Varinder Singh v. Merrick Garland ( 2022 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 8 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
VARINDER SINGH, AKA Barinder Singh, No. 19-71370
AKA Valinder Singh,
Agency No. A205-585-584
Petitioner,
v. MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted June 6, 2022**
Pasadena, California
Before: M. SMITH, BADE, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.
Varinder Singh petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’
(“BIA”) dismissal of his appeal from an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision
denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252. “We review the denial of asylum, withholding of removal and CAT
claims for substantial evidence,” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028
(9th Cir. 2019), and deny the petition.
1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of asylum and
withholding of removal. To establish past persecution, an applicant must show
that he was persecuted “on account of one or more protected grounds.” Guo v.
Sessions, 897 F.3d 1208, 1213 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). To be eligible for
asylum, the protected ground must be “one central reason” for the persecution. 8
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). And to be eligible for withholding of removal, the
protected ground need only be “a reason” for the persecution. Id. § 1231(b)(3)(C).
The agency concluded that Singh did not establish that a protected ground was one
central reason, or a reason, for the harm he suffered; substantial evidence supports
this result.
Singh first argues that members of the Akali Dal Badal Party (the “Badal
party”) imputed an anti-Badal political opinion to him and that he was harmed
because of this imputation. We disagree. There is no direct evidence that the
Badal party imputed a political opinion to Singh in 2012. See Garcia-Milian v.
Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1031–32 (9th Cir. 2014) (as amended). Singh points to the
Badal party’s statement that he was sending money “to a Sikh, separatist, political
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party in Punjab,” but he does not explain how an accusation made five years after
he was personally harmed in India demonstrates that he was harmed on account of
an imputed political opinion.
The indirect evidence—Singh’s refusal to give his family’s land to the Badal
party—does not “compel a conclusion contrary to that reached by the BIA.” See
id. at 1032. Singh admitted that the Badal party “wanted to confiscate” his
family’s land because it is in “an excellent location,” and the Badal party “will
threaten” anyone with “land on a good location.” See Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d
1007, 1015–16 (9th Cir. 2010) (concluding a petitioner did not show that the harm
he suffered—“bandits attempting to steal his grandfather’s farm” and “murder[ing]
his family”—was on account of a protected ground because “the farm was on
fertile” and “valuable” land, and he “implied that the only motivation for the
murders was the land itself”). Singh does not identify anything in the record that
shows that the Badal party considers those who resist its demands for land to be
political adversaries. See Kozulin v. INS, 218 F.3d 1112, 1117 (9th Cir. 2000).
Nor does Singh assert that he associated with anyone who was known by the Badal
party to hold a particular political view. See Navas v. INS, 217 F.3d 646, 659 (9th
Cir. 2000). Thus, the agency reasonably concluded that Singh was not persecuted
on account of an imputed political opinion.
Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s determination that Singh did
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not establish past persecution on account of his Sikh religion under either the
asylum or withholding of removal standards. Singh points to the arrest of his
father in 2017, arguing that “the significance of [Punjabi officers using his father’s
turban to tie his arms at his back] cannot be overstated.” But Singh does not
explain how an incident occurring five years after he was personally harmed in
India demonstrates that he suffered past persecution on account of his religion.
Singh next contends that he was persecuted based on his membership in two
proposed social groups: his immediate family and “landowners in Punjab.” The
agency found that neither of Singh’s proposed social groups were legally
cognizable, and Singh does not contest these findings on appeal. Thus, Singh
waives any challenge to the agency’s conclusion that his proposed social groups
are not legally cognizable. See Singh v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 1152, 1157 n.3 (9th
Cir. 2004). Because the existence of a cognizable social group is an essential
element of claims for asylum and withholding of removal based on this protected
ground, see Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1132 n.3 (9th Cir. 2016), the agency’s
unchallenged determination is dispositive.
Moreover, the record does not compel a conclusion that Singh’s fear of
future persecution is objectively reasonable. Singh points to a 2017 incident
involving his father and brother to argue that he would be harmed on account of his
Sikh religion or an imputed anti-Badal opinion if returned to India. But the IJ
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ascribed “limited weight” to the primary evidence recounting the 2017 incident—
his father’s and neighbor’s affidavits—and Singh does not challenge that finding
on appeal. See Singh, 361 F.3d at 1157 n.3. Singh argues that his “reaction” to the
affidavits is “sufficient to confer refugee status,” but he cites no legal authority to
support this argument and we do not find it persuasive enough to compel a
conclusion that Singh’s fear of future persecution is objectively reasonable.1
2. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief. The
agency reasonably concluded that the past harm Singh endured, although
reprehensible, did not amount to “torture.” See 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(2) (defining
torture as “an extreme form of cruel and inhuman treatment”); see Vitug v. Holder,
723 F.3d 1056, 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2013) (concluding that five beatings, two of
which were “severe,” and economic deprivation did not compel a finding that a
petitioner would be tortured). Singh does not explain how what happened to his
brother in 2017 demonstrates that he “would be subject to a ‘particularized threat
of torture’” if returned to India. See Dhital v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th
Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (citation omitted). And Singh’s argument that the agency
failed to “do the required analysis when [it] concluded that [he] had failed to
1
Because Singh does not prove an objectively reasonable fear of
persecution, which is necessary to compel a finding of eligibility for asylum, Singh
fails to meet the higher “clear probability” standard for withholding of removal.
See Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir. 2006).
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demonstrate that he could avoid persecution through relocation” is meritless
because the authorities he relies upon pertain to asylum, not CAT relief. See
Tzompantzi-Salazar v. Garland, 32 F.4th 696, 705 (9th Cir. 2022) (“[T]he asylum
and CAT regulations with respect to the relocation factor ‘differ markedly.’”
(citation omitted)).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
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