Robert Slovak v. Wells Fargo Bank , 685 F. App'x 583 ( 2017 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAR 28 2017
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROBERT A. SLOVAK, ) No. 15-15881
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) D.C. No. 3:13-cv-00569-RCJ-VPC
)
v. ) MEMORANDUM*
)
WELLS FARGO BANK, NA; )
GOLF COURSE VILLAS )
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION; )
GOLF COURSE VILLAS LIMITED )
PARTNERSHIP, )
)
Defendants-Appellees, )
)
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Robert Clive Jones, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 15, 2017**
San Francisco, California
Before: FERNANDEZ, MURGUIA, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
Robert A. Slovak appeals the district court’s order enforcing the terms of a
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral
argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
proposed written settlement agreement (hereafter “proposed agreement”) presented
by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. after Slovak had entered into an oral settlement
agreement (hereafter “oral agreement”) with Wells Fargo in open court. We
reverse and remand.
At a settlement conference on June 3, 2014, Slovak and Wells Fargo agreed
that in order to settle the litigation between them involving a promissory note
secured by a deed of trust: Slovak would pay a certain amount to Wells Fargo;
Wells Fargo would return “the cancelled note and deed of trust” to Slovak; and
“there will be a reconveyance.” Moreover, at that time the court noted that Wells
Fargo intended to “return a cancelled deed of trust and promissory note” to Slovak
“and also file a deed of reconveyance.” Slovak agreed to that and so did Wells
Fargo.
The proposed agreement tendered by Wells Fargo at a later time stated,
instead, that Wells Fargo would use its best efforts to return the note and would
issue a “full reconveyance” of the deed of trust. It did not provide for return of the
deed of trust. Slovak refused to accept that changed agreement, and asserts that the
district court erred when it forced him to do so. We agree.
Nevada law “governs whether [the parties] reached an enforceable
[settlement] agreement.” Wilcox v. Arpaio, 753 F.3d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 2014).
2
Under that law, the district court could neither force Slovak to accept terms he had
not consented to,1 nor “alter the terms” of the oral agreement.2 Moreover, to the
extent that the district court interpreted the plain terms of the oral agreement to
exclude the requirement that Wells Fargo actually return the promissory note and
the deed of trust, it erred;3 it improperly altered the terms of the oral agreement.4
Even if the district court, or we, could not perceive why Slovak demanded
the return of the deed of trust and the note, he bargained for and insisted upon
precisely those terms when he accepted the oral agreement in open court. The
district court abused its discretion when it ordered him to perform pursuant to the
different terms of the proposed agreement. See Maynard v. City of San Jose, 37
F.3d 1396, 1401 (9th Cir. 1994).
REVERSED and REMANDED. Costs on appeal are taxed against Wells
Fargo.
1
See Mack v. Estate of Mack, 206 P.3d 98, 109 (Nev. 2009).
2
Id.; see also Fury v. Special Adm’rs (In re Estate of Travis), 725 P.2d 570,
571 (Nev. 1986) (per curiam).
3
See Am. First Fed. Credit Union v. Soro, 359 P.3d 105, 106 (Nev. 2015);
Traffic Control Servs., Inc. v. United Rentals Nw., Inc., 87 P.3d 1054, 1058 (Nev.
2004) (per curiam); see also Hunt Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Supreme Oil Co., 817
F.2d 75, 77 (9th Cir. 1987).
4
See Musser v. Bank of Am., 964 P.2d 51, 54 (Nev. 1998) (per curiam).
3