Michael Williams v. T. Yuen , 684 F. App'x 636 ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 21 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MICHAEL B. WILLIAMS, No. 16-16034
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:14-cv-04507-EMC
v.
MEMORANDUM*
T. MICHAEL YUEN, Court Executive
Officer and Clerk of the San Francisco
Court Superior Court,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Edward M. Chen, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 8, 2017**
Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Michael B. Williams, a pre-trial civil detainee under California’s Sexually
Violent Predators Act (“SVPA”), appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law
violations. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(ii), Huftile v. Miccio-Fonseca, 410 F.3d
1136, 1138 (9th Cir. 2005), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Williams’s action because Williams
failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (setting forth pleading standard); see also Jones v. Blanas,
393 F.3d 918, 936 (9th Cir. 2004) (setting forth elements of access-to-courts
claim); People v. Fraser, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 424, 435 (Ct. App. 2006) (no right to
self-representation in civil commitment proceedings under the SVPA).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Williams’s state law claim after dismissing
Williams’s federal claims. See Satey v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 521 F.3d 1087,
1090-91 (9th Cir. 2008) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that
district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law
claims after all federal claims have been dismissed).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Williams leave to
amend because Williams cannot cure the deficiencies in his complaint. See
Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011)
(setting forth standard of review and explaining that “a district court may dismiss
without leave where . . . amendment would be futile”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Williams’s motion
2 16-16034
for reconsideration because Williams failed to state any grounds warranting relief.
See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63
(9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for relief under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 59(e)).
AFFIRMED.
3 16-16034