Anthony Merrick v. David Shinn ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 28 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ANTHONY JAMES MERRICK, No. 20-15600
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:19-cv-05525-SPL-MTM
v.
MEMORANDUM*
DAVID SHINN, Director, Arizona
Department of Corrections; TRINITY
FOOD SERVICES,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
CHARLES L. RYAN, Director, Arizona
Department of Corrections - in his individual
and official capacities; RONALD TOWLES,
Supervisor,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Steven Paul Logan, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 20, 2021**
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, TASHIMA and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
Arizona state prisoner Anthony James Merrick appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
constitutional claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo the district court’s dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Resnick v. Hayes,
213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Merrick’s claims against defendant
Shinn in his official capacity because Shinn is entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity and Merrick does not seek prospective declaratory or injunctive relief.
See Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 824-25 (9th Cir. 2007) (Eleventh Amendment
bars damages actions against state officials in their official capacities); see also
Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Brown, 674 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2012)
(the Eleventh Amendment “does not . . . bar actions for prospective declaratory or
injunctive relief against state officers in their official capacities for their alleged
violations of federal law.”).
The district court properly dismissed Merrick’s conditions-of-confinement
claims because Merrick failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants
knew of or disregarded an excessive risk to Merrick’s health. See Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (prison officials are liable for denying a
prisoner humane conditions of confinement only if they know of and disregard a
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substantial risk of serious harm).
The district court properly dismissed Merrick’s claims based on his inability
to purchase items at the prison store as well as the prices at the prison store
because there is no constitutional right to purchase prison canteen products. See
Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 1996) (prisoners have no
constitutional right to purchase canteen products).
The district court properly dismissed Merrick’s equal protection claims
because indigent prisoners are not a protected class. See Taylor v. Delatoore, 281
F.3d 844, 849 (9th Cir. 2002) (indigent prisoners are not a protected class for
purposes of stating an equal protection claim).
The district court properly dismissed Merrick’s access-to-court claims
because Merrick failed to allege facts sufficient to show an actual injury. See
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349-53 (1996) (elements of an access-to-courts
claim and actual injury requirement); see also Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S.
403, 417 (2002) (to plead an actual injury, the complaint “should state the
underlying claim in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a),[ ] just
as if it were being independently pursued”).
The district court properly dismissed Merrick’s failure-to-train and failure-
to-supervise claims because Merrick failed to allege facts sufficient to show that
there was an underlying constitutional violation. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202,
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1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (a supervisor is liable under § 1983 only if he or she was
personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or there is a sufficient causal
connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional
violation).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing as duplicative
Merrick’s claims in his initial complaint based on allegations regarding Keefe
stores. See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding
that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed claims that
repeated allegations that were previously dismissed under the district court’s
authority to screen in forma pauperis complaints).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Merrick’s motion to
appoint counsel because Merrick did not demonstrate exceptional circumstances.
See Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004) (setting
forth standard of review and requirements for appointment of counsel).
AFFIRMED.
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