Ellen Keates v. Michael Koile ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 6 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ELLEN KEATES, No. 20-16015
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.
2:15-cv-01270-NVW
v.
MICHAEL KOILE, individually as an MEMORANDUM*
employee with the State of Arizona Child
Protective Services; and KIMBERLY
PENDER, individually as an employee with
the State of Arizona Child Protective
Services,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Neil V. Wake, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 4, 2021**
Portland, Oregon
Before: W. FLETCHER and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and BLOCK,***
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Frederic Block, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
District Judge.
Appellant Ellen Keates (“Keates”) appeals the District Court’s denial of her
motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50 after a jury rendered a
verdict in favor of Appellees Michael Koile (“Koile”) and Kimberly Pender
(“Pender”), who were sued individually as employees of Arizona’s Child
Protective Services (“CPS”). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
and we affirm.
The following facts were established at trial. On May 20, 2013, Keates took
her thirteen-year-old daughter A.K. to see a pediatrician. While being examined by
Dr. Susan Stephens, A.K. disclosed that she “had attempted to hurt herself.” At
some point in time, Keates entered the examination room, and Dr. Stephens
became concerned about Keates’s behavior because she discounted the possibility
that A.K. would engage in self-harm and spontaneously mentioned that A.K. had
been the victim of sexual abuse. Consequently, Dr. Stephens instructed Keates to
take A.K. to the Phoenix Children’s Hospital to be evaluated by a psychiatrist. Dr.
Stephens informed Keates that if A.K. was not checked in within thirty minutes,
she would contact CPS. At the hospital, Behavioral Health Crisis Counselor
Randall Call (“Call”) concluded that it would be unsafe to release A.K. from the
hospital after Keates initially refused to stay home with A.K. to make sure that she
did not harm herself. Call instead determined that A.K. should be transferred to an
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inpatient psychiatric environment as soon as a bed became available and contacted
CPS.
The next morning, May 21, 2013, Pender assigned Koile to investigate on
behalf of CPS. Upon arriving at the hospital, Koile spoke to A.K. and hospital
staff. Keates was not at the hospital. Koile attempted to contact Keates by phone
several times without success. That same morning, a social worker told Koile that
Aurora Behavioral Health (“Aurora”) would have a bed available for A.K. at 3:00
P.M. that day. At the time of these events, it took an average of five days to obtain
a warrant to take custody of a child. Koile took A.K. into custody and transferred
her to Aurora in the early afternoon without obtaining a warrant.
Keates then brought this action, claiming Koile and Pender violated her
constitutional rights when A.K. was seized without a warrant.1 At trial, the jury
returned a verdict in Defendants’ favor. In doing so, it answered three
interrogatories, finding that Koile and Pender (1) had “reasonable cause to believe
[A.K.] was in imminent danger of serious bodily injury within the time it would
have taken to obtain a court order authorizing the removal,” and (2) “pursue[d]
avenues of investigation that were reasonable considering all the circumstances,”
and (3) that “the scope and degree of the interference with familial association
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A.K. asserted claims in the initial complaint. Before trial, A.K. reached the age of
majority and voluntarily withdrew her claims.
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[was] reasonably necessary to avert the imminent danger.”
In denying the renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, the District
Court held that “the verdict and the jury interrogatories established both (1) that
Defendants did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and (2) that, if they did,
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because they did not violate law that
was clearly established in the circumstances of this case.”
We review the District Court’s denial of a motion for judgment as matter of
law de novo. See In re Bard IVC Filters Prod. Liab. Litig., 969 F.3d 1067, 1077
(9th Cir. 2020). We ask whether the evidence, construed in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party, “permits only one reasonable conclusion, and that
conclusion is contrary to the jury’s verdict.” Josephs v. Pac. Bell, 443 F.3d 1050,
1062 (9th Cir. 2006). We hold that the jury’s verdict that there was no
constitutional violation was reasonable and supported by the record. Ample
evidence supported a finding that the officials “ha[d] reasonable cause to believe
that [a] child [was] likely to experience serious bodily harm in the time that would
be required to obtain a warrant.” Rogers v. Cnty. of San Joaquin, 487 F.3d 1288,
1294 (9th Cir. 2007). Consequently, we need not address the issue of qualified
immunity.
AFFIRMED.
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