Eric Gilbert v. United States ( 2021 )


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  •                 FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ERIC L. GILBERT; AUDRA GILBERT,          No. 18-17004
    husband and wife,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,      D.C. No.
    2:17-cv-03762-
    v.                           JJT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; PHILIP
    K. LEOPARD, as Trustee of Namaca           OPINION
    Management Limited,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    John Joseph Tuchi, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted February 3, 2021
    Phoenix, Arizona
    Filed May 20, 2021
    Before: William A. Fletcher, Eric D. Miller, and
    Danielle J. Hunsaker, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge Hunsaker
    2                 GILBERT V. UNITED STATES
    SUMMARY *
    Tax
    The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal, for lack
    of jurisdiction, of appellants’ action for a declaratory
    judgment on the effect of the Foreign Investment in Real
    Property Tax Act and Fixed, Determinable, Annual, or
    Periodical income rules on a contract to purchase real
    property from a foreign entity.
    The FIRPTA and FDAP require a buyer in taxable
    transactions with a foreign entity to deduct, withhold, and
    pay a prescribed amount to the Internal Revenue Service, to
    ensure that funds to pay the required taxes are collected up
    front. The Declaratory Judgment Act allows a federal court
    with jurisdiction to issue a declaration resolving the parties’
    competing legal rights, except with respect to federal taxes.
    Appellants sought a declaratory judgment that withholding
    money, to pay federal taxes, from their agreed purchase price
    of real property from a foreign entity is not a breach of the
    real estate contract. The panel affirmed the district court’s
    determination that the Declaratory Judgment Act prohibits
    courts from entering declaratory judgments related to federal
    taxation obligations.
    The panel addressed appellants’ remaining claims in a
    contemporaneously filed memorandum disposition.
    *
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It
    has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    GILBERT V. UNITED STATES                         3
    COUNSEL
    Lauren Elliott Stine (argued) and Julia Wittman, Quarles &
    Brady LLP, Phoenix, Arizona, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
    Sherra Wong (argued) and Michael J. Haungs, Attorneys,
    Tax Division; Richard E. Zuckerman, Principal Deputy
    Assistant Attorney General; United States Department of
    Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Defendant-Appellee United
    States of America.
    Robert Andrew Rahtz (argued) and Peter Westby, Platt &
    Westby PC, Phoenix, Arizona, for Defendant-Appellee
    Philip K. Leopard.
    OPINION
    HUNSAKER, Circuit Judge
    Eric and Audra Gilbert contracted to buy real property
    from Namaca Management Limited (Namaca), a purported
    foreign entity. After a dispute arose concerning the
    withholdings required under the Foreign Investment in Real
    Property Tax Act (FIRPTA) and the Fixed, Determinable,
    Annual, or Periodical income (FDAP) rules, the Gilberts
    brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment that,
    among other things, withholding money from their agreed
    purchase price to pay the federal taxes required under
    FIRPTA and the FDAP rules is not a breach of their real
    estate contract with Namaca. 1 The district court dismissed
    this claim for lack of jurisdiction because the Declaratory
    1
    The Gilberts’ remaining claims are         resolved   in   a
    contemporaneously filed memorandum disposition.
    4                GILBERT V. UNITED STATES
    Judgment Act prohibits courts from entering declaratory
    judgments related to federal taxation obligations. We affirm.
    I. BACKGROUND
    In July 2014, the Gilberts and Namaca, acting through its
    trustee Philip K. Leopard, entered a Contract for Deed
    (Contract) for the sale of a residential property in Peoria,
    Arizona (Property). The Gilberts agreed to pay $1,200,000
    for the Property under the following terms: an initial down
    payment of $60,000; a lump sum payment of $90,000 by
    March 2015; 24 monthly payments of $4,750; adjustable
    monthly payments after the first 24 months; and a final
    balloon payment in August 2019. Namaca guaranteed that
    the Property was not currently encumbered and agreed to not
    take any action that would encumber the Property. But the
    day after executing the Contract, the Gilberts discovered a
    federal tax lien had been recorded against the Property for
    $416,372.05 several months earlier. Thereafter, the parties
    amended their contract to require Namaca to resolve the title
    issues “as quickly as possible” and for all title defects to be
    resolved “prior to or at the time of final conveyance of the
    Property.” Nearly a year and a half later, in November 2015,
    the federal government recorded a second tax lien against the
    Property for $283,007.48.
    This brings us to the heart of this case. In August 2017,
    the Gilberts notified Leopard that because Namaca is a
    foreign entity they were required to withhold a portion of
    their agreed purchase price under FIRPTA and a portion of
    their interest payments under the FDAP rules. Leopard
    disputed that the withholdings were required, claiming
    “Leopard and Namaca are ‘non-resident non-persons’
    exempt from withholding.” But the Gilberts insisted that
    Namaca was not exempt from the withholdings and advised
    Leopard that they would “withhold . . . all additional sums
    GILBERT V. UNITED STATES                    5
    payable under the [Contract] until their withholding
    obligation under the FDAP rules have been fulfilled.”
    Leopard continued to dispute the withholdings, arguing the
    Property is not a “US real Property interest” subject to
    statutory withholding, and that the Gilberts’ failure to pay
    their full payment amount would be a breach of contract.
    Ultimately, the Gilberts filed this lawsuit seeking a
    declaratory judgment that “the withholding of payments to
    Namaca pursuant to FIRPTA and FDAP did not breach the
    terms of the [Contract].” Shortly thereafter, Leopard
    recorded a Notice of Election to Forfeit, accelerating the full
    unpaid balance on the Contract and giving notice that the
    Gilberts would forfeit their interest in the Property if they
    failed to pay by the required deadline. Leopard also moved
    to dismiss the Gilberts’ lawsuit. The district court granted
    the motion, concluding that it lacked subject matter
    jurisdiction over the Gilberts’ declaratory judgment claim
    under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2201
     because their requested relief
    concerned federal taxes. The Gilberts timely appealed, and
    we have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    .
    II. DISCUSSION
    We review a dismissal for lack of subject matter
    jurisdiction de novo, and we accept the district court’s
    jurisdictional factual findings unless they are clearly
    erroneous. Hughes v. United States, 
    953 F.2d 531
    , 535 (9th
    Cir. 1992).
    As relevant here, FIRPTA and the FDAP rules require
    the transferee—or buyer—in taxable transactions with a
    foreign entity to deduct, withhold, and pay a prescribed
    amount to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 
    26 U.S.C. § 1472
    ; 
    26 U.S.C. § 1445
    (a). Congress specifically enacted
    FIRPTA to prevent foreign investors engaging in real
    6                GILBERT V. UNITED STATES
    property transactions in the United States from avoiding
    United States taxes. Brian S. Masterson, 2 Tucker on Tax
    Planning Real Estate Trans. § 22:3 (updated 2021). The pre-
    tax withholding requirement ensures that funds to pay the
    required taxes are collected up front. And the requirement
    obligates the buyer to facilitate enforcement and collection.
    26 C.F.R. 1.1445-1(b); see also John R. Wilson,
    2 Transnational Business Transactions § 10:31 (updated
    2020) (“The key to enforcing FDAP taxes is to make one or
    more U.S. persons (or at least foreign persons over whom
    the U.S. has effective jurisdiction) responsible and liable for
    the collection and payment of the taxes.”); id. § 10:64
    (updated 2020) (“FIRPTA contains an elaborate withholding
    regime to enforce its provisions.”). Indeed, the party
    required to make the withholding is liable for any
    miscalculation. 
    26 U.S.C. § 1461
    ; Del Com. Properties, Inc.
    v. Comm'r, 
    251 F.3d 210
    , 213 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
    Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, a federal court
    may issue a declaration resolving the parties’ competing
    legal rights “[i]n a case of actual controversy within its
    jurisdiction, except with respect to Federal taxes.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 2201
    (a) (emphasis added). This exception stems from the
    “congressional antipathy for premature interference with the
    assessment or collection of any federal tax.” Bob Jones Univ.
    v. Simon, 
    416 U.S. 725
    , 732 n.7 (1974). Accordingly, “[i]t is
    fundamental to tax jurisprudence that declaratory judgments
    and injunctions are rarely, if ever, granted.” MCA, Inc. v.
    Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 
    715 F.2d 475
    , 476 (9th Cir. 1983) (per
    curiam).
    The Gilberts argue that because the FIRPTA and FDAP
    withholdings are made before the IRS assesses tax liability,
    see 
    26 U.S.C. § 1445
    (c)(1)(A); 
    26 C.F.R. § 1.1445-1
    (b), the
    taxation exception does not apply because a declaration
    GILBERT V. UNITED STATES                    7
    concerning their withholding obligations will not restrain the
    ultimate assessment of taxes. We disagree.
    The Declaratory Judgment Act’s bar against resolving
    matters “with respect to Federal taxes” is not conditioned on
    a determination of ultimate tax liability. 
    28 U.S.C. § 2201
    (a).
    Moreover, the Declaratory Judgment Act “is coextensive
    with the Anti-Injunction Act despite the broader language of
    the former.” Perlowin v. Sassi, 
    711 F.2d 910
    , 911 (9th Cir.
    1983) (per curiam); Bob Jones Univ., 
    416 U.S. at
    732 n.7
    (“There is no dispute, however, that the federal tax exception
    to the Declaratory Judgment Act is at least as broad as the
    Anti-Injunction Act.”). The Anti-Injunction Act bars
    jurisdiction over any claim seeking to “restrain[] the
    assessment or collection of any tax.” 
    26 U.S.C. § 7421
    (a).
    This bar applies even where the IRS has yet to make a final
    determination of the plaintiff’s tax liability. See Bob Jones
    Univ., 
    416 U.S. at
    738–39 (applying the Anti-Injunction Act
    to taxpayer’s claim that its § 501(c)(3) status was improperly
    revoked); Int’l Lotto Fund v. Va. State Lottery Dep’t, 
    20 F.3d 589
    , 592 (4th Cir. 1994) (“Courts have found the Anti-
    Injunction Act to apply in numerous cases where the IRS had
    yet to make a final determination of the plaintiff’s tax
    liability.”). There is no basis to reach a different conclusion
    under the Declaratory Judgment Act.
    Courts clearly lack jurisdiction over claims seeking an
    injunction or declaration “against the collection of the tax by
    withholding.” United States v. Am. Friends Serv. Comm.,
    
    419 U.S. 7
    , 10 (1974) (per curiam) (emphasis added); see
    Fredrickson v. Starbucks Corp., 
    840 F.3d 1119
    , 1122 (9th
    Cir. 2016) (refusing to issue declaratory and injunctive relief
    under the Tax Injunction Act because the “withholding of
    tax payments from wages constitutes a method of tax
    ‘collection’”) (citation omitted). As the Fourth Circuit noted,
    8                GILBERT V. UNITED STATES
    there is no “justification for treating withholding from a
    foreign corporation as anything other than the collection of
    a tax.” Int’l Lotto Fund, 
    20 F.3d at 592
    . But the Gilberts’
    requested declaration—that withholding funds as required
    by FIRPTA and the FDAP rules from the Contract price is
    not a breach of the Contract—is different. They are not
    seeking to stop the government from collecting taxes related
    to the parties’ real estate transaction. Quite the opposite.
    They seek to comply with their asserted FIRPTA and FDAP
    obligations but in a way that avoids any adverse contractual
    consequences with Namaca.
    Nonetheless, by filing this action and asking the court to
    declare their tax withholding obligation rather than
    withholding the required funds and paying them to the IRS
    and then, if necessary, filing suit against Namaca, the
    Gilberts are interfering with or restraining the collection of
    taxes. That they sought to interplead the funds they contend
    must be withheld pending a declaratory judgment
    determining whether the IRS or Namaca is entitled to such
    funds further supports this conclusion. The IRS does not
    need to await court authorization before it can collect taxes
    it asserts are owed. Cf. 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(1). Indeed, judicial
    review of tax-collection disputes is limited to post-payment
    refund proceedings. See Flora v. United States, 
    362 U.S. 145
    , 162–63 (1960); Kent v. N. California Reg’l Office of
    Am. Friends Serv. Comm., 
    497 F.2d 1325
    , 1328 (9th Cir.
    1974). A pre-payment judicial ruling concerning the parties’
    FIRPTA and FDAP rights and obligations would be binding
    on the parties involved in the litigation, thereby undermining
    standard tax procedures. See Flora, 
    362 U.S. at
    164–65;
    Kent, 497 F.3d at 1328 (noting that “allowing interpleader
    could disrupt the orderly procedures created by Congress for
    handling tax litigation”). The Supreme Court has recognized
    that the government’s vital interest in securing tax revenues
    GILBERT V. UNITED STATES                       9
    justifies a “pay-first, litigate-later” system of judicial review.
    See Flora, 
    362 U.S. at
    164 & n.29. The Gilberts’ attempt to
    litigate the existence, or extent, of their withholding
    obligation before paying withheld funds to the government
    departs from this longstanding principle. There can be no
    dispute that the ultimate issue in this case is the parties’ tax
    obligations flowing from their real estate transaction. And
    even though the Gilberts are not seeking to avoid tax
    liability, Congress has made clear that the court lacks
    jurisdiction over their request for declaratory relief.
    
    28 U.S.C. § 2201
    (a).
    III. CONCLUSION
    It is understandable why the Gilberts are seeking
    clarification of their withholding obligations vis-à-vis their
    contractual obligations owed to Namaca. As has been
    observed, the FIRPTA and FDAP withholding requirements
    can create tension between a foreign entity that wants full
    payment under the contract, and the transferee, “who does
    not want to be left ‘holding the bag.’” John R. Wilson,
    2 Transnational Business Transactions § 10:31 (updated
    2020). But this tension is not resolved by filing litigation that
    interferes with the tax-collection process. It is resolved by
    parties addressing this issue when they negotiate the terms
    of their transaction. Unfortunately, the Gilberts failed to do
    this, and they are suffering the consequences of the
    uncertainty that comes from such failure.
    The district court’s dismissal of the Gilbert’s request for
    a declaratory judgment that withholding money from their
    agreed purchase price to pay the taxes allegedly owed under
    FIRPTA and the FDAP rules is not a breach of their real
    estate contract is
    AFFIRMED.