United States v. Mamm ( 2017 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       DEC 12 2017
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No.    16-16416
    Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No. 3:98-cv-00086-CRB
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    MARIN ALLIANCE FOR MEDICAL
    MARIJUANA and LYNETTE SHAW,
    Defendants-Appellants.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of California
    Charles R. Breyer, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted December 6, 2017**
    San Francisco, California
    Before: RAWLINSON and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and RICE,*** Chief District
    Judge.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Thomas O. Rice, Chief United States District Judge
    for the Eastern District of Washington, sitting by designation.
    Marin Alliance for Medical Marijuana and its founder Lynnette Shaw
    (collectively, “MAMM”) appeal from the district court’s order denying MAMM’s
    motion for attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). As the
    parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We have
    jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and we affirm.
    The EAJA directs courts to award attorney’s fees to “a prevailing party” in
    certain civil actions involving the United States, unless the government’s position
    was “substantially justified” or “special circumstances make an award unjust.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 2412
    (d)(1)(A); Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 
    567 F.3d 1128
    , 1131 & n.1 (9th Cir. 2009). A “prevailing party” is one that obtains a
    “judicial imprimatur” on a “material alteration of the legal relationship of the
    parties.” Citizens for Better Forestry, 
    567 F.3d at
    1131–32 (emphasis omitted)
    (quoting Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health and
    Human Res., 
    532 U.S. 598
    , 604, 605 (2001)). “[A] favorable judicial statement of
    law in the course of litigation that results in judgment against the [moving party]
    does not suffice to render him a ‘prevailing party.’” Hewitt v. Helms, 
    482 U.S. 755
    , 763 (1987). Rather, the party seeking fees must point to a “judicial
    pronouncement . . . which affects the behavior of” the opposing party. 
    Id. at 761
    (emphasis in original). This court reviews de novo a district court’s legal
    2
    determination whether a litigant is a “prevailing party” and thus entitled to fees
    under the EAJA. Citizens for Better Forestry, 
    567 F.3d at 1131
    .
    The district court did not err in concluding that MAMM is not a “prevailing
    party” for purposes of an EAJA fee award. In its underlying merits order, the
    district court denied MAMM’s motion to dissolve the 2002 permanent injunction
    barring its business operations, but noted that a 2015 federal appropriations rider
    effectively precluded the government from enforcing the injunction against
    MAMM to the extent MAMM complied with applicable California law. While the
    district court’s order suggests that enforcing either the injunction or federal law
    against MAMM would violate the appropriations rider, it is not an “enforceable
    entitlement” preventing the government from attempting to do so. Klamath
    Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 
    589 F.3d 1027
    , 1031 (9th
    Cir. 2009) (emphasis omitted) (“To receive what one sought is not enough to
    prevail: the court must require one’s opponent to give it.”).
    The district court’s interpretation of the rider may “serve as a standard of
    conduct to guide [government] officials in the future,” but it does not require the
    “cessation of [government] action.” Hewitt, 
    482 U.S. at 759, 761
    ; see also
    Klamath, 
    589 F.3d at
    1033 n.5 (finding no prevailing party status where “the
    district court’s finding would not be judicially enforceable against the [defendant]
    unless [the plaintiff] initiated further proceedings . . . and successfully invoked [a
    3
    preclusion doctrine] to establish its entitlement to ‘some form of judicially-
    sanctioned relief’” (quoting Citizens for Better Forestry, 
    567 F.3d at 1132
    )).
    MAMM thus received no “judicial relief” and is not a “prevailing party” entitled to
    fees under the EAJA. Hewitt, 
    482 U.S. at 759, 760
    .1
    AFFIRMED.
    1
    We deny MAMM’s motion requesting judicial notice, as the documents in
    question shed no light on whether the district court’s merits order provided
    MAMM an “enforceable entitlement” against the government. See Klamath, 
    589 F.3d at
    1033 n.5.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16-16416

Filed Date: 12/12/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021