Gabriel Saldana-Salgado v. Merrick Garland ( 2022 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 14 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GABRIEL SALDANA-SALGADO, No. 19-70486
Petitioner, Agency No. A201-022-059
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted February 10, 2022**
Phoenix, Arizona
Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and O’SCANNLAIN and GRABER, Circuit
Judges.
Gabriel Saldana-Salgado asks this Court to grant his petition for review and
to reverse the denial of his second motion to reopen proceedings. As the facts are
known to the parties, we repeat them only as necessary to explain our decision. We
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
deny the petition.
Petitioners “may file only one motion to reopen . . . and that motion must be
filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision
was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).
This is Salgado’s second motion to reopen and it was filed more than 90 days after
the final decision.
Petitioner, however, argues that his motion is exempt from the limitations of
§ 1003.2(c)(2) because it falls under the exception carved out in § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).
To prevail on this claim, Salgado “must ‘clear four hurdles: (1) he [must] produce
evidence that [country] conditions [have] changed . . . (2) the evidence [must] be
“material;” (3) the evidence must not have been available . . . previous[ly] . . . and
(4) . . . the new evidence . . . would establish prima facie eligibility for the relief
sought.’” Rodriguez v. Garland, 990 F.3d 1205, 1209 (9th Cir. 2021) (alterations in
original) (quoting Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008)); see also
Go v. Holder, 744 F.3d 604, 607 (9th Cir. 2014). The BIA denied the motion because
it found that Salgado failed to demonstrate a material change in country conditions
and failed to show prima facie eligibility for relief.
Contrary to Petitioner’s assertions, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in
reviewing his motion. “[T]he [BIA] does not have to write an exegesis on every
contention.” Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (second
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alteration in original) (quoting Lopez v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 799, 807 n.6 (9th Cir.
2004)). Instead, it merely must “consider the issues raised, and announce its decision
in terms sufficient to enable a reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and
thought and not merely reacted.” Id. It did so here when it acknowledged the
evidence Petitioner presented and articulated specific grounds for the denial of his
motion.
In any event, the BIA did not abuse its discretion because Salgado failed to
show that “the circumstances of the country at the time of the petitioner’s previous
hearing, and those at the time of the motion to reopen” are materially different. Salim
v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2016). The travel advisories issued by the
United States Department of State fail to show a change in country conditions
material to Petitioner’s fear of persecution by a single member of the cartel in his
native town. Further, Salgado’s evidence regarding his son’s withholding of removal
case does not contribute toward a finding of changed conditions, because his son
experienced threats and violence in 2011, prior to Petitioner’s “previous hearing” in
2014. Id.PETITION DENIED.
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