Comcast of Illinois X v. Multi-Vision Electronics, Inc. ( 2010 )


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  •                     United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    No. 09-2177
    Comcast of Illinois X, An Illinois  *
    Limited Liability Company,          *
    *
    Plaintiff – Appellee,  *
    *        Appeal from the United States
    v.                           *        District Court for the
    *        District of Nebraska.
    Multi-Vision Electronics, Inc.,     *
    a dissolved Nebraska Corporation,   *        [UNPUBLISHED]
    doing business as Cable Network     *
    Company, also known as Cable,       *
    Network,                            *
    *
    Defendant,             *
    *
    Ronald J. Abboud, Individually,     *
    *
    Defendant – Appellant. *
    Submitted: March 8, 2010
    Filed: March 16, 2010
    Before MURPHY, JOHN R. GIBSON, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM.
    Ronald Abboud appeals from the District Court’s 1 April 13, 2009 denial of
    his Rule 60(b) motion for relief from an October 11, 2006 judgment against
    Abboud in a suit by Comcast alleging violations of the Cable Communications
    Policy Act, 47 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (1992) (“CCPA”). We affirm.
    We review a district court’s ruling on a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of
    discretion. Jones v. Swanson, 
    512 F.3d 1045
    , 1048 (8th Cir. 2008). Rule 60(b) of
    the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the court to “relieve a party . . . of
    a final judgment” due to “(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
    (2) newly discovered evidence . . . or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.”
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (2009). Relief under Rule 60(b) may be granted only upon an
    adequate showing of exceptional circumstances. 
    Jones, 512 F.3d at 1048
    .
    Appellant claims that the district court erred in concluding that his motion is
    untimely. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a Rule 60(b) motion to be
    brought “within a reasonable time, and . . . no more than a year after the entry of
    the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c) (2009). Final judgment in this case was
    entered on October 11, 2006. Appellant filed his Rule 60(b) motion on May 12,
    2008, over a year and a half later.
    Appellant contends that a debtor in bankruptcy proceedings is granted an
    extension under 11 U.S.C. § 108(a) on the time to file a Rule 60(b) motion. “If
    applicable nonbankruptcy law . . . fixes a period within which the debtor may
    commence an action, and such period has not expired before the date of the filing
    of the petition, the trustee may commence such action only before . . . two years
    after the order for relief.” 11 U.S.C. § 108(a)(2) (2005). Appellant argues that
    since he filed his bankruptcy petition on July 16, 2007, less than a year after the
    1
    The Honorable Joseph F. Bataillon, Chief Judge, United States District
    Court for the District of Nebraska.
    -2-
    district court’s final judgment, he is entitled to an extra year to file his Rule 60(b)
    motion.
    The statute is silent, however, on whether a debtor is entitled to the same
    time extensions as a trustee under § 108(a). Appellant is the debtor in his
    bankruptcy action, not the trustee. He fails to cite to any support, in the Eighth
    Circuit or elsewhere, that treats debtors and trustees synonymously for the
    purposes of § 108(a).           Moreover, appellant ignores the importance of
    reasonableness in framing time limits on Rule 60(b) motions. This case involved a
    lengthy litigation in which summary judgment was upheld on appeal, see Comcast
    of Illinois X v. Multi-Vision Electronics, Inc., 
    491 F.3d 938
    (8th Cir. 2007), and a
    subsequent stay pending appellant’s bankruptcy proceeding. The district court did
    not abuse its discretion in concluding that, given the case’s history, appellant’s
    motion was not filed within a reasonable time.
    Even if appellant’s motion were timely filed, he did not supply evidence of
    exceptional circumstances warranting relief from judgment. He failed to
    demonstrate that Comcast did not exist as a legal entity at the time of his CCPA
    violations. In any event, the question of Comcast’s legal existence is irrelevant
    since it was awarded damages as a “private attorney general” on behalf of the
    entire cable industry, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(A)(i) (1992). The district
    court found no mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, or newly
    discovered evidence. Its denial of appellant’s Rule 60(b) motion was well within
    its discretion.
    Accordingly, we affirm the order of the district court.
    ______________________________
    -3-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-1152

Judges: Murphy, Gibson, Riley

Filed Date: 3/16/2010

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024