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 2015-02

Jose Camino v. L.S. McEwen ( 2015 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                              FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT                                FEB 18 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
JOSE J. CAMINO,                                  No. 13-56319
Petitioner - Appellant,            D.C. No. 8:12-cv-00057-GW-E
v.
MEMORANDUM*
L. S. MCEWEN, Warden,
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
George H. Wu, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted January 8, 2015
Pasadena, California
Before: KOZINSKI, WARDLAW, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
Jose Camino appeals the district court’s denial of his
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    petition. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and we affirm. The
California Court of Appeal’s determination that Camino was not subjected to an
unlawful, deliberate two-step interrogation is neither contrary to, nor an
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent.
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (d)(1); Harrington v. Richter,
    131 S. Ct. 770
    , 785-86 (2011).
The California Court of Appeal correctly identified and applied Supreme
Court precedent governing midstream Miranda warnings. The California Court of
Appeal considered whether substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding
that the officers did not deliberately employ a two-step interrogation strategy.
Missouri v. Seibert,
    542 U.S. 600
     (2004). Focusing on Officer Rondou’s testimony
and the murky circumstances of Camino’s involvement in the crime at the
beginning of the interview, the California Court of Appeal reasonably applied
Seibert’s law on deliberateness.
In the context of two-step interrogations, we have held that “a deliberateness
finding is appropriately reviewed as a factual finding.” United States v.
Narvaez-Gomez,
    489 F.3d 970
    , 974 (9th Cir. 2007). We must defer to a state
court’s factual finding unless it “was based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (d)(2); see Taylor v. Maddox,
    366 F.3d 992
    , 999-1000 (9th Cir.
2004). Here, in light of Officer Rondou’s testimony and the circumstances of
Camino’s arrest, the state trial court reasonably concluded that “there [was] no
deliberately employed two-step process.”
AFFIRMED.
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