Hardip Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr. , 585 F. App'x 942 ( 2014 )


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  •                                                                               FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                                NOV 24 2014
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    HARDIP SINGH,                                    No. 10-70920
    Petitioner,                        Agency No. A097-268-648
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Argued and Submitted April 11, 2014
    Submission Vacated April 11, 2014
    Resubmitted November 20, 2014
    San Francisco, California
    Before: SILVERMAN, W. FLETCHER, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
    Hardip Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of an order
    by the Board of Immigration Appeals, which affirmed an Immigration Judge’s
    denial of Singh’s application for withholding of removal and relief under the
    Convention Against Torture. Singh challenges the BIA’s and the IJ’s conclusion
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    -2-
    that changed country conditions in India rendered him ineligible for relief. We
    have jurisdiction under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a)(1) and review for substantial evidence.
    See Gonzalez–Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 
    336 F.3d 995
    , 998 (9th Cir. 2003). As the
    BIA’s holding here regarding country conditions is essentially identical to the IJ’s,
    “‘we treat the IJ’s statement of reasons as the BIA’s and review the IJ’s decision.’”
    Sowe v. Mukasey, 
    538 F.3d 1281
    , 1285 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gonzalez v. INS,
    
    82 F.3d 903
    , 907 (9th Cir. 1996)). We deny the petition for review.
    The IJ concluded that, assuming Singh’s testimony was credible, he had
    suffered past persecution in India on account of his political and religious beliefs,
    entitling him to a rebuttable presumption that he had reason to fear future
    persecution. 
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.16
    (b)(1). The IJ then determined, however, that the
    government provided sufficient evidence of changed country conditions in India to
    rebut that presumption. 
    Id.
     § 1208.16(b)(1)(i)(A). Substantial evidence supports
    this determination. Contrary to Singh’s contention, the IJ’s changed-conditions
    analysis was sufficiently “individualized.” See Chand v. INS, 
    222 F.3d 1066
    , 1079
    (9th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he determination of whether or not a particular applicant’s fear
    is rebutted by general country conditions information requires an individualized
    analysis that focuses on the specific harm suffered and the relationship to it of the
    particular information contained in the relevant country reports.”). The IJ provided
    -3-
    an individualized assessment of Singh’s situation and rationally construed the
    country reports in the record, which indicated that persecution of Sikhs by the
    government has greatly diminished, if not disappeared. See Singh v. Holder, 
    753 F.3d 826
    , 830-35 (9th Cir. 2014). Although the country reports contain some
    ambiguous and inconsistent language, “it is well established that a decision is
    supported by substantial evidence despite the presence of conflicting or ambiguous
    information in the country reports.” 
    Id. at 833
    . “The scope and precision of the
    country report evidence in the record distinguishes this case from the cases where
    we have deemed such evidence insufficient to support a determination that there
    has been a fundamental change in circumstances.” 
    Id.
     Therefore, substantial
    evidence supports the IJ’s changed-conditions conclusion. See Lolong v. Gonzales,
    
    484 F.3d 1173
    , 1178 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (“We must uphold the BIA’s
    determination unless ‘the evidence not only supports, but compels the conclusion
    that the . . . decision was incorrect.’”).
    Because the IJ’s changed country conditions determination is supported by
    substantial evidence, Singh’s claims for both withholding of removal and CAT
    protection fail. See Sowe, 
    538 F.3d at 1288
     (“When the government rebuts an
    applicant’s well-founded fear of future persecution, it defeats the applicant’s . . .
    claim for withholding of removal.”); El Himri v. Ashcroft, 
    378 F.3d 932
    , 938 (9th
    -4-
    Cir. 2004) (finding no CAT eligibility where most of the government violence
    against stateless Palestinians had ended).
    PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.