Alexander Minasian v. Merrick Garland ( 2021 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
APR 23 2021
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ALEXANDER MINAS DAWOOD No. 19-70192
MINASIAN,
Agency No. A208-081-660
Petitioner,
v. MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted April 14, 2021**
San Francisco, California
Before: SCHROEDER, RAWLINSON, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Alexander Minasian (Minasian), a native and citizen of Bahrain,
seeks review of a decision from the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
dismissing his appeal of the denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Minasian also
submits that the Immigration Judge (IJ) erred by denying the last of his several
requests for a continuance.
In 2010, Minasian came to the United States on a visitor visa shortly after he
resigned from his job with a luxury car and jewelry company owned by a
prominent Bahraini family. In 2012, a Bahraini court convicted Minasian in
absentia of forgery and breach of trust, sentencing him to 10 years’ imprisonment.
A warrant was also issued for his arrest in 2012. His conviction stemmed from his
former employment, and he alleges that his employer influenced the judicial
proceedings. In 2015, Minasian applied for asylum. Minasian maintained that he
feared mistreatment from the corrupt Bahraini court and while imprisoned.
1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that
Minasian failed to file his asylum application within the one-year time limit and
that no exception applies. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B); see also Al Ramahi v.
Holder, 725 F.3d 1133, 1134–35 (9th Cir. 2013) (applying substantial evidence
standard and describing exceptions to one-year filing deadline: “changed
circumstances” or “extraordinary circumstances”). Minasian argues that the
timeliness of his asylum claim should be measured from when he first learned of
the issuance of an arrest warrant (2015) rather than when he was convicted (2012).
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We disagree. Minasian’s asylum claim is premised on his position that the
Bahraini conviction was illegally obtained. Minasian knew of the conviction in
2012 and hired an attorney to appeal it, believing it to be illegal. Indeed, even
before the conviction, Minasian had learned that a civil lawsuit had been converted
into the criminal case, a procedure Minasian alleges was unusual and only possible
due to the family’s influence. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s
determination that no changed circumstances or extraordinary circumstances
existed to excuse the untimely filing. See Dhital v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 1044, 1049
(9th Cir. 2008).
2. Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s conclusion that
Minasian failed to clearly articulate a particular social group. See Matter of
W-Y-C- & H-O-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 189, 191 (BIA 2018) (requiring a clear
indication in the administrative record of “the exact delineation of the proposed
social group”). Minasian’s proposed social group before us is “victims of corrupt
judicial proceedings in Bahrain.” Minasian argues that he sufficiently articulated
this group in a motion for continuance. This motion, however, merely set forth the
means of persecution (wrongful conviction), not the contours of the proposed
particular social group. See Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1070, 1086 (9th Cir.
2020). During his testimony, the closest Minasian came to articulating a particular
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social group was repeated references to “corruption.” The IJ reasonably
interpreted this testimony as a fear of persecution based on political opinion, and
concluded that Minasian failed to establish a nexus between his asserted political
opinion and the claimed persecution. See Aden v. Wilkinson, 989 F.3d 1073, 1084
(9th Cir. 2021) (explaining that asylum applicant must establish nexus by
demonstrating persecution “on account of a statutorily protected ground”) (citation
omitted). Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination, including the fact
that there was no evidence presented that the prosecution was motivated by
Minasian’s “anticorruption beliefs” or that Minasian exposed any government
corruption. See Santos-Ponce v. Wilkinson, 987 F.3d 886, 890 (9th Cir. 2021)
(explaining that “whether the ‘nexus’ requirement has been satisfied . . . is
reviewed under the substantial evidence standard”) (citation omitted).
3. Denial of Minasian’s motion for continuance was not an abuse of
discretion. See Hui Ran Mu v. Barr, 936 F.3d 929, 936 (9th Cir. 2019) (applying
abuse of discretion standard). The IJ granted Minasian three continuances,
delaying the case for more than a year. The fourth request asked for a continuance
“until the resolution of the foreign proceedings.” Given the three prior
continuances and the indefinite nature of the fourth request, the denial was not an
abuse of discretion. See Sandoval-Luna v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir.
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2008) (affirming denial of continuance in light of prior six-month extension and
lack of available relief); see also Gonzalez v. INS, 82 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 1996)
(holding that denial of indefinite continuance following multiple prior
continuances was not an abuse of discretion).
PETITION DENIED.
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