Navjot Singh v. Merrick Garland ( 2022 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 10 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
NAVJOT SINGH, No. 16-73511
Petitioner, Agency No. A205-937-207
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted February 8, 2022**
San Francisco, California
Before: HURWITZ and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges, and ERICKSEN,*** District
Judge.
Navjot Singh petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
decision denying his claims for asylum and withholding of removal. We have
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as
provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Joan N. Ericksen, United States District Judge for the District of
Minnesota, sitting by designation.
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition for review.1
“Where, as here, the BIA agrees with the IJ’s reasoning, we review both
decisions.” Garcia-Martinez v. Sessions, 886 F.3d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir. 2018); Lai
v. Holder, 773 F.3d 966, 970 (9th Cir. 2014) (“In so doing, we review … the reasons
explicitly identified by the BIA, and then examine the reasoning articulated in the
IJ’s oral decision in support of those reasons.”) (citation omitted). “Thus, we refer
to the Board and IJ collectively as ‘the agency.’” Medina-Lara v. Holder, 771 F.3d
1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2014). Under substantial evidence review, we treat the agency’s
factual findings as “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Rayamajhi v.
Whitaker, 912 F.3d 1241, 1243 (9th Cir. 2019). Accordingly, in order to reverse the
agency’s finding, “we must find that the evidence not only supports that conclusion,
but compels it.” INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992).
Here, the agency reasonably determined that the government sufficiently
rebutted any presumption of future persecution with evidence that Singh could safely
and reasonably relocate within India. The evidence, including a 2012 report from
the Library of Congress, supported the conclusion that relocation is feasible given
Singh’s own testimony that he is not a high-profile member of the Mann Party.
1
Because Singh did not raise any argument with respect to the denial of his
CAT claim, it is waived. See Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259–60 (9th
Cir. 1996).
2
Although Singh testified that he continues to support the Mann party and believes
that he will be “traceable” as a Sikh if he relocates, the record does not compel a
conclusion different than the agency’s because substantial evidence—including
reports in the administrative record that refute Singh’s concern—supports the
finding that Singh could safely and reasonably relocate within India. See INS v.
Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 18 (2002) (noting that asylum is ordinarily unavailable if an
applicant can safely relocate to another part of his home country) (citing 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.13(b)(1)(i)).
Because substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that
internal relocation is possible and reasonable, the BIA likewise did not err in
affirming the Immigration Judge’s dismissal of Singh’s application for withholding
of removal on that basis. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2) (relocation is relevant to
assessing eligibility for withholding of removal and the likelihood of future
persecution); Sowe v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 1281, 1288 (9th Cir. 2008) (“When the
government rebuts an applicant’s well-founded fear of future persecution, it defeats
the applicant’s asylum claim, and his or her claim for withholding of removal.”)
(citing Gonzalez-Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 995, 999, 1001 n.5 (9th Cir.
2003)). Accordingly, we deny Singh’s petition.
PETITION DENIED.
3