Charlene Wagner v. University of Washington ( 2022 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 25 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHARLENE WAGNER, No. 20-35808
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:20-cv-00091-BJR
v.
MEMORANDUM*
UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, a public
university; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Barbara Jacobs Rothstein, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 8, 2022
Portland, Oregon
Before: PAEZ and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, and TUNHEIM,** District Judge.
Charlene Wagner (“Wagner”) appeals the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of the University of Washington (“University”), individual
University Defendants, and the Service Employees International Union Local 925
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable John R. Tunheim, Chief United States District Judge
for the District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.
(“SEIU”) (collectively, “Defendants”). Wagner alleged four claims under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and
several state law claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review de novo. Danielson v. Inslee, 945
F.3d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 2019). We affirm.
1. Section 1983 Claims Against SEIU. The district court did not err in
granting summary judgment on Wagner’s § 1983 claims against SEIU. SEIU did
not act “under color of state law” in contracting with Wagner. Collins v.
Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145, 1147 (9th Cir. 1989); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
To maintain a claim under § 1983, Wagner must establish that SEIU “(1)
deprived [her] of a right secured by the Constitution, and (2) acted under color of
state law.” Collins, 878 F.2d at 1147. We apply a two-prong framework to
determine if a private actor acted “under color of state law,” which is commonly
known as “state action.” Belgau v. Inslee, 975 F.3d 940, 946 (9th Cir. 2020);
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 929, 937 (1982). We first consider
“whether the claimed constitutional deprivation resulted from ‘the exercise of
some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the
state or by a person for whom the State is responsible.’” Belgau, 975 F.3d at 946
(quoting Ohno v. Yasuma, 723 F.3d 984, 994 (9th Cir. 2013)). Utilizing one of
four tests outlined by the Supreme Court, we then examine “whether the party
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charged with the deprivation could be described in all fairness as a state actor.” Id.
at 947 (quoting Ohno, 723 F.3d at 994); Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d
1128, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012) (outlining the four tests).
Neither prong is satisfied here. Wagner’s “claimed constitutional
deprivation” stems from a private agreement between her and SEIU, not a state
statute or policy. Belgau, 975 F.3d at 946 (quoting Ohno, 723 F.3d at 994).
Further, SEIU cannot fairly be “described . . . as a state actor” under either
alternative outlined in the joint action test. Id. at 947 (quoting Ohno, 723 F.3d at
994). The University did not “affirm[], authorize[], encourage[], or facilitate[]
unconstitutional conduct” as it had, at most, a “ministerial” role in processing dues
deductions. Id. at 947–48 (quoting Ohno, 723 F.3d at 996). Further, the
University did not “insinuate[] itself into a position of interdependence with” SEIU
such that SEIU could be deemed a “joint participant.” Id. at 947 (quoting Ohno,
723 F.3d at 996). In this arrangement, the University acted as a “passthrough” for
dues deduction and remittance. Id. at 948. For these reasons, the district court did
not err in granting summary judgment to SEIU.
2. Section 1983 Claims Against the University Defendants. Next, the
district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Wagner’s § 1983 claims
against the individual University Defendants and the University. Wagner’s First
Amendment claims are foreclosed by Belgau. In Belgau, we held that Janus v.
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American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees, Council 31, 138
S. Ct. 2448 (2018), did not “extend a First Amendment right to avoid paying union
dues” or create “a new First Amendment waiver requirement for union members
before dues are deducted pursuant to a voluntary agreement.” Id. at 951–52. Thus,
Wagner has no First Amendment right to refuse to pay her voluntarily authorized
union dues or to require that SEIU obtain her waiver before requesting that the
University deduct and remit her dues. Wagner’s Fourteenth Amendment claim
also fails. Wagner was not deprived of a constitutionally protected property
interest when the University deducted and remitted her voluntarily authorized dues.
Cf. id. at 950 (holding that “[t]he First Amendment does not support [e]mployees’
right to renege on their promise to join and support the union”). Accordingly, the
district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the individual University
Defendants and the University.
3. State Law Claims. Finally, the district court did not err in granting
summary judgment on Wagner’s state law claims against all Defendants.
Wagner’s breach of contract claim fails because her 2018 membership agreement
was adequately supported by consideration. See id. at 949 n.4 (upholding a
materially indistinguishable revised membership agreement also governed by
Washington law as a valid contract). As a result, Wagner’s unjust enrichment
claim also fails. See id. The district court did not err in granting summary
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judgment to the Defendants on Wagner’s state law claims.
AFFIRMED.
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