United States v. Derek Bellamy , 586 F. App'x 306 ( 2014 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                            FILED
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT                             DEC 02 2014
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No. 13-30296
    Plaintiff - Appellee,              D.C. No. 1:13-cr-00031-SEH-1
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    DEREK TYSON BELLAMY,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Montana
    Sam E. Haddon, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted November 19, 2014
    Portland, Oregon
    Before: CLIFTON, M. SMITH, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
    Derek Tyson Bellamy was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm,
    18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and sentenced to 63 months imprisonment. Bellamy appeals
    the conviction, claiming insufficient evidence, and the sentence, claiming it is
    substantively unreasonable. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    1. To obtain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the government must
    prove “(1) that the defendant was a convicted felon; (2) that the defendant was in
    knowing possession of a firearm . . .; and (3) that the firearm . . . was in or affecting
    interstate commerce.” United States v. Nevils, 
    598 F.3d 1158
    , 1163 (9th Cir. 2010)
    (en banc) (quoting United States v. Beasley, 
    346 F.3d 930
    , 933-34 (9th Cir. 2003)).
    Possession is established when the defendant has “knowledge of the firearms and the
    power and intent to exercise control over them.” United States v. Nungaray, 
    697 F.3d 1114
    , 1117 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    2. Bellamy stipulated that he was a convicted felon and that the firearm at issue
    traveled in interstate commerce; only possession is at issue. Bellamy’s admissions
    that he “saw the firearm when he [got] into the vehicle,” and “pushed the gun back
    when he was exiting the vehicle,” are sufficient to establish that Bellamy had
    knowledge of the firearm and the power and intent to control it. See United States v.
    Gutierrez, 
    995 F.2d 169
    , 171-72 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding a passenger’s attempt to
    conceal a weapon from police established possession).
    3. Bellamy’s within-Guidelines sentence, which took account of a base offense
    level of 22 under United States Sentencing Guidelines § 2K2.1(a)(3), and five
    criminal history points under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(a), (d), was not unreasonable. See
    2
    Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 41 (2007) (“[C]ourts of appeals must review all
    sentences . . . under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.”).
    AFFIRMED.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-30296

Citation Numbers: 586 F. App'x 306

Judges: Clifton, Smith, Hurwitz

Filed Date: 12/2/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024