Irma Ortiz-Bonilla v. Merrick Garland ( 2021 )


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  •                                                                               FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    APR 19 2021
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    IRMA NOHEMY ORTIZ-BONILLA,                       No.   19-70498
    Petitioner,                        Agency No. A200-238-871
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted April 15, 2021**
    Pasadena, California
    Before: M. SMITH and IKUTA, Circuit Judges, and STEELE,*** District Judge.
    Irma Nohemy Ortiz-Bonilla, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for
    review of a February 2019 decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable John E. Steele, United States District Judge for the
    Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.
    that denied Ortiz’s May 2018 motion to reopen. We have jurisdiction under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a)(1), Mata v. Lynch, 
    576 U.S. 143
    , 147–48 (2015), and we deny
    the petition for review.
    Ortiz’s May 2018 motion to reopen was time- and number-barred, but Ortiz
    argues that the BIA should have excused these bars due to ineffective assistance of
    counsel. Specifically, Ortiz claims that her counsel was deficient in not filing a
    brief in support of Ortiz’s appeal of the February 15, 2017 decision of the
    immigration judge (IJ), which denied her February 9, 2017 motion to reopen.
    Although the failure to file an appeal brief is presumed prejudicial when the appeal
    is dismissed summarily, the BIA did not err in concluding that the presumption of
    prejudice was rebutted here, because Ortiz failed to raise any plausible grounds for
    relief from the IJ’s February 15, 2017 ruling. See Singh v. Ashcroft, 
    367 F.3d 1182
    , 1186, 1189 (9th Cir. 2004). We agree with the BIA that Ortiz’s motion to
    reopen failed to identify any error in the IJ’s February 15, 2017 ruling. And Ortiz
    fails to raise any meaningful argument on appeal that the BIA’s February 2019
    decision was erroneous, because Ortiz again fails to raise any plausible grounds for
    relief that could have been raised on appeal of the IJ’s February 15, 2017 ruling.
    Ortiz’s remaining arguments about errors in the 2014 removal proceedings
    and ineffectiveness of Ortiz’s original counsel in 2014 that were not raised in the
    2
    motion to reopen before the BIA are not properly before us, because the scope of
    our review is limited to whether the BIA abused its discretion in denying reopening
    based on ineffective assistance of counsel during Ortiz’s appeal of the February 15,
    2017 decision of the IJ, see Singh v. Holder, 
    658 F.3d 879
    , 885 (9th Cir. 2011).
    PETITION DENIED.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-70498

Filed Date: 4/19/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/19/2021