Isabel Gonzalez-Veliz v. Merrick Garland ( 2021 )


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  •                      FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ISABEL GONZALEZ-VELIZ,                             No. 19-72090
    Petitioner,
    Agency No.
    v.                            A209-483-835
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
    General,                                             OPINION
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Argued and Submitted March 5, 2021
    Pasadena, California
    Filed May 4, 2021
    Before: Eugene E. Siler, * Andrew D. Hurwitz, and
    Daniel P. Collins, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge Siler
    *
    The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, United States Circuit Judge for the
    U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
    2                GONZALEZ-VELIZ V. GARLAND
    SUMMARY **
    Immigration
    The panel denied Isabel Gonzalez-Veliz’s petition for
    review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals
    dismissing her appeal from an order of an Immigration Judge
    deeming her application for asylum, withholding of removal,
    and Convention Against Torture abandoned, under 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.47
    (c), based on her failure to submit required
    biometrics or establish good cause for her failure to do so.
    The panel held that there was no abuse of discretion in
    the IJ’s decision to deem Gonzalez-Veliz’s application
    abandoned where the IJ instructed Gonzalez-Veliz, whose
    counsel was present, to complete biometrics requirements
    before her merits hearing, ensured that she had the relevant
    instructions, and warned her that her failure to comply could
    result in her application being deemed abandoned. The
    panel rejected Gonzalez-Veliz’s argument that her duty to
    comply with biometrics requirements ended when she
    submitted the required application to the service center. The
    panel explained that the clear text of 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.47
    (c)
    places the burden on the applicant to comply with biometrics
    requirements in conformity with the instructions to the
    application, which in turn direct the applicant to call a
    particular telephone number if she does not receive the
    requisite biometric receipt notices after her submission,
    which Gonzalez-Veliz failed to do. Because she never
    requested a continuance to complete the biometrics
    **
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It
    has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    GONZALEZ-VELIZ V. GARLAND                     3
    requirement, and failed to follow up after she did not receive
    notices of receipt of her application, the panel concluded that
    Gonzalez-Veliz failed to show good cause for failing to meet
    the requirement. The panel also concluded that the IJ did not
    err in failing to question the government about whether it
    sent Gonzalez-Veliz the biometrics submission receipt
    notices, as the burden was on Gonzalez-Veliz to follow up
    when she failed to receive the notices.
    The panel held that there was no abuse of discretion in
    the IJ’s denial of Gonzalez-Veliz’s earlier motion for a
    continuance to obtain an attorney where she knew of her
    right to hire an attorney, was given a two-month continuance
    to obtain counsel, was never detained, knew that the IJ would
    proceed with the next hearing even if she was unrepresented
    unless she showed good cause, did not try to contact an
    attorney before seeking the continuance, and was able to
    retain counsel months before her merits hearing.
    The panel concluded that because Gonzalez-Veliz’s
    application for relief was properly found abandoned, the
    Board correctly deemed moot any challenge to the IJ’s
    denial of Gonzalez-Veliz’s request for a continuance to
    obtain evidentiary support for her application.
    The panel rejected Gonzalez-Veliz’s contention that she
    was deprived of a neutral arbiter because, even assuming that
    the IJ was “rude and harsh,” Gonzalez-Veliz failed to show
    that the IJ’s conduct affected the outcome of proceedings.
    4             GONZALEZ-VELIZ V. GARLAND
    COUNSEL
    Akram Abusharer (argued), Abushrarar & Associates,
    Anaheim, California, for Petitioner.
    Clair L. Workman (argued), Senior Litigation Counsel;
    Keith I. McManus, Assistant Director; Office of
    Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States
    Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Respondent.
    OPINION
    SILER, Circuit Judge:
    Isabel Gonzalez-Veliz claims that the Board of
    Immigration Appeals (BIA) erred in dismissing her appeal
    from an order of an Immigration Judge (IJ) finding her
    application for asylum, withholding of removal, and
    Convention Against Torture relief abandoned. Gonzalez-
    Veliz also argues that the IJ erred in denying two
    continuance requests, one for more time to obtain an attorney
    and one for more time to allow the submission of evidence
    helpful to her application. Finally, she contends that the IJ
    failed to act as a neutral arbiter. We deny her petition for
    review.
    BACKGROUND
    Gonzalez-Veliz, a native and citizen of Guatemala,
    entered the United States in New Mexico, on or about
    October 19, 2016. The next day she was served with a
    GONZALEZ-VELIZ V. GARLAND                               5
    Notice to Appear charging her as removable pursuant to
    
    8 U.S.C. § 1182
    (a)(6)(A)(i). 1
    On June 28, 2017, Gonzalez-Veliz appeared pro se
    before an IJ for her initial removal hearing. During this
    hearing, the IJ informed Gonzalez-Veliz of her right to an
    attorney at her own expense. The IJ provided Gonzalez-
    Veliz with a “list of nonprofit agencies and some private
    attorneys who have indicated that they may be willing to take
    a case for free or reduced fee.” The IJ told Gonzalez-Veliz
    to “[c]all those offices” and described other ways she could
    find an attorney, including asking around her church and
    local community. Continuing the case to give Gonzalez-
    Veliz an opportunity to locate counsel, the IJ told Gonzalez-
    Veliz to find an attorney “right away” because the IJ would
    proceed with her case at the next hearing if she did not have
    a good excuse for failing to secure counsel. Gonzalez-Veliz
    affirmatively indicated she understood.
    On September 8, 2017, Gonzalez-Veliz appeared at her
    next scheduled hearing without counsel. Gonzalez-Veliz
    stated she “couldn’t get an attorney” because she was “sick”
    with “a lot of headaches,” but acknowledged that she had not
    seen a doctor. Gonzalez-Veliz also claimed that she was
    prevented from locating an attorney because she began
    looking for a job a week before the hearing; she admitted,
    however, that she had not even tried to contact an attorney.
    The IJ found that Gonzalez-Veliz had not established good
    1
    Gonzalez-Veliz’s minor son is also listed as a petitioner in this case
    and was a respondent in the proceedings below as a “rider” on Gonzalez-
    Veliz’s removal relief application. Because his claims are entirely
    derivative of his mother’s, we do not discuss them separately.
    6              GONZALEZ-VELIZ V. GARLAND
    cause for another continuance to find an attorney. The IJ
    then found Gonzalez-Veliz removable as charged.
    The IJ engaged in a detailed discussion with Gonzalez-
    Veliz about filing an application for relief and the proof
    required for such an application, specifically mentioning the
    need for a declaration. The IJ told Gonzalez-Veliz that she
    needed to file her application by the next scheduled hearing,
    whether or not she had obtained counsel, or the application
    would be deemed abandoned absent a good excuse.
    Gonzalez-Veliz again affirmatively indicated that she
    understood.
    On October 13, 2017, Gonzalez-Veliz appeared before
    the IJ, this time with counsel, and filed an application for
    asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against
    Torture protection. She did not submit the requisite
    declaration, but the IJ continued the case for a week to allow
    her to do so.
    On October 20, 2017, Gonzalez-Veliz again appeared
    with counsel and submitted her declaration. The IJ then told
    Gonzalez-Veliz that she needed to submit biometrics before
    the merits hearing scheduled for February 8, 2018:
    IJ: Okay, ma’am, you also have to get your
    biometrics taken. That is your fingerprints
    and your photographs, your hair color, eye
    color, et cetera. If you fail to get your
    biometrics done before the next hearing, I
    will find that you have abandoned your
    application and I will deny it without the
    hearing. Do you understand?
    Gonzalez-Veliz: Yes.
    GONZALEZ-VELIZ V. GARLAND                    7
    IJ: The government is providing you with
    written instructions on the steps that you must
    take to get your biometrics done. Take those
    with you and immediately start following
    those instructions. If you fail to get your
    biometrics taken before the next hearing,
    again, I will find that you have abandoned
    your application. Do you understand?
    Gonzalez-Veliz: Yes.
    The biometrics instructions inform aliens that they must
    send three items to a particular address and that when the
    items are received the alien “will receive [a U.S. Citizenship
    and Immigration Services (USCIS)] receipt notice in the
    mail indicating that USCIS has received [the alien’s] asylum
    application, and [a]n [Applicant Support Center (ASC)]
    notice for you, and separate [ASC] notices for each
    dependent included in [the alien’s] application.” The alien
    is instructed that if “you do not receive th[e ASC] notice in
    3 weeks, call (800) 375-5283.”
    On January 16, 2018, Gonzalez-Veliz, through counsel,
    filed a motion for a continuance, explaining that she had not
    yet received requested police reports and court records
    needed to prove her removal relief case. The IJ denied the
    motion, finding that Gonzalez-Veliz “failed to show good
    cause or that she had not had sufficient [time] to obtain the
    evidence or to document her efforts to obtain the evidence.”
    On February 8, 2018, Gonzalez-Veliz appeared for the
    scheduled merits hearing. Her counsel, who allegedly was
    running late due to illness, did not appear at the scheduled
    hour. The IJ initially indicated that he would therefore
    8             GONZALEZ-VELIZ V. GARLAND
    continue the case for another year, but then engaged in a
    discussion with Gonzalez-Veliz:
    IJ: The government attorney has told me that
    you have not gotten your fingerprints done.
    Why is that?
    Gonzalez-Veliz: The evidence that I was
    asked for?
    IJ: No, your fingerprints, your biometrics,
    your photographs, your fingerprints, like we
    told you to do on October 20th. Why haven’t
    [you] gotten them done?
    Gonzalez-Veliz: Well, to be honest, I am not
    really that aware of—familiar with it and my
    friend, the one that’s guiding me, he works.
    IJ: Ma’am, you sure are familiar with it. The
    government attorney handed you written
    instructions on the steps to take. I told you
    you needed to get the biometrics done. I told
    you that if they weren’t done, I would deny
    your case. Why haven’t they been done?
    Sheds a little more light on counsel’s stomach
    ailments. Why haven’t you gotten your
    fingerprints done, ma’am?
    Gonzalez-Veliz: Is that the evidence that I
    was asked for from back in Guatemala?
    IJ: No, ma’am. It is going and making an
    appointment to have your fingerprints and
    your photographs taken, following the
    GONZALEZ-VELIZ V. GARLAND                   9
    instructions you were given at the last
    hearing. For about the 4th time, do you have
    any explanation why you have not done that?
    Gonzalez-Veliz: Well, the truth is that, well,
    as I say, I really did not understand as to that
    I had to do that or how to do that.
    IJ: Any other explanation?
    Gonzalez-Veliz: Well, I would like to
    apologize because, well, truthfully, I speak
    Spanish. My attorney speaks English and I
    have—I am able to communicate with him
    very little.
    IJ:    Ma’am, do you have any other
    explanation for why you did not get your
    fingerprints done, as you were told to do?
    Gonzalez-Veliz: No.
    The IJ then decided to hear Gonzalez-Veliz’s case instead of
    rescheduling. Once counsel arrived, the following exchange
    occurred:
    IJ: All right, counsel. [The Department of
    Homeland Security (DHS)] informed the
    court when we were originally here that
    respondent didn’t get printed.
    Counsel for Gonzalez-Veliz: We filed—
    IJ: I asked respondent about that and she said
    she didn’t know how to do it. You’ve given
    10          GONZALEZ-VELIZ V. GARLAND
    me a document that is the instructions for
    submitting       certain     applications       to
    immigration court. Attached to it and that’s
    all it says and attached to it is part of a return
    receipt, certified mail.          The—not the
    confirmation of receipt, the one that is sent.
    So do you have anything to show respondent
    actually got biometrics done?
    Counsel for Gonzalez-Veliz: I do not have
    anything to show biometrics is done, judge.
    We use—we submitted the form, . . . the copy
    of the first three pages of the application to
    the service center. We assumed that they
    would respond to us prior to the merits
    calendar.
    IJ: Well, counsel, why isn’t the return receipt
    that you get back that confirms proof of
    receipt attached?
    Counsel for Gonzalez-Veliz: I don’t know
    why we didn’t receive it, judge, but that’s—
    this is all I have and we did make that filing
    after the first—our first master hearing
    appearance.
    IJ: Well, if that’s the case, why didn’t you
    get alarmed by the fact that no appointment
    came in and no return receipt came back?
    Counsel for Gonzalez-Veliz: We were
    alarmed about it, judge, and we—
    IJ: Then, why wasn’t the process redone?
    GONZALEZ-VELIZ V. GARLAND                11
    Counsel for Gonzalez-Veliz: Because we
    didn’t have time to do that process by the
    time we saw that that was an issue. We—
    when we make these filings—
    IJ: By the time you saw that was an issue,
    counsel—first of all, there’s no zip code
    written on here.     Why would that be
    considered properly submitted, then?
    Counsel for Gonzalez-Veliz: Judge, I believe
    that—
    IJ: There’s no A-number on the document.
    Counsel for     Gonzalez-Veliz:      Which
    document?
    IJ: The document you submitted to me. How
    do I know what was sent?
    Counsel for Gonzalez-Veliz: Judge, this is
    what they send. I’m giving you proof of that
    this is what we did and I’m giving you
    evidence of when we mailed it.
    IJ: You did not—counsel, you haven’t given
    me proof of anything. There’s no return
    receipt here. There’s nothing on this to
    indicate it was done in respondent’s case.
    There’s certainly nothing to show it was
    received. What does it take to get a return
    receipt back? A week?
    12          GONZALEZ-VELIZ V. GARLAND
    Counsel for Gonzalez-Veliz:         Probably;
    maybe a week or two.
    IJ: Two? That’s pretty long. So if this was
    done in October and nothing came back, what
    was done to verify—to ensure that she got
    fingerprinted?
    Counsel for Gonzalez-Veliz: [F]ollowing
    that filing, we didn’t make a follow-up filing,
    judge. We were concerned with trying to get
    the documents and, you know, complete—
    and working on the process but we didn’t
    look at the fingerprints again once we
    submitted it.
    IJ: Well, then, isn’t that on the respondent?
    Not getting fingerprinted?
    Counsel for Gonzalez-Veliz: In my opinion?
    No, judge. It’s not on the respondent.
    IJ: No? It’s not respondent’s obligation to
    make sure she gets fingerprinted . . . . I’m
    saying that it is respondent’s obligation to
    make sure it gets done. If it doesn’t get done
    and if there’s no response, it’s respondent’s
    obligation to make sure it gets done.
    Counsel for Gonzalez-Veliz: I don’t agree
    with that assessment, judge.
    IJ: No?
    GONZALEZ-VELIZ V. GARLAND                    13
    Counsel for Gonzalez-Veliz:               It’s
    respondent’s responsibility to take the steps
    necessary to get the fingerprinting process
    going. She can’t force the government to get
    her fingerprinted. We sent that notice. We
    have the receipt. It shows the—you know,
    the tracking information on it. Like, the—we
    can try to verify exactly, like what happened
    with this posting but we did do our part.
    IJ: Why didn’t you try to do that, then?
    Counsel for Gonzalez-Veliz: Why didn’t—
    because we can’t share—we don’t chase
    around every single biometrics notice in the
    firm. That’s not what—we don’t—like,
    sometimes it is an issue. Sometimes, we have
    to send it twice or three times but in this
    particular case, you said—we, you know, we
    didn’t think that it will be an issue. So, we
    said, “Okay.” . . . “Let’s set the merits date in
    February,” and we did. Then, when we saw
    that we were having issues getting some of
    the documentations, we filed a motion to
    continue. At the time, we didn’t see that we
    still—we didn’t recognize that the biometrics
    receipt still hadn’t been received. You denied
    the motion to continue, judge. If we—
    IJ: Yes, counsel, because there was not any
    evidence shown to me of any efforts made to
    get the evidence.
    Counsel for Gonzalez-Veliz: Okay, judge,
    but efforts were made to get the evidence.
    14          GONZALEZ-VELIZ V. GARLAND
    IJ: Well, counsel, respondent—there would
    be no Real ID Act if respondent could simply
    say efforts were made without corroborating
    the effort.
    ...
    Counsel for Gonzalez-Veliz: There is the
    Real ID Act, judge, and in order to comply
    with the requirements of the Real ID Act, we
    asked for that motion to continue and we
    recognized that you made an order requesting
    those documents. Now, if that motion was
    granted, we wouldn’t have this issue. We
    probably—we could have followed up
    further on the case.
    IJ: Counsel, it is not my fault . . . . If
    respondent had gotten fingerprinted, we
    wouldn’t have had this issue. If respondent
    had followed up on the lack of getting a
    biometrics appointment, we wouldn’t have
    this issue. . . . If respondent had documented
    efforts allegedly made to get evidence I
    requested, we might not have this issue.
    Counsel for Gonzalez-Veliz: Judge, I think
    the respondent attempted to get those
    documents. We did our part in trying to get
    those fingerprints done.
    ...
    IJ: Where’s the evidence that respondent
    tried to get the documents?
    GONZALEZ-VELIZ V. GARLAND                   15
    Counsel for Gonzalez-Veliz: I mean, there’s
    her testimony.
    IJ: Counsel, you don’t corroborate your
    testimony with your testimony. There is no
    testimony.    There was no declaration
    submitted.
    After this exchange, the government asked the IJ to find
    Gonzalez-Veliz’s application abandoned because of her
    failure to obtain biometrics. The government noted that the
    biometrics instructions explained that if the alien does not
    receive the requisite notice within three weeks of
    submission, she should follow up by calling a specific
    number. The IJ reminded Gonzalez-Veliz that she “was told
    that if she didn’t get her biometrics done in compliance with
    the instructions she was given, it would be considered
    abandoned.” Counsel for Gonzalez-Veliz then admitted to
    not following up with the biometrics request in accordance
    with its instructions.
    The IJ found Gonzalez-Veliz’s application abandoned.
    The BIA dismissed Gonzalez-Veliz’s appeal. We have
    jurisdiction of her timely petition for review pursuant to
    
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    .
    DISCUSSION
    I. Abandonment
    The governing regulation makes plain that failure to
    provide biometrics “within the time allowed by the [IJ]’s
    order, constitutes abandonment of the application and the
    [IJ] may enter an appropriate order dismissing the
    application unless the applicant demonstrates that such
    failure was the result of good cause.” 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.47
    (c);
    16             GONZALEZ-VELIZ V. GARLAND
    see also 
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.10
     (“Failure to comply with
    processing requirements for biometrics . . . within the time
    allowed will result in dismissal of the application, unless the
    applicant demonstrates that such failure was the result of
    good cause.”). An IJ’s decision to deem an asylum
    application abandoned is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
    Taggar v. Holder, 
    736 F.3d 886
    , 889 (9th Cir. 2013).
    At the October 20, 2017 hearing, the IJ twice warned
    Gonzalez-Veliz that if she did not provide her biometrics
    before the next hearing her application would be deemed
    abandoned. The IJ also noted that the government would be
    providing Gonzalez-Veliz with certain instructions on how
    to complete her biometrics and that Gonzalez-Veliz should
    “immediately start following” them.
    Gonzalez-Veliz did not follow the instructions but
    argues that her duty to comply ended when she submitted the
    three items to USCIS. This argument is belied by the clear
    text of 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.47
    (c), which places the burden on the
    alien “to . . . comply with the requirements to provide
    biometrics and other biographical information in conformity
    with . . . the instructions to the applications . . . and
    instructions provided by DHS, within the time allowed by
    the [IJ]’s order.” The possibility of the government’s failure
    to issue the requisite notices is contemplated by the
    instructions, which tell the alien to call a particular number
    if she does not receive the requisite notices after her
    submission. Our sister circuits have found that an IJ does
    not abuse his or her discretion in deeming an application
    abandoned when an alien fails to submit biometrics or
    provide good cause for not doing so. See Ramirez-Coria v.
    Holder, 
    761 F.3d 1158
    , 1160, 1162–63 (10th Cir. 2014);
    Gomez-Medina v. Holder, 
    687 F.3d 33
    , 35, 37–38 (1st Cir.
    GONZALEZ-VELIZ V. GARLAND                          17
    2012); Umezurike v. Holder, 
    610 F.3d 997
    , 999–1004 (7th
    Cir. 2010). We agree.
    Gonzalez-Veliz did not request a continuance before the
    February 8, 2018 merits hearing to complete her biometrics.
    Nor did counsel show good cause for requesting such a
    continuance on February 8. Instead, counsel argued that if
    the IJ had granted a previous unrelated continuance request,
    the biometrics issue would have been discovered and dealt
    with. 2 Moreover, far from showing good cause for failing to
    follow up on the biometrics submission after the government
    assertedly failed to send the requisite notice, counsel
    dismissively stated, “we don’t chase around every single
    biometrics notice in the firm.” In contrast to Karapetyan v.
    Mukasey, 
    543 F.3d 1118
     (9th Cir. 2008), and Cui v.
    Mukasey, 
    538 F.3d 1289
     (9th Cir. 2008), there is no dispute
    that Gonzalez-Veliz received adequate notice of what she
    needed to do. See Karapetyan, 
    543 F.3d at
    1130–31 (“[A]s
    we have previously recognized [in Cui], the ability of
    otherwise diligent applicants, like [the alien], to comply with
    the fingerprint requirement was frustrated by the legal
    uncertainties surrounding the fingerprint laws. . . . [The
    alien] did not receive adequate notice regarding the
    fingerprint requirement.”); Cui, 
    538 F.3d at 1294
     (“There is
    no evidence that DHS delivered a fingerprint notice and
    instructions to [the alien], as is currently required under
    
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.47
    .”).
    We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the IJ’s
    decision to deem Gonzalez-Veliz’s application abandoned.
    Her due process claim fails for the same reason. See
    Grigoryan v. Barr, 
    959 F.3d 1233
    , 1240 (9th Cir. 2020) (“To
    2
    That January 16, 2018 continuance request was made specifically
    for the purpose of obtaining documents from Guatemala.
    18            GONZALEZ-VELIZ V. GARLAND
    prevail on a due process challenge to deportation
    proceedings, [the alien] must show error[.]” (quoting Lata v.
    INS, 
    204 F.3d 1241
    , 1246 (9th Cir. 2000)); see also Juarez
    v. Holder, 
    599 F.3d 560
    , 566 (7th Cir. 2010) (“The
    petitioners also assert a rather vague due-process challenge
    to the denial of their motion for a continuance and the IJ’s
    decision to deem their applications for relief abandoned. But
    immigration proceedings satisfy due process so long as they
    conform to the applicable statutory and regulatory standards,
    as these did.” (citation omitted)).
    II. Denial of Continuances
    A. To Find an Attorney
    There was no abuse of discretion in the denial of
    Gonzalez-Veliz’s final request for more time to obtain an
    attorney. See Arrey v. Barr, 
    916 F.3d 1149
    , 1157–58 (9th
    Cir. 2019). Gonzalez-Veliz knew of her right to hire an
    attorney; was given a two-month continuance to obtain
    counsel; was never detained; knew that the IJ would proceed
    with the hearing even if she was unrepresented unless she
    showed good cause; but did not even try to contact an
    attorney before seeking the continuance. In any event, she
    was able to retain counsel months before her February 8
    merits hearing. Compare 
    id.
     at 1158 & n.3 (finding no abuse
    of discretion where IJ granted three continuances over two
    months to acquire an attorney and warned the alien that her
    case would not be continued any further), with Biwot v.
    Gonzalez, 
    403 F.3d 1094
    , 1099–1100 (9th Cir. 2005)
    (finding abuse of discretion because alien was given only
    five total business days from two granted continuances to
    locate an attorney while incarcerated and made “diligent”
    efforts to obtain counsel), and Rios-Berrios v. INS, 
    776 F.2d 859
    , 862–63 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding abuse of discretion
    because alien was given only two total business days from
    GONZALEZ-VELIZ V. GARLAND                  19
    two granted continuances to locate attorney while
    incarcerated).
    B. To Obtain Corroborating Evidence
    Because Gonzalez-Veliz’s application for relief was
    properly found abandoned, the BIA correctly deemed moot
    any challenge to the denial of Gonzalez-Veliz’s previous
    request for a continuance to obtain evidentiary support for
    her application. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 
    429 U.S. 24
    , 25
    (1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not
    required to make findings on issues the decision of which is
    unnecessary to the results they reach.” (citations omitted)).
    III.      Neutral Judge
    Gonzalez-Veliz was not deprived of her right to a neutral
    arbiter. See Reyes-Melendez v. INS, 
    342 F.3d 1001
    , 1006
    (9th Cir. 2003). Even assuming that the IJ was “rude and
    harsh,” Gonzalez-Veliz “must show that the denial of . . . her
    right to a neutral fact-finder ‘potentially affected the
    outcome of the proceedings.’” Arrey, 916 F.3d at 1159
    (citation omitted).
    The IJ permitted Gonzalez-Veliz to file her application
    for relief, gave her ample opportunity to present her case,
    and explained in detail what evidence she needed to submit
    to prove her case despite candidly stating that prevailing
    would be “difficult.” See Almaghzar v. Gonzales, 
    457 F.3d 915
    , 922 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Although the IJ showed
    impatience at times, [the alien] had ample opportunity to
    present his case, and the record as a whole does not suggest
    that the IJ did not conduct the hearing with an open mind.”).
    Gonzalez-Veliz’s suggestion that the IJ inappropriately
    assumed the role of the government by questioning her,
    particularly when she appeared pro se, is unavailing. See
    20             GONZALEZ-VELIZ V. GARLAND
    Shoafera v. INS, 
    228 F.3d 1070
    , 1075 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e
    have recently noted that the duty of the [IJ] is analogous to
    that of the administrative law judge in social security
    disability cases and thus, the IJ has a duty to fully and fairly
    develop the record.” (citation and internal quotation marks
    omitted)). The IJ may have expressed frustration at times,
    but his questioning was compliant with the court’s duty to
    “fully and fairly develop the record.” Nor did the IJ err in
    failing to question the government about whether it sent the
    biometrics submission receipt notices, as the burden is on the
    alien to follow up if the notice is not received. See 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.47
    (c).
    PETITION DENIED.