Jason Bezis v. City of Livermore ( 2021 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAY 19 2021
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    JASON ADRIAN BEZIS,                             No.    19-17386
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 3:19-cv-01061-RS
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    CITY OF LIVERMORE; et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of California
    Richard Seeborg, Chief District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted March 18, 2021**
    San Francisco, California
    Before: MURGUIA and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges, and LYNN,*** District
    Judge.
    Appellant Jason Adrian Bezis (“Bezis”) brought suit under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    against the City of Livermore, John Marchand, individually and in his capacity as
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Barbara M. G. Lynn, Chief United States District
    Judge for the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
    the Mayor of Livermore, Steven Spedowfski and Robert Carling, individually and
    in their official capacities as members of the Livermore City Council (“City
    Council”), and Jason Alcala, individually and in his official capacity as Livermore
    City Attorney (collectively called “the City”). Bezis contended that the City violated
    his First Amendment rights and his right to due process and equal protection at a
    City Council meeting on February 27, 2017, when City Council members, the
    Mayor, and the City Attorney interrupted him with multiple procedural points of
    order when Bezis strayed from the agenda topic.
    The City moved to dismiss Bezis’s First Amended Complaint for failure to
    state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which was granted by
    the district court, with leave to amend. After Bezis filed his Second Amended
    Complaint, the City again moved to dismiss, and the motion was granted without
    leave to amend. Bezis appealed to this Court. We affirm the district court’s grant
    of the City’s motion to dismiss.
    We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo a district
    court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), accepting as true
    all allegations of fact in a well-pleaded complaint and construing those facts in the
    light most favorable to the plaintiff. Karam v. City of Burbank, 
    352 F.3d 1188
    , 1192
    (9th Cir. 2003). A district court’s refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
    state law claims after all federal claims were dismissed is reviewed for abuse of
    2                                   19-17386
    discretion. Costanich v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 
    627 F.3d 1101
    , 1107 (9th
    Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). A district court’s decision on qualified immunity is
    reviewed de novo. Vazquez v. Cnty. of Kern, 
    949 F.3d 1153
    , 1159 (9th Cir. 2020).
    The district court did not err in dismissing Bezis’s Second Amended
    Complaint.      City Council meetings are limited public forums in which it is
    appropriate to place reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of speech,
    in addition to restrictions on speech content, so long as those regulations are
    viewpoint neutral and enforced in a neutral manner. Norse v. City of Santa Cruz,
    
    629 F.3d 966
    , 975 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). The district court properly held that
    because Bezis’s comments were off the topic of the agenda, the City Council was
    entitled to restrict him to the agenda item, without improperly infringing on his First
    Amendment rights, and that Bezis’s Second Amended Complaint failed to allege
    any new facts that would impact that holding. Therefore, the district court rightly
    concluded that Bezis failed to state a First Amendment claim upon which relief could
    be granted.1 Further, the district court properly concluded that because Bezis’s
    remaining constitutional claims relied on the same facts alleged to support his First
    Amendment claim for relief, those claims necessarily failed as well.
    1
    The district court also properly dismissed Bezis’s facial First Amendment challenge. The
    facial challenge was dismissed as moot because the City represented that the challenged
    procedural rule had been amended twice since the City Council meeting at issue, and Bezis
    offered no response in opposition, thus, as the district court found, “effectively conceding the
    point.”
    3                                          19-17386
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Bezis’s
    supplemental state law claims. Under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1367
    (c)(3), a district court “may
    decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a [state law] claim” when “all
    claims over which it has original jurisdiction” have been dismissed. The district
    court’s dismissal of Bezis’s state law claims, after all of Bezis’s federal claims were
    dismissed, was a proper exercise of the district court’s discretion.
    Finally, the district court did not err in finding that Bezis had alleged no facts
    to overcome the individual Appellees’ qualified immunity. To determine whether
    qualified immunity applies, we ask whether (1) the plaintiff has plausibly alleged a
    violation of a constitutional right, and (2) the constitutional right was “clearly
    established” at the time of the conduct at issue. Wilk v. Neven, 
    956 F.3d 1143
    , 1148
    (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 
    555 U.S. 223
    , 231 (2009)). The district
    court properly found that Bezis had not plausibly alleged a violation of a
    constitutional right, and thus had not alleged sufficient facts to overcome the
    individual Appellees’ qualified immunity.
    AFFIRMED.
    4                                     19-17386