Anthony Sunseri v. Experian Information Solutions ( 2022 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         MAY 3 2022
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ANTHONY SUNSERI,                                      No.    21-55583
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                  D.C. No.
    2:20-cv-08932-DOC-RAO
    v.
    EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS,                       MEMORANDUM*
    INC.,
    Defendant-Appellee,
    and
    EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES,
    INC.,
    Defendant,
    CREDIT MANAGEMENT, L.P.,
    Defendant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted March 7, 2022
    Phoenix, Arizona
    Before: HAWKINS, PAEZ, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    Anthony Sunseri appeals the dismissal of his claims under the Fair Credit
    Reporting Act (“FCRA”) and its California equivalent. We have jurisdiction under
    
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and we reverse and remand.
    1.    Sunseri is not collaterally estopped from asserting that Experian’s post-
    bankruptcy credit reporting procedures violate 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) based on the
    settlement order in White v. Experian Info. Sols., No. CV 05-1070-DOC (MLGx),
    
    2008 WL 11518799
     (C.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2008) (“the White Order”).1 See Sec. &
    Exch. Comm’n v. Stein, 
    906 F.3d 823
    , 828 (9th Cir. 2018) (noting that the availability
    of collateral estoppel is reviewed de novo). Sunseri was not a party in White, nor a
    member of the class. None of the other exceptions to nonparty issue preclusion
    apply. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 
    553 U.S. 880
    , 892–95 (2008).
    Nor is Sunseri bound by the White Order’s proclamation that the procedures
    it outlines “conclusively” comply with the FCRA in the post-bankruptcy credit
    reporting context and that all consumers are barred from asserting otherwise.
    Particularly because “[t]he reasonableness of the procedures and whether the agency
    followed them [are] jury questions in the overwhelming majority of cases,” Sunseri
    is entitled to discovery into Experian’s actual procedures before they can be assessed
    as “reasonable . . . to assure maximum possible accuracy” in compliance with §
    1681e(b). See Guimond v. Trans Union Credit Info. Co., 
    45 F.3d 1329
    , 1333 (9th
    1
    On appeal, Experian no longer defends the application of collateral estoppel.
    2
    Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). Reasonableness is not a static issue, and procedures
    that met the high bar of § 1681e(b) fourteen years ago may not today.
    2.    Sunseri has stated a claim for a violation of § 1681e(b) by alleging facts
    “tending to show that [Experian] prepared a report containing inaccurate
    information.” See Guimond, 
    45 F.3d at
    1332‒33 (citation omitted). The first
    amended complaint plausibly alleges that Experian was aware of Sunseri’s
    bankruptcy discharge, that the account at issue was discharged, and that Experian
    inaccurately reported the discharged account on the report it prepared. Sunseri also
    plausibly alleged that Experian should have known the collection account pre-dated
    his December 2018 bankruptcy filing. Experian reported that the account would
    continue on record until October 2025, indicating that it first became delinquent in
    October 2018. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(4).
    Our recent decision in Moran v. Screening Pros, LLC, 
    25 F.4th 722
     (9th Cir.
    2022), does not prevent Sunseri from proceeding past the pleading stage. In that
    case, we held that the defendant consumer reporting agency could not be liable for
    its violation of the FCRA because its interpretation of § 1681c(a), while incorrect,
    was not “objectively unreasonable.” Moran, 25 F.4th at 729; id. at 728 (noting that
    “[t]he FCRA imposes liability for negligent or willful violations of its terms.”)
    (citations omitted). By contrast with the seven-year reporting window at issue in
    Moran, here Sunseri alleges a violation of the fact-intensive “reasonableness”
    3
    standard. See id. It is too soon to decide as a matter of law that Experian’s
    interpretation of its obligations under § 1681e(b) was not objectively unreasonable.
    Further, assuming White’s procedures remain not objectively unreasonable,
    Experian’s compliance with White is inappropriate for resolution at this early stage.2
    The parties’ requests for judicial notice [Docket Entry Nos. 17, 28] are
    DENIED.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED. Each party shall bear its own costs on
    appeal.
    2
    Experian’s compliance is not obvious, as evidenced by Sunseri’s allegations that
    neither TransUnion nor Equifax made the same reporting errors even though they
    were equally bound by White’s terms.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 21-55583

Filed Date: 5/3/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 5/3/2022