , 609 (8th Cir. 2023) (en banc), since
    the ACCA focuses on when the defendant committed the offenses, not when he was
    arrested or convicted. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (e)(1). In any event, even if Robinson had
    only three predicate convictions rather than four, he would still qualify as an armed
    career criminal under the ACCA.
    There is some question whether Robinson can be considered an armed career
    criminal given that the court, rather than a jury, found that he had committed his
    predicate offenses on different occasions. It is true that the Supreme Court recently
    held that a jury must resolve the "ACCA's occasions inquiry unanimously and beyond
    a reasonable doubt." See Erlinger v. United States, 
    144 S. Ct. 1840
    , 1852 (2024). But
    any error that the district court committed here was harmless. See Stowell, 82 F.4th
    -2-
    at 610. We held in Stowell that it was clear beyond a reasonable doubt that "no
    reasonable juror could find that Stowell committed his offenses on the same occasion,
    considering they occurred days apart and involved different victims." See 
    id.
    Likewise, Robinson committed his predicate offenses in 1996, 1997, 2013, and 2015
    at different locations and against different victims, so we believe that any reasonable
    jury would have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Robinson committed these
    offenses on different occasions. Erlinger does not cast doubt on Stowell's conclusion
    that this error can be harmless. See Erlinger, 144 S. Ct. at 1860–61 (Roberts, C.J.,
    concurring); see also United States v. Johnson, 
    114 F.4th 913
    , 917 (7th Cir. 2024).
    Robinson adverts without elaborating to two other contentions in his brief. The
    first challenges the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. Robinson appears to
    argue that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the court erroneously
    determined that he is an armed career criminal. But as we have already said, the court
    did not err in that determination. Robinson also briefly suggests that the evidence to
    support his conviction was insufficient, as "he was never found in possession of the
    firearm" that led to his conviction. But a police officer named Bradley Overton
    testified that he saw someone open the driver's door to a pickup truck and throw a gun
    near an interstate ramp. He identified the driver as Robinson. Overton pursued the
    truck and told another officer where to find the gun. That officer testified that he
    found the gun where Overton said it would be. Overton also testified that he pursued
    Robinson until Robinson parked at a mall, and there was no one other than Robinson
    in the truck. This evidence is manifestly sufficient to support the conviction.
    Affirmed. We also deny Robinson's pro se motions to supplement the record
    and for release from custody.
    ______________________________
    -3-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 23-3438

Filed Date: 10/9/2024

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/9/2024