Leydi Rios-Valladares v. Merrick Garland ( 2021 )


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  •                                NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         APR 28 2021
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    LEYDI LISSETH RIOS-VALLADARES;                   No.    19-70887
    I.E.B.R., a Juvenile; BLANCA ARMIDA
    VALLADAREZ DE RIOS; BLANCA                       Agency Nos.       A202-027-647
    MERARY RIOS-DE SOTO; M.G.S.R., a                                   A202-027-648
    Juvenile; E.R.S.R., a Juvenile; ROBERTO                            A202-028-341
    SORTO-VASQUEZ,                                                     A206-758-847
    A206-758-848
    Petitioners,                                       A206-758-849
    A206-759-485
    v.
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney                     MEMORANDUM*
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Argued and Submitted April 15, 2021
    San Francisco, California
    Before: W. FLETCHER, RAWLINSON, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
    Dissent by Judge W. FLETCHER
    Petitioner Leydi Lisseth Rios-Valladares and members of her extended
    family (Petitioners), natives and citizens of El Salvador, petition for review of a
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision affirming the order of the
    Immigration Judge (IJ) denying their applications for asylum and withholding of
    removal. We have jurisdiction under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
     and deny the petition for
    review.
    1.    Asylum is unavailable if an applicant can safely relocate to another part of
    the applicant’s home country. Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 
    918 F.3d 1025
    , 1029 (9th
    Cir. 2019). Petitioners had the burden of establishing that such relocation was not
    reasonable.1 
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.13
    (b)(3)(i). Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s
    conclusion that Petitioners—supporters of the Nationalist Republican Alliance
    (ARENA) party—could reasonably relocate within El Salvador. See Zehatye v.
    Gonzales, 
    453 F.3d 1182
    , 1185 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e must uphold the IJ’s
    determination if it is supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence
    in the record.”).
    1
    Petitioners failed to exhaust and waived any challenge to the IJ’s
    determination that they did not suffer past persecution because they did not
    challenge it before the BIA or raise it in their opening brief in this court. See
    Barron v. Ashcroft, 
    358 F.3d 674
    , 677-78 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that
    § 1252(d)(1) mandates exhaustion and, thus, this court generally lacks jurisdiction
    over “the merits of a legal claim not presented in the administrative proceedings
    below”); Martinez-Serrano v. I.N.S., 
    94 F.3d 1256
    , 1259-60 (9th Cir. 1996)
    (discussing waiver based on the failure to raise a claim in an opening brief).
    Petitioners also waived any argument that they would be persecuted by the
    government or a quasi-official group because they did not make that argument in
    their opening brief and instead argued that they would be persecuted by “private
    persecutors” that the government is unwilling or unable to control. See Martinez-
    Serrano, 
    94 F.3d at 1259-60
    .
    2
    The IJ, based on review of the record evidence, concluded that there was “no
    evidence that members of the ARENA party are targeted throughout El Salvador,”
    and that various jurisdictions throughout El Salvador had elected ARENA party
    members. Petitioners have not disputed these findings, which are supported by
    substantial evidence. The IJ also noted that two family members—who were also
    members of the ARENA party and had been threatened—had fled El Salvador but
    later returned and remained unharmed. Petitioners argue that they are not similarly
    situated to those family members because those family members are elderly, they
    stay in their home, and they are no longer politically active. But before returning
    to reside in El Salvador, one of these family members had previously returned
    without incident. Petitioners do not address any other factors relevant to their
    burden of showing that they are unable to reasonably relocate within El Salvador.
    
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.13
    (b)(3); Knezevic v. Ashcroft, 
    367 F.3d 1206
    , 1214 (9th Cir.
    2004) (discussing factors for determining reasonableness of internal relocation).
    They have not shown that a “reasonable adjudicator would be compelled” to reach
    a conclusion contrary to the one reached by the agency. 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(B).
    2.    Substantial evidence also supports the denial of withholding of removal
    based on the IJ’s finding that Petitioners had not shown that relocation within El
    Salvador was unreasonable. See 
    8 C.F.R. § 208.16
    (b)(3).
    PETITION DENIED.
    3
    FILED
    Leydi Rios-Valladares, et al v. Merrick Garland, No. 19-70887
    APR 28 2021
    W. Fletcher, Circuit Judge, dissenting:                                     MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    I respectfully dissent. In my view, the IJ’s and BIA’s conclusions are not
    supported by substantial evidence.
    Petitioners, who were deemed credible, testified that they received repeated
    death threats over a period of several months. During that time, one of their homes
    was shot at and later set on fire. The perpetrators identified themselves as
    affiliated with the FMLN party. They demanded that Petitioners pay extortion
    money and that Petitioners stop supporting the ARENA party. Armed men have
    continued to inquire about Petitioners’ whereabouts. Petitioners have thus
    established that they have an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution on
    account of their support for the ARENA political party.
    The IJ’s and BIA’s conclusion that the FMLN was not responsible for
    Petitioners’ persecution is not supported by substantial evidence. The IJ
    incorrectly stated that the perpetrators never identified themselves as FMLN, and
    overlooked evidence in the record that the FMLN promised gangs money and
    lenient prison treatment in exchange for intimidating opposition voters.
    Because I would conclude that Petitioners have an objectively reasonable
    fear of future persecution by the Salvadoran government or a quasi-official group, I
    would also conclude that the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) must
    overcome the presumption that it would be unreasonable for Petitioners to relocate
    within El Salvador. See 
    8 C.F.R. §1208.13
    (b)(3)(ii) (“In cases in which the
    persecutor is a government or is government-sponsored, it shall be presumed that
    internal relocation would not be reasonable.”). On the evidence in the record, DHS
    cannot overcome that presumption.
    2