Sukhpreet Singh v. Merrick Garland ( 2021 )


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  •                                                                                FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    JUN 23 2021
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    SUKHPREET SINGH, AKA Sukh Thapa,                 No. 20-72158
    Petitioner,                        Agency No. A209-937-641
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    MERRICK B. GARLAND,
    Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted June 9, 2021**
    Seattle, Washington
    Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.
    Petitioner Sukhpreet Singh, a native of India, petitions for review
    of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision affirming the Immigration
    Judge’s denial of his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Singh’s application is
    based on the fear that he will be persecuted or tortured at the hands of opposition
    party members because of his membership in the Shiromani Akali Dal Mann Party
    (“Mann Party”) and his support for the separatist movement for Khalistan, an
    independent Sikh state.
    We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    . We review legal questions
    de novo and the agency’s factual findings for substantial evidence. Aden v.
    Wilkinson, 
    989 F.3d 1073
    , 1079 (9th Cir. 2021). We deny the petition.
    1. Substantial evidence supported the BIA’s holding that Singh failed to
    show past persecution because the beatings Singh suffered, though regrettable, did
    not rise to the level of mistreatment characterized as “persecution.” Singh’s claims
    were based primarily on two beatings he received at the hands of opposition party
    members, each lasting only a few minutes. The cumulative harm that Singh
    experienced was not so severe as to compel a conclusion that a constituted
    persecution. See, e.g., Hoxha v. Aschroft, 
    319 F.3d 1179
    , 1181–82 (9th Cir. 2003)
    (holding that the harm suffered, two broken ribs and repeated death threats, did not
    compel a finding of past persecution); Gu v. Gonzalez, 
    454 F.3d 1014
    , 1020–21,
    1029 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that the harm suffered, three days of detention and a
    two-hour interrogation, did not compel a finding of past persecution).
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    2. Substantial evidence supported the BIA’s holding that Singh did not carry
    his burden of establishing an objective risk of future harm, whether by
    demonstrating an individualized risk or a pattern-or-practice of persecution.
    Although the country conditions reports Singh submitted contained references to
    “isolated, but recurring” incidents of political violence, the IJ found the reports less
    persuasive than the more recent State Department Report that did not mention any
    systematic violence against Mann Party supporters, in part because there had been
    a fundamental change in circumstances in India since 2015, as a new party had
    taken control of the Punjab government. The IJ was entitled to weigh the evidence
    as it did. See, e.g., Sowe v. Mukasey, 
    538 F.3d 1281
    , 1286 (9th Cir. 2008);
    Gonzalez-Hernandez v. Aschroft, 
    336 F.3d 995
    , 1000 (9th. Cir 2003). Further, the
    record evidence did not compel a different result because there was little evidence
    that Singh’s assailants remain interested in him, and Singh’s family members have
    been able to remain in India without interrupting their political activities for the
    Mann Party.
    3. Having failed to show past persecution or an objective risk of future harm,
    Singh’s asylum, withholding, and CAT claims fail. See Sanjaa v. Sessions, 
    863 F.3d 1161
    , 1164 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining that the standard of proof for
    withholding of removal is higher than that for asylum, requiring petitioner show
    3
    that “it is more likely than not that he would be subject to persecution”) (quoting
    Robleto-Pastora v. Holder, 
    591 F.3d 1051
    , 1057 (9th Cir. 2010); Guo v. Sessions,
    
    897 F.3d 1208
    , 1217 (9th Cir. 2018) (explaining that the concept of torture is more
    severe than persecution).
    PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
    4