Mario Sandoval-Gomez v. Eric Holder, Jr. ( 2021 )


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  •                                                                               FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    MAY 17 2021
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    MARIO SANDOVAL-GOMEZ, AKA                        No.   10-73448
    Milton Alvarado-Sandine,
    Agency No. A092-563-965
    Petitioner,
    v.                                              MEMORANDUM*
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Argued and Submitted June 3, 2014
    Resubmitted May 17, 2021
    Pasadena, California
    Before: GOULD and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and ENGLAND,** District
    Judge.
    Mario Sandoval-Gomez petitions for review of the dismissal by the Board of
    Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) of his appeal of the order of removal. The BIA
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Morrison C. England, Jr., Senior United States District
    Judge for the Eastern District of California, sitting by designation.
    found Sandoval-Gomez removable based on his conviction for attempted arson
    under California Penal Code section 455 as an aggravated felony, 
    8 U.S.C. § 1227
    (a)(2)(A)(iii). Sandoval-Gomez challenges his removal, alleging that (1) the
    immigration judge (“IJ”) improperly permitted the Government to lodge new
    charges on remand from the BIA; and (2) the BIA erred in concluding that his
    attempted arson conviction qualified as an aggravated felony under the federal
    explosives statute, 
    18 U.S.C. § 844.1
    1.    The IJ properly permitted the Government to lodge new charges. The BIA’s
    January 2009 remand order did not preclude the Government from pursuing new
    removal charges based on Sandoval-Gomez’s attempted arson conviction. The
    BIA vacated its prior order entirely and broadly instructed the IJ to conduct “any
    further proceedings the [IJ] deems appropriate.” Thus, the Government was
    permitted to bring additional charges.2 See Fernandes v. Holder, 
    619 F.3d 1069
    ,
    1074 (9th Cir. 2010) (“An articulated purpose for the remand, without any express
    limit on scope, is not sufficient to limit the remand such that it forecloses
    1
    Sandoval-Gomez was also found removable based on a controlled
    substance conviction. He did not challenge that conclusion.
    2
    Because there was no final order of removal, neither res judicata nor law of
    the case apply. See Bravo-Pedroza v. Gonzales, 
    475 F.3d 1358
    , 1360 (9th Cir.
    2007). Further, there was no violation of the BIA’s regulations, because the case
    was remanded.
    2
    consideration of other new claims or motions that the IJ deems appropriate or that
    are presented in accordance with relevant regulations.”); see also 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.30
    .
    2.    The BIA erred when it concluded that Sandoval-Gomez was removable
    based on California Penal Code section 455. The Government bears the burden of
    proving that Sandoval-Gomez is removable on all charges of removability. See
    Cheuk Fung S-Yong v. Holder, 
    600 F.3d 1028
    , 1034 (9th Cir. 2010); see also
    Pereida v. Wilkinson, 
    141 S. Ct. 754
    , 761 (2021). Sandoval-Gomez argues that
    California Penal Code section 455 is not an aggravated felony, because it punishes
    conduct not included in 
    18 U.S.C. § 844
    (f)(1) or § 844(i). See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1101
    (a)(43)(E)(i) (defining aggravated felony). We agree.
    California Penal Code section 455 is divisible. See Mathis v. United States,
    
    136 S. Ct. 2243
    , 2249 (2016). The felony therein can be committed in one of three
    ways: (1) “willfully and maliciously attempt[ing] to set fire to or attempt[ing] to
    burn . . . any structure, forest land, or property”; (2) “willfully and maliciously
    . . . aid[ing], counsel[ing] or procur[ing] the burning of any structure, forest land or
    property”; or (3) “willfully and maliciously . . . commit[ting] any act preliminary
    thereto, or in furtherance thereof.” 
    Cal. Penal Code § 455
    ; see also CALJIC 14.84;
    3
    People v. Carrasco, 
    77 Cal. Rptr. 3d 912
    , 916 (Ct. App. 2008). Only attempting to
    set fire or to burn any structure or property would be an aggravated felony.
    Based on the record before us, we cannot determine how Sandoval-Gomez
    committed the attempted arson offense. Thus, the record is inconclusive as to
    whether Sandoval-Gomez was convicted of an aggravated felony offense. See
    Medina-Lara v. Holder, 
    771 F.3d 1106
    , 1113 (9th Cir. 2014) (“When a court using
    the modified categorical approach to determine whether an underlying conviction
    is a predicate offense relies solely on the link between the charging papers and the
    abstract of judgment, that link must be clear and convincing.”). The Government
    failed to meet its burden of proof. Accordingly, the BIA erred when it concluded
    that Sandoval-Gomez was removable based on a conviction of an aggravated
    felony.3
    Although the BIA reviewed Sandoval-Gomez’s appeal as an application for
    cancellation of removal, the BIA did not actually rule on his application. Instead,
    the BIA concluded that Sandoval-Gomez was convicted of an aggravated felony,
    and the conviction made him statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal.
    3
    The additional elements under 
    8 U.S.C. § 844
    (f)(1) and § 844(i) relating to
    the property (i.e., owned by the United States or used in interstate commerce) are
    purely “jurisdictional” and do not apply for purposes of applying the categorical
    approach. See In re Vasquez-Muniz, 
    23 I. & N. Dec. 207
    , 210–12 (BIA 2002)
    (citing United States v. Castillo-Rivera, 
    244 F.3d 1020
     (9th Cir. 2001)).
    4
    Accordingly, because Sandoval-Gomez is not removable based on an aggravated
    felony, the issue of whether Sandoval-Gomez is eligible for cancellation of
    removal remains unresolved. See Arrey v. Barr, 
    916 F.3d 1149
    , 1157 (9th Cir.
    2019) (holding that we “cannot affirm the BIA on a ground upon which it did not
    rely” (citation omitted)).
    Thus, we remand this matter back to the BIA for further proceedings,
    including to determine in the first instance whether Sandoval-Gomez is eligible for
    cancellation of removal.
    PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED, REMANDED.
    5